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 1 
Introduction 
The Return of the Religious and the Postmodern Sacred 
 
God is no longer dead.  When Nietzsche famously declared his death toward 
the end of the 19
th century, it seemed possible, even inevitable, that God and religion 
would die under the rationalist atheist onslaught.  That, however, was not to be the 
case.  Religion and “spirituality” have survived the atheist challenge, albeit 
profoundly changed.  Although there are a number of contributing factors, the revival 
of the religious in the West has occurred partly as a result of the postmodernist 
collapse of the scientific meta-narratives that made atheism so powerful.  The 
postmodern critique of Enlightenment universalism (of which, more in the first 
chapter) has had the unexpected result of fuelling the resurgence of some forms of 
religion.  The critiques of religion made by such modern luminaries as Nietzsche, 
Marx and Freud have been found to be “also perspectives, also constructions or 
fictions of grammar” (Caputo, 2001: 59).  Postmodern writers have critiqued modern 
universalisms as contingent, historically produced and arbitrary, but they are 
unsurprisingly also often aware of the contingency of their own positions.  Significant 
too, the postmodern respect for tolerance and diversity (however limited or facile this 
may be in practice) has meant that atheist dismissals of religion as “superstition” have 
become problematic to make, considering that postmodern subjects are unable to 
make recourse to some universal truth claim.  Definitive statements like “there is no 
God” come off suspiciously like the dogmatic statements of the Christianity of old.  
Concurrently, the postmodern skepticism towards scientific meta-narratives has meant 
the growth of all sorts of pseudo-science and New Age medical and psychological 2 
practices.  The apparent return of religion and/or pseudo-science are both unexpected 
considering the antipathy towards traditional religion by feminism and gay liberation, 
as well as the Marxist roots of the liberal Left, yet it emerges in part as a way of 
finding more female and queer friendly forms of spiritual practice.   In practice, this 
respect for diversity is arguably oriented more towards the individualised practices of 
New Age “spirituality” than towards Christianity or Judaism (Islam arguably 
represents a rather different case post September 11), however God figures and 
Christian symbols are nevertheless pervasive through-out popular culture.  The return 
of the religious has been in two forms therefore, the rise of so-called fundamentalisms 
in the established faiths—Christian, Jewish, Muslim—and the rise of New Age style 
spirituality.
i  It is in the interplay between traditional religions and New Age-ised 
spirituality that the stream of spiritual popular culture that I call the postmodern 
sacred finds itself.  The question I ask, therefore, is how does the sacred appear in the 
postmodern media? 
Clearly after September 11, religion has become an ever-more vital, and 
contested, part of culture here in Australia, and indeed across the world.  The 
aftermath of September 11, however, has not been a re-assessment of what 
legitimately constitutes the domain of the religious or the spiritual (and these two are 
not necessarily one and the same), but rather, the political implications that stem from 
religious belief.  Debates over abortion, gay marriage, terror legislation, Israeli 
settlements, Middle East policy and so on are inflected with religious beliefs and 
practices, yet these debates all take religious positions as given.  The terms shift 
depending on context, but all have a marked tendency to take religious beliefs as 
unified positions, static and fixed traditions—becoming, variously, religious/secular, 
Christianity/Islam, Judaism/Islam, East/West, and so on.  This is, I should add, a 3 
presumption not only of atheistic disdain towards religion (as outmoded for example), 
but one also made by religious adherents themselves, advocating their eternal, fixed 
truths.  What I would like to do here is complicate the matter substantially, by 
pointing out how secular and profane are always-already entangled within one 
another.  I use popular culture as an entry point, an entry point that can presume 
neither belief nor unbelief in its audiences.  In particular, I shall chiefly use explicitly 
unreal texts, texts in the science fiction, fantasy and fantastic horror genres.  All of 
these, I argue refract religious symbols and ideas through a postmodernist sensibility, 
with little regard for the demands of “real world” epistemology.   
 
The argument 
 
Chapter One traces the broad outlines of what I call the postmodern sacred, a 
strain of spiritually inflected unreal texts that have been remarkably central to the 
popular culture of the last decade or so.  I begin by discussing the traditional sacred as 
analysed by such scholars of religion as Mircea Eliade and Rudolph Otto.  This 
establishes the continuities and discontinuities the postmodern sacred has with the 
traditions it draws on. I analyse the postmodern turn by engaging with three of the 
most influential theories of postmodernity—Jean-Francois Lyotard’s idea of the 
collapse of the meta-narrative, Jean Baudrillard’s ideas about hyper-reality and 
simulation, and Fredric Jameson’s theory that postmodern art is a theory of pastiche.  
I argue that the postmodern sacred exemplify those three theorists’ work in different 
ways.  As a consequence of the postmodern turn, it is an individualised, consumerist 
approach to spirituality, pastiching together religious symbols into unreal texts.  
Given that texts like Lord of the Rings and The Matrix have been some of the most 4 
successful of the last decade, this appearance of spirituality in the midst of popular 
culture is an important cultural development.   
Chapter Two analyses the New Age usage of what I call transcendental 
signifier.  Modifying Jacques Derrida’s notion of the transcendental signified, I argue 
that New Age influenced popular culture gestures to the transcendental as a way of 
signifying a spirituality distinguished from the monotheistic Jewish and Christian 
traditions.  I argue that the transcendental signifier is reliant on a New Age approach 
to subjectivity—one that individualises and detraditionalises spiritual experience.  I 
analyse the use of the transcendental signifier in such texts as Dead Like Me and The 
X-Files.   
In Chapter Three I discuss the literalisation of metaphor in the postmodern 
sacred—the appearance of gods, monsters, heavens and hells.  I argue that the special 
effects of contemporary visual culture makes the supernatural a visceral experience, a 
process that makes the sign appear almost corporeal.  Paradoxically however, that 
process produces a hyper-reality that makes the postmodern world highly unreal.  I 
analyse corporeal gods and monsters in such texts as Stargate SG:1, Futurama, and 
Constantine.  I suggest that the corporeal gods may in fact be a way of staging belief 
safely in a secondary world, without entailing the need for real-world belief and 
practice.   
In Chapter Four I analyse the key text of Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings.  I 
discuss the relationship between Tolkien’s text and Biblical motifs such as 
apocalypse, sacramentality and Christ figures.  I argue however, that the postmodern 
reception of Peter Jackson’s recent film adaptations has re-written the Lord of the 
Rings as a New Age style text as much as a Christian.  I argue then that the 
postmodern sacred is marked by a supplementary relationship between Christianity 5 
and the New Age, that these two elements both add to and replace each other’s 
presence in texts. 
In Chapter Five I discuss the apparent return of the meta-narrative after 
September 11.  I argue that the “return of the real” discourse raised after September 
11 disguises its own hidden postmodern positions, that September 11 merely provides 
a convenient pre-text around which to hang an already existent conservative 
“backlash” to the postmodern identity politics of feminism, anti-racism and gay 
liberation movements.  I argue that whilst the postmodern sacred appears to present 
heroic narratives that would confirm the “return of the real” argument these are often 
diffused into the pleasures of postmodern textuality.  I discuss a number of texts in 
this chapter—the anti-postmodern heroes of The Matrix and Harry Potter, and the 
direct responses to September 11 presented by Stargate SG:1 and Battlestar Galactica.   
In Chapter Six I discuss postmodern nostalgia.  I argue that, rather than a 
refusal of postmodernity, the search for a lost authentic real life experience “outside” 
of the postmodern symbolic exchange is in fact a key part of the capitalistic system.  I 
analyse the varying uses of nostalgia in Harry Potter, Xena: Warrior Princess and 
Buffy the Vampire Slayer.  I argue that Buffy in particular shows the dueling 
nostalgic principles at the heart of the postmodern condition most starkly—the ironic 
postmodern referentiality that renders the world into a series of signs, and the search 
for a world outside the sign through intense, even violent, bodily experience.  I argue 
that these two principles in fact tacitly support each other, that nostalgic postmodern 
consumption relies on a swing between one and the other.   
Thus, I argue that the postmodern sacred is a paradoxical attempt at accessing 
spirituality, using the symbols contained in explicitly unreal texts to gain a second-
hand experience of transcendence and belief.  This second-hand experience displaces 6 
the need for belief or real-world practice into a textual world, requiring little of its 
consumers.  While they seem to suggest a desire for a magical world outside of 
capitalism, the wonder produced by these texts however is only temporary, eventually 
the consumer must return again to purchase another text.   
 
Methodology—Selections, Omissions, Erasures 
 
Film theorist Melanie J Wright points out that, “for the most part, existing 
literature on religion-film relationships show little or no awareness of critical 
approaches in film and cinema studies, although it routinely expresses interest in 
those fields” (8).  Wright rightly outs that new work in religion and film is regularly 
hailed as pioneering, precisely because of a lack of on-going dialogue between the 
two fields (and, despite the fact that she points out research has been undergone since 
the 1920s, it is clearly too early to speak of an intersecting field possessing any degree 
of scholastic stability).  For religious studies, often the problem has been a set of 
presumptions about the text that are clearly un-workable in present day Cultural 
Studies practice—of auteurism (in particular, using the “real” world belief of writer or 
director to validate religious readings), of a static method of interpreting religious 
symbols, of suggesting that consumption of a religiously inflected text necessarily 
entails religious belief of itself.  These approaches suggest the kinds of passive 
audiences critiqued by such writers as Henry Jenkins.  Jenkins suggests that fans 
engage with texts in a far more sophisticated, participatory fashion, discarding 
unwanted textual elements, foregrounding others, and sometimes re-writing popular 
culture texts into substantially new texts.   7 
Wright suggests that “the territory of cultural studies, into which much film 
studies has been shifting, offers a discursive space in which the much-touted dialogue 
between religious (or theological) studies and film studies is perhaps newly possible” 
(27).  Yet, this thesis is not chiefly intended to be a dialogue between theology, 
religious studies and Cultural Studies, although there are of course references to 
theologians and sociological and other forms of religious study.  Dialogue implies, I 
think, a certain minimal kind of ethical responsibility, of “doing justice” to a person, 
or in this case, discipline.  I make no pretence as to being a theologian.  Instead, I 
situate it squarely with contemporary Cultural Studies practice, and more broadly, 
within that body of work that has come to be tagged “theory.”  As such, one thing you 
will find here is a spirited defence of the continued relevance, and indeed in my 
opinion the increased applicability, of theory for contemporary Cultural Studies 
scholarship.  So as the title suggests, this thesis draws heavily on postmodern theory, 
in particular that of Jean Baudrillard, Fredric Jameson and Jean-Francois Lyotard, as 
well as the deconstructionist theory of Jacques Derrida.  Influential, too, have been the 
theological probings of Mark C Taylor, whose own work creatively reads 
contemporary religious culture through the lens of postmodern and post-structuralist 
thought.   
One approach I have largely avoided is the Jungian derived mythological 
approach to films, exemplified by such writers as Mircea Eliade and Joseph 
Campbell.  Mythological criticism tends to posit a recurrence of archetypes and across 
cultures; the kind of universalising theory film and Cultural Studies have long since 
discarded.  Joel W Martin rightly points out that “myth critics tend to focus on our 
psychological quest for meaning but ignore the way meaning is always politicised and 
historicised” (10).  Mythological criticism has been clearly problematised by the 8 
insights of post-structuralism, from the Foucaultian focus on power (knowledge is 
never neutral, it works to privilege some positions and marginalise others) to the 
Derridean disruption of the text, and culture by extension, as a seamless whole.  
Mythological criticism is also problematic from a feminist perspective, since reading 
provisional historical constructs as universal and timeless seems to deny the capacity 
for change that underpins feminist thought and activism.  Where I have referred to the 
mythological approach, it is not as much as a theoretical framework as to trace the 
emergence of these ideas
ii into New Age spiritualities and popular culture—for 
example, Joseph Campbell’s work influencing George Lucas’s Star Wars.  
In keeping with current Cultural Studies practice, the ideological work that 
texts I have studied perform with regard with to race, class, gender and sexuality—
what are sometimes dismissed as “identity politics”—is never far from my mind.  It’s 
important to realise that while texts perform what Annette Kuhn terms “cultural 
instrumentalities,” (1990: 1) these are necessarily multiple given the impossibility of 
truly definitive readings.
iii  While for reasons of economy I have often tried to confine 
my theorising to the religious, it is nevertheless apparent that these texts may perform 
other, equally important, roles in the culture.  
Generically, the texts I have chosen fit largely into the genres of fantasy, 
science fiction and fantastic horror, what I loosely call the unreal.  I began writing this 
thesis as a study of the literary genre of fantasy.  What became increasingly apparent 
over the course of my studies, however, is how artificial the separations between 
fantasy, science fiction and horror are, and indeed how the different media of print, 
television and film are reliant upon one another when one is looking at these kinds of 
fandoms.  Whilst it is surely laziness that leads bookstores into lumping the three 
together, nevertheless there is a strong inter-relationship between the three—science 9 
fiction and fantasy inevitable incorporate some form of horror, whilst some forms of 
horror at least incorporate some aspects of the fantastic, say in the forms of 
supernatural elements or creatures like ghosts, vampires and so on.   It is this common 
supernatural element that generically marks off the texts of the postmodern sacred.   
Critical approaches to these genres have frequently followed Russian 
structuralist Tvetzan Todorov’s approach, which divides texts into uncanny, 
marvellous and fantastic.  Those texts that introduce a moment of epistemological 
uncertainty—is this real or not—are what Todorov calls “the fantastic.”  While this 
approach has been immensely influential, particularly in psychoanalytically 
influenced theories such as Rosemary Jackson’s, it is not particularly useful in 
understanding contemporary unreal genres, for these genres induce little of the 
hesitation that Todorov or Jackson describes.  The mostly-Tolkien derived fantasy 
genre sold in bookstores and the subversive literature Jackson affirms have little to do 
with another, the latter of which being more applicable to writers like Kafka.  Besides 
this, very few unreal texts, particularly visual film and TV texts, produce the kind of 
ontological hesitation described.  Thus Jackson and Todorov’s definitions are of little 
use to understanding the texts I have analysed.  Where I have used the term fantastic, 
it has generally been to mean, broadly, those texts with supernatural or otherwise 
unreal elements.   
More recently than Todorov and Jackson’s work, Alec Worley has suggested 
that fantasy might be defined by the presence of magic—“magic fuels fantasy, 
manifesting as miracles, mysterious forces or inexplicable events, none of which can 
be ascribed to the laws of rationality, nature or science” (10).  Any text that offers a 
scientific explanation, however, falls into science fiction (hereafter SF) for Worley.  
Whilst interesting, this approach proves problematic, given the rapid growth of 10 
pseudo-scientific explanations in fantasy texts (often in a genetic basis), and the 
miraculous events that periodically occur in otherwise scientific SF (say, for instance, 
the unexplainable revival of Neo in the first Matrix movie).  Worley uses the 
classification “science fantasy” for texts like Star Wars which have implausible 
“scientific” explanations for their events—which seems a contradiction in terms.  
These are unrealistic (implausible) realistic (scientific) unrealistic (not reflecting real 
life) texts?  At this point genre analysis begins to seem a little specialised, devising 
distinctions that have little to do with the way texts are consumed, let alone how they 
function culturally.   
Whilst I think a loose definition based upon a real/unreal binary is helpful in 
some sense—these texts are explicitly unreal—it is as useful to describe the genres by 
settings and tropes (medieval styled worlds, wizards and dragons for fantasy, space-
ships and aliens for SF; vampires, werewolves and so on for fantastic horror).  Whilst 
SF and fantasy seem relatively easy to recognise, if not always to define, fantastic 
horror is the least recognisable of these.  What I mean by fantastic horror is those 
texts with supernatural elements and creatures—vampires, werewolves, demons and 
so on.  Examples I have used include the postmodern Gothic series Buffy the Vampire 
Slayer and Angel, and the comic-book movie Constantine.  These texts use elements 
from classical Gothic texts, but tend to work as much as a synthesis of fantasy’s epic 
struggles and Gothic signifiers.  The X-Files, on the other hand, combines classic and 
contemporary horror tropes with conspiracy theory SF.  While these all show a 
remarkable generic fluidity, there are two elements that have remained constant—the 
presence of some fantastic or supernatural element in the text, and religious 
iconography and significance.  For this reason, I have excluded teen slasher movies 
and other forms of somewhat Realist horror texts from my texts.   11 
Classically, science fiction has tended to define itself against the real, or 
extrapolate from it.  Marxist literary critic Darko Suvin argues that SF produces what 
he calls “cognitive estrangement.”  Suvin argues that SF includes a novum, a “strange 
newness” (4) that allows its readers to see the world through different eyes.  SF, he 
says, “sees the norms of any age, including its own, as unique, changeable, and 
therefore subject to a cognitive view” (7, italics original).  It is this critical capacity 
that Suvin argues distinguishes SF from other unreal genres like fantasy and fairy 
tales.  But as Jean Baudrillard points out, the sense of real and unreal in the 
postmodern world becomes tenuous (1994: 124).  When reality collapses into hyper-
reality, it becomes too difficult to create the cognitive effects described by Suvin.  I 
shall argue in my final chapter then that postmodern nostalgia tends to downplay the 
critical tendency of SF, preferring instead to make the recycling of older texts in the 
genre as crucial a feature of the genre as any.  In a cultural climate of pervasive 
nostalgia, it becomes difficult to separate SF’s critical capacity from other similarly 
unreal genres—SF, particularly on television, becomes a set of familiar tropes rather 
than a practice of extrapolation and cognitive estrangement on the real world.  So 
rather than spend time in tedious genre nit-picking, I have preferred to take my texts 
on the same terms as their viewer-readers, which seem far more aligned towards a 
real/unreal distinction than between the three.  Genre in this sense, especially given 
the postmodern cross-breeding of texts, is marked as much by a history of readings 
and shared audiences than by any firm sense of textual contents.   
So why these genres, rather than those which explicitly depict “real-world” 
religion (say, The Passion of the Christ)?  Wright suggests that a “small number of 
critics have asked how film might move from trying to depict religion to ‘doing’ it” 
(4).  In my opinion, these genres provide the flexibility necessary to depart from a 12 
Realist epistemology of the “real,” and are thus best equipped to deal with many of 
the supernatural events we find in various religious traditions.  New uses of CGI 
(Computer Generated Imagery) in particular make unreal genres able to depict the 
supernatural in hyper-real detail.  Importantly, too, the departure from “real” history 
frees some texts to be able to construct alternative versions of spiritual experience, to 
make a disguised comment on current practices, and to combine various traditions 
together in interesting ways.  The recurrence of religious tropes in these texts is often 
over-looked in critical accounts of their success.  Instead, we see unreal texts 
dismissed as adolescent wish-fulfilment.  I shall argue instead, not for the high 
seriousness of these texts (many are indeed quite silly), but for the importance of the 
religious element to their cultural functioning.  I argue, against the backdrop of a 
postmodern world both estranged from reality and desperately seeking it, that 
consuming religiously-inflected texts is a way of accessing spiritual experience 
divorced from real-world practice or belief.   
When it comes to the criteria I have used in selecting my texts, contemporary 
impact and degree of visibility in the culture has usually been key.  I have chosen 
therefore contemporary texts, which have been consumed within the postmodern 
media culture.  Texts like Harry Potter, Lord of the Rings and The Matrix have 
grossed billions of dollars in box office, DVD purchases and spin-off material.  
Within those mass audiences, all also feature devoted fan bases that one could 
arguably call cultish.  I have also chosen TV series like The X Files, too, which have 
been wildly successful.  Other texts have been chosen for their cult status—Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer, for instance, has never been quite the massive hit it promised to be, 
yet it lasted seven seasons and spawned a spin-off called Angel.  But Buffy’s cultural 
impact, both in its immensely self-referential dialogue and butt-kicking post-feminist 13 
heroine, cannot be underestimated; as the series has been widely imitated (amongst 
others, for example in the latest incarnation of the British Dr Who series).  Some of 
the other selections have been perhaps more capricious on my part—for instance, the 
series Dead Like Me which I analyse in Chapter Two was cancelled after two seasons 
but gained a devoted following on cable re-runs.  In this it lacks both popularity and 
cultural impact; however, it nevertheless provides a generic context for the other more 
popular unreal texts.  The consumption of science fiction, fantasy and fantastic horror 
fans are, not surprisingly, often confined to those genres, however one often finds 
little discrimination between the three—the key determining factor being their 
recognisable unreality.  As to the production of the texts, although many of these texts 
feature multi-national casts, writers and production teams, they are nevertheless 
produced and distributed as global Americanised culture, and thus many national 
differences have been effaced.  It is arguable that both production and consumption of 
the postmodern sacred occur in a virtual, postmodern world which more often makes 
distinctions based upon genre, special effect budget (how it looks), and the 
recognisability of the stars, than with nationality of production.   
Because of my criteria in choosing texts because of their popularity and 
visibility within the culture, the majority of these have been films or TV series.  This 
illustrates, I think, a cultural shift towards a post-literate society.  Although texts like 
Harry Potter and Lord of the Rings begin on the page, their reception has arguably 
been largely mediated through their filmic adaptations.  Although I argue that 
postmodern reception of these texts is marked by a tendency to slide between 
mediums, I shall on occasion refer to the written texts in order to demonstrate the 
slippages elided by postmodern readings (but not, one hopes, by postmodern theory 
itself).   14 
 
 
Sister Rosette in the anime Chrno Crusade
 
As for the omissions in this thesis, well, sadly one cannot study all the texts 
one might wish to.  Japanese anime is one area I have neglected in particular, and has 
grown astronomically over the time I have been writing this PhD.  Many anime texts 
make creative use of Buddhist, Shinto, Christian and other religious symbols (see for 
instance, the above photo from anime Chrno Crusade, which features gun-toting nuns 
and an elaborate demon cosmology.  For a white Western scholar like myself, anime 
provides the challenge of wrestling with an immense output, not to mention the 
dangers of a critical Orientalism.  Although it contains many unreal texts—science 
fiction, cyberpunk, fantasy—the term anime merely denotes Japanese animation, and 
such anime also encompasses romance, martial arts comedies, and so on.  So 
obviously, anime is produced in a different cultural context to my other texts and 
tracing sensitively the differences in signification and generic expectation, as well as 
the cultural shifts that occur in its translation and consumption in the West, proved in 15 
the end too daunting a challenge, especially considering the already wide scope of the 
thesis.  While it is arguable that many of my conclusions have applicability to the 
Western consumption of anime—especially given the cross-over between 
fantasy/SF/horror fandoms and anime—studying the religious themes in anime in the 
depth required would make a thesis in itself.  For a basic English-language primer on 
anime, I recommend Susan Napier’s Anime: From Akira to Howl’s Moving Castle, 
which includes an interesting chapter on depictions of apocalypse and its relationship 
to both Japanese religious traditions and modern history (249-274).   
Despite the backdrop of September 11, the most significant absence from this 
study is Islam.  This is due to the fact that, despite the incredible growth of Islam in 
the West in countries like the UK and France, explicit references to Islam remain 
largely absent from unreal texts.  One suspects this is due to the fact that most writers 
and producers continue to be basically unaware of Islamic beliefs and practices, and 
thus unable to appropriate symbols or tropes for textual use.  Given the prohibitions 
on representing Muhammad, references to Islamic beliefs in such texts could be 
problematic due to the possibility of causing offence to Muslims (most famously, the 
Salman Rushdie affair, which continues to be controversial a good decade after the 
publication of The Satanic Verses).  Another practical consideration would be the 
ability of the largely post-Judeo-Christian audience to understand Islamic references.  
Of course, the repressed nevertheless returns, so we tend to see a refracted Islam 
appear in the familiar Orientalist guises of the “exotic” or the racialised, monstrous, 
often alien, Other.  I have, of course, noted this when it appears, most particularly in 
texts like Peter Jackson’s films of Lord of the Rings. 16 
Notes 
                                                 
i Hindu, Buddhism and Confucianism represent special cases given their relationship 
to the New Age in the West.  Although I argue that the New Age is particularly 
receptive to those traditions because of their perceived liberal approaches to gender 
and sexuality, as Karen Armstrong notes, “There are Buddhist, Hindu and even 
Confucian fundamentalisms, which also cast aside many of the painfully acquired 
insights of liberal culture, which fight and kill in the name of religion and seek to 
bring the sacred into the realm of politics and national struggle” (2004:ix).  So the 
separation between fundamentalism and spirituality becomes slightly strained, and 
depends on the national context in which one is talking—Buddhism as practiced in 
the US or Australia varies significantly from its practice in Tibet.   
ii See Chapter One for an in-depth analysis of Eliade’s work on the sacred and 
profane.   
iii Kuhn defines cultural instrumentality briefly as “what, in cultural terms, it [the text] 
does” (1).   17 
Chapter One 
The Postmodern Sacred 
 
 
Daniel Radcliffe as Harry Potter in Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets 
 
Postmodern and sacred are two terms which do not sit easily together.  
Postmodernist critics have typically had an antagonistic relationship with the sacred, 
partly, one suspects, to the Marxist heritage of much current humanities research, and 
in particular the broad field of Cultural Studies.
1  Partly the rise of the Religious Right 
has proved problematic for those of us more comfortable with the identity politics of 
the Left—be they feminist, queer, anti or post-colonialist, anti-racist and so on.  
Religion can often seem our natural enemy.  More basically, though, religion serves 
mostly as a bastion of the traditional, and it is this that jars when one juxtaposes 
postmodern and sacred together.  However, there is nevertheless a movement within 18 
contemporary popular culture that I am terming the postmodern sacred that 
synthesises aspects of the postmodern with the sacred, and as we shall when we begin 
looking in detail, that relationship is not as odd as it would appear at first glance.  
What is the postmodern sacred?  The postmodern sacred is, in basic terms, 
pop-culture spirituality.  It is texts that are consumed in part for their spiritual content, 
for an experience of the transcendent outside of the bounds of formal religious and 
spiritual traditions.  It is New Age stickers that say “magic happens”, it is Lord of the 
Rings, Buffy the Vampire Slayer,
2 “Jesus Is My Homeboy” shirts.  It is the un/belief 
of REM’s “Losing My Religion”
3 and the “gay church music” of The Hidden 
Cameras.  The postmodern sacred is everywhere once one begins to look for it, for 
popular culture is rife with the detritus of millennia of religious tradition.  Because of 
the suspension of the usual rules of the “real world” in their textual universes, the 
postmodern sacred occurs most of all in the literary and visual genres of science 
fiction, horror and fantasy and it is those that I will be drawing on for my textual 
analysis.  Although they are produced for the profane purposes of capitalism and 
entertainment, these texts are heavily packed with spiritual signifiers cobbled together 
from various religions and myths. 
The postmodern sacred characteristically utilises the signs of disparate 
religious and spiritual traditions, but it is not a part of them.  It is notable for its 
critical stance towards religious institutions
4 and yet it is also willing to use them for 
their symbolic power.  Because it is largely textually based, the postmodern sacred is 
consumptive, and is necessarily entangled with the mechanics of postmodern global 
capitalism.  Thus it makes the egalitarian call of all pop culture, but delivers the 
unequal products of classed economics.  It is, first and foremost, a de-institutional and 
individualised
5 form as Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim would describe it, 19 
a “choose-your-own” approach to spirituality, though that choice is necessarily 
curtailed by the products available in the market.  Though the postmodern sacred can 
be criticised for its erasure of class, I find myself in agreement with philosopher Jane 
Bennett when she says that the commodity might embody several “dissonant 
possibilities” (127).  These dissonant possibilities include producing a will to 
consume further, erasing the social inequities involved in the production of the 
commodity itself, and doing ideological work that can range from feminist to 
fundamentalist.   
The postmodern sacred emerges out of the various New Age movements that 
have become an increasingly acceptable part of hegemonic Western capitalism, 
championed and popularised by such people as the influential Oprah Winfrey, though 
it is not constrained by their need to justify their beliefs as epistemological “truth.”  
The postmodern sacred is the textual sedimentation of many New Age beliefs and 
practices.  It takes from the New Age both its scepticism towards traditional 
institutions as well as a constant emphasis on the Self.  Sociologist Paul Heelas argues 
that the New Age places the experience of the individual at its foreground as the sole 
arbiter of truth and authority.  He says that “truth, not surprisingly for those who see 
themselves as spiritual beings, must – at least first-and-foremost – come by way of 
one’s own experience.  For this alone provides direct and uncontaminated access to 
the spiritual realm” (21).  Rather than view their practices as religion, New Agers 
often use the term “spirituality” to more accurately capture what they consider to be 
more properly “lived” spiritual experiences.  This shift in terminology is important.  It 
foregrounds the break that New Agers see themselves as having made with traditional 
organised religion, which they considered a set of beliefs and practices that are “not 
lived” in the same way.  “Religion” is considered to be tied to institutions such as the 20 
Catholic and Anglican Churches, to be disconnected from if not totally opposed to 
real-life spiritual practice.  The New Age emphasis on lived experience means then 
that spiritual experience can just as easily occur in a popular culture context as in a 
yoga class or in meditation, for popular culture is experienced as a bodily 
experience—sound and spectacle on small and large screen.  Similarly, too, popular 
culture is re-experienced as a common culture, from both commodified aspects like 
clothing, figurines etc to the endless quoting of beloved series.   
This shift in terminology is also important in that it often discards the notion 
of God.  Recently, this New Age shift has been articulated by religious scholar Ray 
Billington (although he himself seems not to link his own ideas to the New Age, 
drawing instead on the writings of various mystics).  Billington provocatively argues 
that God is antithetical to spirituality, that we need to “remove the concept of God.  
We need mysticism without theology”(8).  Billington argues instead for a holistic, 
largely Eastern influenced spirituality, a “religion without god” as the title of his book 
goes.  What replaces God in the New Age is the often nebulous idea of “spirit” or 
“energy.”  These ideas derive from Buddhism, Taoism and Hinduism but are largely 
disconnected from their traditions.  The New Age appropriation of yoga or tantric sex, 
for instance, frequently re-figure these practices as capitalist commodities, as reliant 
on racialised exoticism than true mysticism.   
But, whilst the New Age ideas of spirit are undeniably important to the 
postmodern sacred, it is also important to note that the figure of God has not been 
completely abandoned.  The postmodern sacred on the whole makes use of Eastern 
and Christian ideas and symbols equally, in a sometimes jarring synthesis of disparate 
traditions.  This eclecticism is a key feature of the New Age that fictional texts have 
taken for themselves.  It is the interplay between the Judeo-Christian traditions and 21 
New Age spirituality that marks the postmodern sacred as a peculiarly contemporary 
form of popular culture.   
But whilst its textual appropriations do not preclude the possibilities of the 
postmodern sacred functioning as a complement to traditional forms of institutional 
religion, the postmodern sacred  arguably functions as supplemental in the sense that 
Derrida describes it in Of Grammatology, an addition and a replacement.
6  Though 
the pop culture texts I’ve referred to have been praised in some religious quarters, it 
should be noted that evangelicals, for instance, largely loathe these texts, for a number 
of reasons.  The critical stance on religious institutions understandably alienates 
religious conservatives, as does an often ironic take on traditional religion, especially 
in such paradigmatically postmodern sacred shows as Buffy the Vampire Slayer.
7  
The practice of witchcraft in many texts has enraged evangelicals most, making that 
time-honoured move of confusing Wicca or Merlinesque magic with Satan worship.  
A recent example of this is the ludicrous banning of J.K Rowling’s Harry Potter series 
in a number of school libraries in the United States.
8  The outright fear and hostility 
towards Harry Potter is not by any means isolated, a fear of any text that involves the 
unreal or supernatural has long propelled evangelical disdain for the fantastic.  The 
point is, then, if pop-culture spirituality functions as a supplement to traditional 
religious practice, it is, in some quarters at least, a monstrous supplement.  This 
supplemental relationship between Christianity and the New Age will be examined in 
greater detail in chapter four, where I talk through how both have been used in Peter 
Jackson’s post-millennial film adaptations of J.R.R Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings 
trilogy.   
Another facet that places the postmodern sacred outside of much traditional 
religious practice is that it characteristically affirms the rights of people who have 22 
historically been marginalised by the Christian institutions—specifically, women, 
people of colour and queers.  This marks a significant departure from much of the 
religious history of the West, and in particular makes the postmodern sacred 
diametrically opposed to the rise of the Christian Right, which has been notable for its 
blatant hatred of queers, constant opposition to feminism and racial equality (taken in 
the form of, say, opposition to Equal Opportunity legislation).  Whilst much religious 
discourse takes the form of virulent denouncements of these marginalised positions, 
the postmodern sacred is notable for its inclusiveness and availability.  In other words, 
one does not need to be accepted and ideologically vetted to engage with pop culture, 
one needs the media access.
9
  This does not mean, however, that the postmodern sacred cannot be criticised 
on the grounds of representations of race, gender or sexuality.  Rather, the postmodern 
sacred has an explicit commitment to these ethical positions (more strongly in some 
places than others) and to contemporary liberal notions of equality and tolerance.  So 
we see fairly positive strong female characters (Buffy, Major Carter in Stargate, 
Scully in The X-Files), queers (Willow, Tara and Kennedy in Buffy, Captain Jack in 
Torchwood), and people of colour (Teal’c in Stargate, Morpheus in The Matrix).
10  
While many of these representations are still problematic—this can at times be mere 
lip-service to the idea of equality, not to mention Orientalist exoticism or sheer 
tokenism—it is noteworthy nevertheless and marks a shift from Eurocentric, 
patriarchal and homophobic religious traditions. 
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The traditional sacred 
 
 In beginning to define the postmodern sacred, I pointed to a number of 
aspects that separate it from the traditional sacred.  However, in order to fully 
appreciate those differences one must understand of traditional forms of the sacred.  
In particular, Mircea Eliade’s classic study The Sacred and the Profane:The Nature of 
Religion proves itself worthy of a more in-depth engagement, in order to illuminate 
the continuities and discontinuities that the postmodern sacred has with modern, 
medieval and pre-modern forms of the sacred.  Eliade’s work surveys a wide cross-
cultural landscape; he is ambitiously interested in the entire history of human religious 
behaviour.  Like anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss and linguist structuralist 
Ferdinand de Saussure, Eliade’s work is one of the last gasps of universalism in 
humanities scholarship.  But even taking that substantial difference into account, his 
work has proved tremendously influential in not just the field of the history of religion 
which he helped found, but also in the various New Age spiritual movements and 
philosophies that the postmodern sacred itself draws on.   
The traditional sacred maintains a clear-cut distinction between sacred and 
profane, such that Eliade can claim that the “first possible definition of the sacred is 
that it is the opposite of the profane” (10, italics original).  Eliade argues that culture 
can be divided by this opposition, indeed for him, the two are inherently opposed.  It 
should be noted that though the profane has frequently had the suggestion of the taboo 
or sacrilegious, Eliade in this instance however means it to mean merely the non-
sacred.  In the traditional sacred, then, the sacred and the profane are inimitable, they 
cannot exist together, though as we shall see, one will nevertheless occur within the 
other.  A fairly typical example of this viewpoint is when Greek Orthodox theologian 24 
Demetrios Passakos says “every culture brings forth [. . .] the distinction between 
sacred and profane and consequently between clean and unclean” (277, italics added), 
signifying already not only the universalising tendencies of this line of theological 
speculation, but the continuities being made between pre-modern “primitive” 
religions and modern and postmodern Christianity.  The division between sacred and 
profane works to divide culture radically in this sense; one can extrapolate a list of 
binary oppositions rather rapidly, say: 
sacred   profane 
clean   unclean 
believers heretics 
us     them 
It is quite clear in examining the sacred/profane binary how ideologically loaded those 
terms are—sacred and profane not only necessarily rely on the existence of the other, 
but quite clearly the way the opposition is structured works to privilege the sacred.  
That privilege has in many ways been erased by the legacy of Enlightenment 
rationalism and secular humanism, which has tried to rephrase the split in different 
terms which privilege the profane side of the opposition (say as superstition vs. 
reason).  Regardless of how one wants to phrase it though, sacred and profane 
historically have served to illuminate a profound cultural split.  
Though defining the sacred or indeed religion is notoriously difficult, it is 
nevertheless necessary that we attempt a basic definition.  For Eliade, the sacred 
“always manifests itself as a reality of a wholly different order from ‘natural’ 
realities” (10).  The sacred, by definition, then is not of this world, it is otherworldly, 
supernatural, transcendent.
11  One poignant definition of the sacred remains Rudolph 
Otto’s The Idea of the Holy which suggests that the holy may be considered to be the 25 
awe-induced state of experiencing “the presence of that which is a mystery 
inexpressible and above all creatures” (13).  Otto terms this psychological state 
“mysterium tremendum” (12) and coins the term “numinous” to describe supernatural 
elements that are wholly other to this world.  Eliade contends that Otto’s analysis is 
grounded solely in the “irrational” experiences of awe and terror, and proposes 
instead to view religion in its entirety (10).  The interplay between awe and terror is 
one experience that continues to underlie constructions of the transcendent in the 
postmodern sacred’s texts, yet this as Eliade rightly points out, is an entirely 
subjective experience.  Defining the sacred by its effect on a presumed viewer is 
interesting, but incomplete in describing other religious experiences.  In contrast, 
Eliade prefers to look at how the opposition of the sacred and profane structures the 
very being, time and space of religious cultures. 
Interestingly, though Eliade takes the sacred and the profane to be opposed, 
paradoxically, the fact that the sacred must necessarily manifest itself in profane 
objects means that, “for those who have a religious experience all nature is capable of 
revealing itself as cosmic sacrality” (Eliade 12).  The paradox of the sacred then is 
that it is a manifestation of radical Otherness (ie not being of this world) in this 
natural world.  Thus the initial sharp distinction between the sacred and the profane 
becomes increasingly complicated.  How can the sacred, which is by definition 
otherworldly, nevertheless appear in this world?  How does one distinguish between 
the sacred and profane if they both appear in this (profane) world?  Eliade, however, 
does not pay much direct theoretical attention to this apparent paradox in his work, 
though his work on what he called hierophanies may go some way to answering these 
questions. 26 
Eliade coins the term “hierophany” to describe those manifestations of the 
sacred in this profane world.  The hierophany, as Eliade defines the term, is when 
“something sacred shows itself to us” (11).  The hierophany stands out from the rest 
of the world in that it announces itself as sacred.  It manifests itself, it is a revelation.  
The question of how to distinguish the sacred from the profane is thus answered by 
the hierophany, for the hierophany’s “announcement” of itself as sacred makes the 
question meaningless.  The hierophany, then, is self-evidently sacred.  This 
tautological definition is arguably insufficient for any skeptical, let alone atheistic, 
approach to the sacred.  Suffice it to say that the hierophany is understood as sui 
generis in Eliade, it cannot be understood in any other terms.   
On a more sustained engagement with Eliade’s work, we find that the 
hierophany works to construct a sacred/profane divide that reappears even more 
strongly than at first glance, since the split between “the sacred and profane is often 
expressed by the opposition between real and unreal or pseudoreal”(Eliade 13).
12  
One way that opposition is expressed in Eliade’s work is in his conceptualisation of 
sacred space.  Most fundamentally, manifestations of the sacred dramatise a 
cosmological act of creation, testifying to the presence of gods and other-worldly 
presences.  Eliade says “every world is the work of the gods, for it was either created 
directly by the gods or was consecrated, hence cosmicised, by men [sic] ritually 
reactualising the paradigmatic act of Creation” (64).   
Though at first glance this seems to blur the lines of sacred and profane (or 
even entirely erase the profane), one finds on closer inspection that split is being made 
at the meta-physical level of Being.  Eliade argues powerfully that religion not only 
organises space into sacred and not-sacred but translates the sacred into absolute 
being and the profane into non-being: 27 
 
There is [. . .] a sacred space, and hence a strong significant space; there are 
other spaces that are not sacred and so are without structure or consistency, 
amorphous [. . .] For religious man, this spatial nonhomogeneity finds 
expression in the experience of an opposition between space that is sacred—
the only real and real-ly existing space—and all other space, the formless 
expanse surrounding it.  (20) 
 
Eliade argues that the manifestation of sacred space (the hierophany) ontologically 
founds the world, creating an absolute fixed point of reality.  He points out that this 
sacred space is conceptualised as the “Centre of the World,” for example Jerusalem is 
the centre of the world in Christian tradition due to its associations with Christ and 
indeed the pre-existing Hebrew tradition of it as a Holy City.  This symbolism of the 
Centre of the World is invoked in many disparate ways, though, in the formation of 
not only obviously religious spaces like temples, (holy) cities and countries; but in the 
dwellings where people live—“every religious man places himself at the Centre of the 
World [. . .] as close as possible to the opening that ensures him communication with 
the gods” (64).  The spatialisation of the Sacred presents the illusory promise of 
absolute ontological foundation, a fixity of Being.   
Conversely, then, profane space appears to the religious to represent partial or 
even absolute non-being.  It is Chaos, unknowable, terrifying.  That opposition 
noticeably shows how the sacred/profane works not just to secure the space of the 
sacred, but as a projection of Otherness elsewhere, where everything outside the 
bounds of the sacred cannot be said to even properly exist.  It’s easy to see how 
problematic this opposition can be, meaning at the very least that profane space must 
be ritually “sanctified,” and at worst that those who live in that profane space are 
dehumanised and denied the grounds of very existence.   
It should be noted that this conceptualisation of the profane appears to be 
clearly part of Eliade’s ahistorical invocation of the archaic.
13  When he points out the 28 
complete desacralisation of the profane modern world (13) quite clearly there is not 
that sense of non-being with which the profane appears to a religious mindset.  
Indeed, that association of the profane with non-being is not one that transfers 
especially well to the contemporary.  Whilst Max Weber famously pointed out that 
the desacralisation of modernity had created a kind of existential dread,
14 this is 
arguably quite different from that conceptualisation of the sacred as the only true 
ground of being.  Even postmodernists who talk about the replacement of the physical 
with the symbolic
15 nevertheless approach modern space as being unmarked by the 
sacred—it is neither religious nor irreligious, it is instead a-religious.  So, although 
his work has been tremendously influential, Eliade’s conceptualising of space is 
nevertheless largely irrelevant to the spaces of the Western countries with which the 
postmodern sacred is produced and consumed. 
Though it is problematic in many ways, I find Eliade’s work to nevertheless be 
productive in theorising the traditional sacred.  His initial distinction between sacred 
and profane is useful because it articulates a premise that has underlined Western 
culture for a very long time—indeed such a premise continues to be held by many 
people, both religious and secular.  Whilst I argue that such a distinction has been 
considerably complicated by the postmodern sacred, it is nevertheless apparent that 
the sacred/profane binary continues to inform in some fashion how our culture sees 
spirituality.   
Eliade’s work is highly relevant to the present in other ways.  We see that 
religious experience for Eliade has certain thematic concerns.  His work on sacred 
time and space illuminate an ongoing argument of his, that religious desire is 
motivated by a desire for the real.  He says: 
 29 
Religious man’s [sic] desire to live in the sacred is in fact equivalent to his 
desire to take up his abode in objective reality, not to let himself be paralysed 
by the never-ceasing relativity of purely subjective experiences, to live in a 
real and effective world, and not in an illusion. (28) 
 
 
It is here that Eliade is at his most compelling.  This argument is applicable not just to 
the ontological founding gestures of the many religions he discusses, but, in a 
different sense, to the postmodern turn towards fundamentalism.  For what is 
fundamentalism but an attempt to return from the destabilising effects of the apparent 
effacement of “reality” by the postmodern?  The association of the sacred with 
absolute being—and vice versa—is one that continues to inform Western thought, in 
both fiction and non-fiction.  The idea that there is something not-quite-real about 
contemporary life informs textual representations of nostalgia, not just in the New 
Age but right across the culture.
16  Nostalgic texts, of course, aim at fixing this 
inauthenticity through a return to origins.  So Eliade is quite right in linking the sacred 
with the suggestion of ontological fixity, although it is a promise of religions, political 
movements and texts alike which is ultimately undeliverable.   
That I agree with Eliade’s association of the sacred with Being does not, 
however, mean that as a critic I see Eliade’s advocating of sacred time
17 as 
representing some form of truth about the nature of time.  Rather I see this idea of 
sacred time as still being important in the culture, for it continues to inform New Age 
conceptions of the sacred, as well as spreading out further into the wider culture 
beyond the narrow confines of “spirituality.”  Tony Stigliano has argued that Eliade’s 
work on the sacred attempts to further his earlier fascist sympathies, however it is 
arguable that the consequences of those theories have spread out into the culture, 
almost entirely disconnected from any notion of a return to a racially “pure” fascist 
state.
18  Indeed, the notion of cyclical time provides a powerful alternative to 30 
masculinist and Eurocentric narratives of linear time, as we find in the work of 
feminist Celtic and pagan fantasy writers like Marion Zimmer Bradley, and one that 
will demonstrate that the New Age-ised project of spirituality need not be linked to a 
fascist project of “cleansing” a nation’s origins from the “taint” of immigration or 
ethnic mixing.   
Significantly, too, Eliade’s point about hierophany proves especially useful in 
distinguishing the postmodern sacred from the traditional.  The postmodern sacred is 
most clearly differentiated from Eliade’s hierophanies because it does not (usually) 
announce itself as sacred.  Indeed if pressed it would claim the profane—whilst 
collapsing any firm distinction between the sacred and profane itself.  Whilst Eliade’s 
conception is problematically ahistorical and acultural, I would also argue that the 
postmodern sacred represents a profound rupture in that unified narrative.  In my next 
section I shall discuss how the postmodern sacred may be further distinguished from 
the traditional sacred of Eliade’s work.   
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The postmodern sacred 
 
 
The “Buddy Christ,” Kevin Smith’s parody of religious kitsch in Dogma 
 
Postmodernism has by now become a commonplace “school” of critical 
thought (if something so diverse may be called that).  Indeed, a number of 
contemporary theorists have discounted it over the last few years, especially after 
September 11
19—for example, Terry Eagleton’s After Theory, a collection entitled 
After Postmodernism promoting “critical realism.”  But this is perhaps more 
indicative of an academy hungry for new theory than of any profound cultural shift.  
One needs to weigh, quite seriously, the question of what realism exists now, and how 
have we truly moved past postmodernism?  I do not believe the West has shifted in 
any significant way beyond the postmodern condition.  If anything, the tendencies 
described in postmodern theory from the 1980s onwards have only increased.   
We live in a world of the virtual, in which media permeates everything and 
everyone.  Media “news” seems unable to relay “real” events without first mediating 32 
them through popular culture references from music, films or TV; indeed the lines 
between journalism, entertainment and advertising are blurry at best.  This is the age 
of the spin-off, of product placement and infotainment.  Symbols slide through 
different mediums, from the movie screen to the television to the computer to the 
mobile phone to the written page to the clothing with which we brand ourselves.  
Arguably the symbolic, the virtual and the real have merged, irrevocably, into one.    
The rapid public embrace of the I-Pod demonstrates this ably, where the real-
world referent of first vinyl and then the CD have been replaced with the virtual data 
of the mp3.  The mp3 is, of course, a simulation with no material equivalent, infinitely 
reproducible; it is for this reason that the attempts of organisations like the BPI (in the 
UK) and the RIAA (in the US) to argue that the downloading of an illegal mp3 is 
equivalent to stealing a CD are so highly unconvincing.  Quite obviously, the internet 
has made world-wide dissemination of texts almost instantly possible, replacing 
material production with digital copying.  Indeed, albums can be leaked online as mp3 
files months ahead of their arrival as CDs in-store.  The one constraint is, perhaps, 
server space, yet Peer to Peer (and now Bit-Torrent) programs have long made 
everyone in possession of a file a potential content provider.  In such an environment, 
the digital quickly out-runs the analogue, the virtual eclipses the material.   
Mobile phones have made people contactable immediately much of the time, 
and text messaging (along with email) has changed the way people use language, 
more concisely perhaps, or more brutal or facile depending on your point of view.  
Modern distinctions between the public sphere of work and the private sphere of 
family and recreation are increasingly hard to make in a postmodern world in which 
business people sit on the train on their way home typing emails on their Blackberry 
phones (a mobile phone and computer in one).  24/7 Broadband internet connections 33 
have transformed both workplaces and homes, online messenger services like MSN 
messenger make instant, “free” communication overseas not only possible, but 
constant.  Bit-Torrent makes most contemporary TV shows and movies downloadable 
relatively instantly, with some shows even translated by eager fans and put online 
within days of their initial screening
20 (“fansubbed”), or one could watch the shows 
on Youtube, or browse Myspace profiles for music.
21  So subjectivity in the 
contemporary is clearly what Scott Bakutman calls a “terminal identity” (9), one 
formed in front of the computer and television screens, at the intersection of various 
information networks.
22  Perhaps the decline of postmodern theory may, ironically, 
coincide with the utter victory of the cultural logic of postmodernism itself.   
In any case, it is my argument that the cultural condition of postmodernity is 
more than ever a vital part of the culture, even for those who do not consider 
themselves postmodern.  We shall see this in detail in Chapter Five where I discuss 
the hidden postmodern presumptions of anti-postmodernists like American President 
George W Bush and Australian Prime Minister John Howard.  Indeed, it is arguable 
postmodern positions have become so ingrained in the culture that a critical (or even 
fundamentalist) position entirely outside has become impossible.  Even reactions 
against postmodernism continue to share many of its assumptions.  But to begin with, 
I would like to make some form of separation between postmodern theory and 
postmodern culture.  The wider cultural impact of the theorists usually associated with 
postmodernity is debatable, however, that of those industries that have hastened 
postmodernity—media, television, movies, computer games, tabloid news and so 
on—is most assuredly not.   
My argument is therefore that the texts I analyse are produced under the 
cultural conditions of postmodernity, in particular from the 1990s onwards, and as 34 
such have a number of postmodern facets.  Inevitably the postmodern sacred has 
continuities with traditional forms of the sacred as Eliade describes, but just as surely 
it has significant differences.  In the postmodern sacred, the postmodern acts as a 
qualifier on the sacred.  This does not merely mean that this will be an investigation 
into how sacred might appear in this postmodern world, though it is that, but that the 
postmodern sacred is notable for a number of postmodern characteristics.  The work 
of three of the most prominent postmodern theorists – Jean-François Lyotard, Jean 
Baudrillard and Fredric Jameson – are all instructive in conceptualising the 
postmodern as it appears in the postmodern sacred.   
The first key facet of the postmodern sacred is that it is arises out of a crisis of 
“grand” or meta-narratives.  Jean-François Lyotard famously outlined this thesis in 
The Postmodern Condition, arguing that postmodern culture is marked by skepticism 
towards the Enlightenment grand narratives of science, rationality etc.  For Lyotard, 
postmodernism is in some ways about a crisis of belief.  This is manifested by the 
“end of” debates that the academy has waged for some time—the end of history,
 23 the 
author,
24 God, theory, and time.
25  There is often the sense in postmodernism that 
nothing can be relied as true for very long.  Hence we see a popular suspicion towards 
politicians, churches, the suitability of public figures like sports stars to be “role-
models” and so on.  The crisis of belief in the State will often manifest itself in the 
form of a fantasmatic “conspiracy theory” in which the public face of the State is 
suggested to be façade run to cover up the traces of a hidden cabal running the world 
for their own nefarious purposes.  The television series X Files ran with this 
premise—“The Truth Is Out There”—and proved a barometer of the American 
public’s distrust in its government, both real and as a pleasurable fantasy, as well as a 
measure of fin-de-siecle tension before the year 2000.  The fact that the State has been 35 
publicly proven to have been untruthful (say for instance Watergate, Bill Clinton’s 
economical use of the truth, the imaginary Weapons of Mass Destruction with which 
the Bush government justified the Iraq war) only adds fuel to the conspiracy theory 
fire, though I find myself in agreement with Žižek when he argues that paranoia exists 
regardless of whether the subject of paranoia actually exists or not.
26
One crisis of the postmodern meta-narrative is the very question of reality, and 
it is this point that is taken up by the Jean Baudrillard.  Baudrillard argues that 
because of the immense saturation of media and the predominance of the sign, the 
distinction between real and not real has collapsed into what he calls the “hyper-real.”  
He says, “simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential being, a substance.  It 
is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyper-real” (1).  What 
this means for the postmodern sacred is that the distinction has disintegrated between 
“real” religiosity (as practiced by the traditional sacred) and “fake” simulation in 
popular culture texts.  Whilst arguably Baudrillard over-states his case—people 
continue to make rather urgent distinctions between the real and the unreal—it is 
nevertheless clear that the relationship between the sign and the real-world referent 
has become fraught.  What this means is that representation itself has become 
considered real, whilst our experiences of the real are mediated through textual 
representation, especially visual representation in advertising, television, movies and 
music videos.  An example of the former would be the way in which advertising has 
become a form of action itself, from political “spin” to public announcements about 
the dangers of smoking and so on.  An example of the later would be the common 
reaction to the September 11 bombings of the World Trade Centre buildings in New 
York—that it was “like a movie.”
27  If, after Baudrillard’s recent death in March 
2007, the media was quick to declare the death of postmodern theory and heap scorn 36 
on Baudrillard’s work,
28 it is also interesting to note that postmodern positions 
towards the real have become so ingrained that Thomas de Zengotita can assume a 
“common sense” tone in his popular polemic Mediated to explain how reference to 
popular media makes postmodern subjectivity always-already mediated and self-
reflexive.  This is not to say that the modern sensibility to the real that underlay the 
reaction to Baudrillard’s death is not still incredibly culturally powerful, but that even 
that is still, in some crucial ways, postmodern.
29   
Whilst Baurdillard’s theories of the postmodern focus on the simulation of 
politics, recreation and indeed everyday life, Fredric Jameson has another take on 
postmodernism
30 more focused on the postmodern text itself.  He argues that one of 
the key features of postmodernism is its reduction to the play of surface aesthetics.  
He says “the emergence of a new kind of flatness of depthlessness, a new kind of 
superficiality in the most literal sense [is] perhaps the supreme formal feature of all 
the postmodernisms” (1991: 9).  Jameson argues that postmodern texts are marked by 
what he calls pastiche, the suturing together of texts from other texts.
31  Pastiche, 
Jameson says, in an oft-quoted passage: 
 
is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique, idiosyncratic style, the 
wearing of a linguistic mask, speech in a dead language.  But it is a neutral 
practice of such mimicry, without any of parody’s ulterior motives, amputated 
of the satirical impulse, devoid of any laughter and of any conviction that 
alongside the abnormal tongue you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy 
linguistic normality (17). 
 
Pastiche, as a textual strategy, sees the postmodern text borrowing from other texts.  
Whereas parody had a satirical or ideological point to make about the text that is 
being referenced, reference in a pastiched text has become an end in itself (if not the 
primary end in some particularly stylish texts like Quentin Tarantino’s oeuvre).  It’s 
easy to see how pastiche can fit in with Baudrillard’s theory of simulation, for 37 
pastiche is the textual result of the contemporary disconnection between sign and 
referent.  Pastiche asserts that there is nothing but the play of signs from which to 
assemble texts, the notion of a real-world “outside” the text begins to retreat.
32 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak makes this link clear when she says that: 
 
if one wanted to extend the concept-metaphor, one could locate a break 
between film (the photographic negative) and video (electronic virtual space), 
and extend Jameson’s isomorphic practice to say that postmodernism (and 
postmodernisation as postfordism) is related to micro-electronic transnational 
capitalism rather than multinational late capitalism.  And then the International 
Ladies Garment Workers’ Union can reveal to us that hi-tech postfordism is 
supported, in the lower ranks, by labour practices that would fit right into old-
style industrial capitalism. (317)  
 
So postmodernity is very much about the virtual and electronic shift in political and 
aesthetic economies, though as Spivak rightly points out, this continues to make use 
of modern and even pre-modern forms of capitalist organisation.  Indeed, as Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri argue in their mammoth Empire, global capitalism notably 
makes a shift from industrial production to the production of information and 
symbols, what they term “informatisation” (285).
33  Whilst information tends to flow 
from a privileged positions within the network—particularly the US in the texts I am 
analysing—it flows from and through other points too.  Texts from India or Japan are 
widely available here in Australia, along with what is marketed as “world” cinema 
(that is, anything from non-English speaking countries).  The metaphors employed by 
global capitalism—the net, the web—suggest a different kind of spatialisation at 
work, one without a centre.  In some ways this recalls Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari’s idea of a rhizome
34 culture, a culture which connects any point to any point 
without regard for linear development (20), although it is clearly not subversive of 
postmodern capitalism in the way that Deleuze and Guattari would have perhaps 
hoped.
35  As Spivak points out, modernist top-down distribution has not been 38 
superceded by postmodern virtuality; rather it intersects with it, and supports it.  
Because of this shift in production, it is now perhaps impossible to underestimate the 
number of texts circulating in the culture now—in bookstores (on-line and off), on 
terrestrial television, cable or satellite TV, DVD.   
As well as the opening up of new markets, the world-wide distribution of non-
Western texts is a way of deferring the crisis of originality in postmodern culture, of 
finding new or under-utilised sources for pastiche.  Whilst there are occurrences of 
non-Western texts becoming popular world-wide (say for instance, the anime of 
Miziyaki), there still remains a marked preference for Western “interpreters” of Other 
cultures, of appropriation and incorporation.  So even as the market demands “new” 
works, inevitably the endless flow of cultural information makes texts cannibalising; 
of other texts, and of themselves even.  Available, simultaneously, is much of the 
history of cinema in the West, not to mention the endless re-runs of old TV series.  
The texts of the past remain eternally present in the postmodern media, and it is this 
inability to forget that is part of what makes postmodern texts utilise pastiche so 
frequently.  The postmodernist text is fixated not only on other texts but on its own 
textuality, thus we see the constant self-referential moments of postmodernism.  
Though pastiche sometimes functions to conceal its sources,
36 postmodern texts also 
frequently foreground their own generic characteristics.  A recent example would be 
in the movie Serenity, in which one of the film’s group of anti-heroes Jayne declares 
“let’s go be bad guys” as the team head in to rob a bank.  It is clear that this kind of 
self-referentiality amounts to a kind of winking to the audience, and just as clearly 
shows a crisis of belief in the ability of texts to describe the world
37 in any kind of 
meaningful way as classical Realism attempted to.  Jameson argues that irony is the 39 
characteristic mode of postmodern textuality, and the pointing out of generic 
characteristics often seems the blankest irony of all. 
Arguably then, postmodernism has entered a baroque stage, in which its 
positions and strategies have become utterly pervasive in the Western world, in which 
reflexivity, irony (and conversely, the desire to escape the textual
38) have become 
default positions in the production and consumption of texts.  This is done in and 
through a popular culture produced by the mass media, yearly, weekly, daily, hourly.  
When Jameson analyses such “high” art as Warhol’s Diamond Shoes in his 
immensely influential Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, there 
is the sense that he is far more comfortable discussing the objects that criticism 
“should” address itself to—art, architecture, poetry, literature.  Importantly, these are 
usually singular objects, able to be isolated and critically analysed; in stark contrast to 
the endless flow of “low” pop culture texts (part of what Jameson rightly calls a 
postmodern technological sublime).  So, while many of Warhol’s works are culturally 
ubiquitous, “Diamond Shoes” is obscure enough to be a problematic metonym for a 
cultural-wide movement.  Yet if Jameson’s theory seems at times awkwardly poised 
at the edge of the postmodern (able to recognise it, but not quite of it), he himself 
points out how the distinctions between high and low break down in postmodernism 
to the degree he suggests it is marked by a schizophrenic flow of signifiers.  
Postmodernism may have begun as yet another avant-garde movement, but it has been 
embraced, and been done that much more effectively, by a mass media which has 
little interest in art.  Popular culture is often the domain of the young, and as such, as 
Mark C Taylor points out, “Lyotard is wrong; postmodernism is not something we 
teach our children; it is something they teach us” (1993: 170). 40 
  The postmodern turn makes not only other fictional texts available for 
pastiche, but non-fiction texts as well.  This point can be illuminated by a discussion 
by the postmodern Marxist psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek who points out that one of the 
characteristically postmodern facets of contemporary psychology is that the line 
between patient and analyst has evaporated, that the symptom in fact incorporates the 
theory attempting to describe it.  He says: 
 
Traditional psychoanalysis relied on a notion of the unconscious as the 'dark 
continent', the impenetrable substance of the subject's being, which had to be 
probed by interpretation: when its content was brought to light a liberating 
new awareness would follow. Today, the formations of the unconscious (from 
dreams to hysterical symptoms) have lost their innocence: the 'free 
associations' of a typical educated patient consist for the most part of attempts 
to provide a psychoanalytic explanation of his own disturbances, so we have 
not only Annafreudian, Jungian, Kleinian, Lacanian interpretations of the 
symptoms, but symptoms which are themselves Annafreudian, Jungian, 
Kleinian, Lacanian - they don't exist without reference to some psychoanalytic 
theory. The unfortunate result of this reflexivisation is that the analyst's 
interpretation loses its symbolic efficacy and leaves the symptom intact in its 
idiotic jouissance.  (1999b: n.p.) 
 
In an analogous way, the postmodern text has often incorporated theory within itself; 
it could not exist without reference to not only literary theory but to philosophy, 
sociology and indeed psychoanalytic theory as well.  The notion of praxis, the unity 
of theory and practise is one that is characteristically postmodern and has been 
repeatedly raised by feminist and queer critics and artists.  This can be expressed in 
pop-culture in a number of different manifestations—for instance, witness the way the 
Warchowski brothers incorporated Baudrillard’s Simulations within the Matrix, or the 
incorporation of Joseph Campbell’s Jungian theories of myth into Star Wars.  Given 
that theory contains a repertoire of symbols available for fictional appropriation, it 
makes sense that the postmodernist appetite for pastiche would cannibalise the theory 
of the academy, as well as the literary canon, religious traditions, myth and so on.  41 
Whilst this is all fairly well trodden philosophical ground, the question arises, 
what does this mean for the postmodern sacred?  What influence does the postmodern 
exert on the postmodern sacred?  It should be fairly apparent what the postmodern 
disbelief in “grand” narratives would mean for religious narratives.  The absence of 
belief in meta-narratives that Lyotard describes means that such a meta-narrative as 
the God of the traditional religions is treated with skepticism.  Similarly however, the 
death of the Enlightenment narratives of Science and Reason has meant that atheism 
too has been robbed of its cultural power.  The postmodern sacred, then, lives in an 
age of cultural agnosticism, in which “spirit” provides a useful medium between the 
two unsustainable poles of belief and total unbelief.  “Spirit” suggests that we are on 
the terrain of the New Age,
39 of Oprah and pop-psychology, neither willing to 
commit to a meta-narrative of theology nor to entirely discard the idea of God (or 
Gods, or Goddesses).  This is a point made strongly by postmodern a/theologian Mark 
C Taylor—a large, growing group of people find themselves, “suspended between the 
loss of old certainties and the discovery of new beliefs, these people constantly live on 
the border that joins and separates belief and unbelief” (1984: 5).  It should not be 
surprising, therefore, that at the very least, the postmodern sacred is willing to play 
with the sacred, albeit situated at a safe distance in a secondary textual world divorced 
from the need for real-world commitment and belief. 
Whilst Lyotard’s argument suggests that faith in rationalist science has faded, 
it is done so in an interesting fashion in the postmodern sacred.  Far from simply 
disputing rationalism, the postmodern sacred seems to use it in order to confirm that 
the supernatural can exist alongside rationalism.  The constant references to those 
magical things that live on the outskirts of our consciousness—Greek gods, fairy 
tales, mythic monsters and so on—introduce culturally familiar elements into the text, 42 
while the use of some kind of rationalism helps those improbable things re-enter the 
realm of the possible.  The postmodern sacred thus incorporates irrationalist forms of 
belief into rationalism—and in doing so collapses the border between the two, 
producing not a meta-narrative of scientific rationalism but a postmodern interplay 
between scientific and pseudo-scientific New Age language games.   
  Due to the fact that it is immersed in media, the postmodern sacred is 
inevitably a simulacra as Baudrillard would describe it.  It is neither a real nor fake 
representation, it is instead the textual simulation of religious traditions.  The 
postmodern sacred is, then, hyper-real, in that its representations seem more real than 
religious tradition itself.  Part of this hyper-reality is possibly due to the fact that 
postmodern sacred is able to graphically represent the spiritual as though it were 
literally real.  The fact that the sacred is otherworldly necessarily means that it is 
necessary to suspend the “real-world” conditions of physics etc in order to represent 
the sacred, yet the postmodern sacred is able to present this unreality with far greater 
regularity and in greater hyper-real detail than the visual traditions of the world’s 
religions.   
  Baudrillard himself points out that the prohibition on representing the holy for 
religious fundamentalists stems from the fear that representation and its inevitably 
simulacral nature will ultimately point to the non-existence of “real-world” religious 
referents like God, Allah, Jehovah, Muhammad or Buddha (Simulacra and Simulation 
4).  The recent Danish cartoon controversy
40 stems not just from the troubling 
racialisation and absolute conflation between Muslim, terrorist and Muhammad but 
more basically from the violation of a generally accepted Muslim prohibition on 
representation of the Prophet.   43 
  The postmodern sacred, however, has no such prohibitions on religious 
representation.  Indeed, simulation is the very pre-condition for the postmodern 
sacred’s occurrence.  Religion must be simulated, must be aesthecised and break free 
of its contexts in order to be used and recontextualised as a textual signifier.  It is 
precisely the simulacral nature of the postmodern sacred that makes it that monstrous 
supplement to traditional religious practice.  The postmodern sacred’s textual strategy 
of pastiching together signifiers from disparate sources makes it problematic for 
traditional forms of the sacred intent on maintaining the “purity” of the sacred 
traditions.  It has instead a relativising effect on the spiritual signifiers, presenting 
multiple versions of the sacred, or often even presenting a true “hidden” path to the 
sacred outside of the institutions that regulate religious practice.   
Postmodernism’s textual games are not merely limited to the fictional.  Paul 
Heelas points out that New Age spirituality draws on a number of different, 
sometimes contradictory traditions.  As I have argued, the postmodern sacred is 
entangled within New Age spiritualities, it emerges out of that same culture 
attempting to re-enchant
41 the world, and much of its vocabulary is the language of 
the New Age, though it is also notable for pilfering from the world’s great religious 
traditions as well—Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and especially Buddhism.  What 
distinguishes the postmodern sacred from the New Age, however, is that it will take 
epistemological and ontological claims about the truth of the world, disconnect them 
from their context, and pastiche them together to form fictional texts.  What we have, 
in a sense, is modern-day myth, which as Darko Suvin argues is religion that one has 
ceased to believe in (2000: 216).  That postmodern scepticism towards meta-narrative 
claims opens up many different avenues for its symbolic appropriation, whilst 44 
retaining an unwillingness or indeed possibly even an inability to ground itself in any 
one spiritual tradition. 
An example occurs in the postmodern Gothic television series Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer, which uses not only the traditional Christian iconography of crosses, 
holy water etc, but also relies on a kind of Wiccan symbology that features capricious 
Gods, demons and spirits from many different mythologies.
42  In Buffy, every 
mythology is real, from Hansel and Gretel to Dracula, and that fact is dramatised, 
again and again on-screen.  For the characters, unbelief is tantamount to suicide.  
Buffy doesn’t require its viewers to believe in its mythologies—it is explicitly 
unreal—indeed, part of the pleasure of the text is in entertaining the possibility of the 
supernatural without having to truly believe in it.  If this has long been true of the 
Gothic genre in general with regard to “superstitious” folk beliefs in ghosts and 
monsters, it is arguable that now both Christian and New Age real world beliefs have 
been added to the list.  We begin to see, then, how the postmodern sacred is belief by 
proxy, it displaces “real” belief into a secondary, unreal textual world.   
But although these texts are not supposed to be believed in, there is 
nevertheless a certain suspension of disbelief, a suspension that positions the texts’ 
viewers on “the border that joins and separates belief and unbelief” (Taylor, 1984: 5).  
It is an undeniable fact that the fictional exerts a considerable influence upon 
discourses of the “real”, and this is readily apparent in a number of different areas.  
Lynn Schofield Clark, for instance, points out that a quarter of contemporary 
American subjects believe in aliens, a belief undoubtedly fuelled by fictional texts 
such as The X-Files and Roswell (5). In the New Age itself, it is quite clear that part 
of the resurgence of “Celtic” mythology is related to the phenomena of Celticised 
fantasy, which uses Celtic signifiers like druids and mystical Stonehenge-like circles 45 
without grounding them in a real-world referent.  Medieval recreationists are likely to 
have been as influenced by the fictional worlds of Tolkien and his ilk, or at the very 
least by the Arthurian legends, than to have had their imaginations fired by historical 
descriptions of the time period.  That blurring of the real and fantastic worlds is part 
of the reason why fantastic texts have often been historically regarded as culturally 
problematic (or even potentially dangerous), and why they are so frequently situated 
as clearly demarcated children’s texts, because the possibility of belief in the fictional 
in some ways endangers the Real.  It opens the possibility that the Real itself might be 
fictional; it disrupts the ontological foundation of capitalist reality.   
Mircea Eliade’s concept of the hierophany proves especially useful in 
distinguishing the postmodern sacred from the traditional.  The modern and 
premodern sacred are understood as hierophany, fragments of absolute spirit that are 
the link to the otherworldly.  This hierophanic relationship is an unmediated link 
between the believer and the sacred; the hierophany is a part of the whole revealed to 
the community of believers (in whatever tradition one looks at).  In the postmodern 
sacred, however, there is no fragment of the whole, for indeed there is no hierophany 
in the sense that Eliade describes.  The postmodern sacred is most clearly 
differentiated from Eliade’s hierophanies because it does not (usually) announce itself 
as sacred.  Indeed if pressed it would claim the profane—whilst collapsing the 
distinction between a sacred and profane itself.  While many of the texts I will analyse 
as part of the postmodern sacred have content that mimics this traditional sacred, the 
production of the postmodern sacred most clearly is not a manifestation of a wholly 
different order—it is explicitly made, solely, for the purposes of capitalistic 
consumption.   46 
Since the postmodern sacred posits itself as wholly profane, it does not have 
the use value or ontological foundation which characterises the traditional sacred.  
Whilst Eliade’s conception is problematically ahistorical and acultural,
43 I would also 
argue that the postmodern sacred represents a profound rupture in that unified 
narrative.  The postmodern death of the meta-narrative has meant that the postmodern 
is fundamentally different in not looking to a Truth referent in which to ground its 
practices.  The postmodern sacred remains ambivalent to the possibility of truth, any 
truth.  The postmodern sacred is instead a belief by proxy.  It is characteristically 
postmodern in that it is virtual, pastiched together from the fragments of spiritual 
traditions that do
44 have that ontological foundation.  The postmodern sacred will not 
allow itself to believe in these truths in an unmediated sense, it is always diffused 
through texts, kept at a distance with irony and parody.  Writing about fantasy fiction, 
Darko Suvin points out that this kind of textual appropriation is “not thinkable before 
overriding mythological or religious belief suffers an epochal political breakdown, as 
a consequence of which some of its aspects and elements become available for 
fictional manipulation” (2000:216).  What this means, then, is that the postmodern 
sacred is only made possible by the disruption of religious meta-narratives that 
problematise straight-forward belief.  It is this as much as anything that explains the 
fundamentalist disdain for the postmodern sacred, for it in some senses presumes the 
death of traditions they would rather hold on to.   
  If the traditional sacred is something that people will live and die for,
45 there 
is no similar sense in the postmodern sacred.  Though it is usually characterised by 
large communities of fans – the use of the term “cult” in describing speculative or 
fantastic texts is quite telling – these communities themselves are transient, for 
today’s text du jour will be inevitably replaced tomorrow.  Zygmunt Bauman terms 47 
these communities “neo-tribes,” (1992: 136) and points out that transient groups like 
fan communities are based solely on members’ self-identification.  Unlike more 
traditional collectives, ‘neo-tribes’ have little choice in the inclusion or exclusion of 
members.  “Tribes” quickly die out in capitalism’s blur of aesthetic changes, to be 
replaced by other tribes with a different object of adoration, or possibly a different set 
of consumptive criteria.  None is stable, or membership automatic.  Each one must be 
chosen, according to taste, the choice reiterated through continued consumption.   
  A good example of a postmodern sacred space would be a movie theatre. One 
might look at the movie theatre as a sacred space that sets aside the rules of the 
secular for a certain amount of time, however this sacred space differs from the 
traditional sacred in a number of key ways.  Entrance into the “sacred” space is 
governed not by the laws of religious community but by the laws of the market, 
anyone willing to pay the ticket fee may enter the cinema.  Significantly, the sacred 
space is highly individualised, it is not brought into being by any solid community of 
believers, that particular theatre will be populated by a unique group of people linked 
only by their desire to watch that particular movie, and thus it is unlikely to be 
completed repeated again.  So whilst one can look at the postmodern sacred as in a 
certain sense a sacred space within the culture, it is not marked out as such.  In fact, it 
is marked out as the complete opposite.  With the exception of a few “religious” 
movies targeted at religious communities,
46 movies are considered generally to only 
be profane—entertainment, escapism.  Sacred spaces continue within our culture to be 
clearly delineated areas, and clearly the movie theatre is rarely regarded as a possible 
site of spirituality, though of course there is a great deal of research that engages with 
the idea that films can be spiritual.  Eliade argues that sacred space is in an 
interruption of the normal laws of the secular, yet it is clear that the postmodern 48 
sacred space only partially fulfils that condition, for though the movie theatre might 
for the consumer be an intermittent communion, it is of course a business that will run 
countless and constant screenings so long as it makes a profit.  As a part of the 
profane world of business, the movie is hardly an interruption of the laws of the 
secular, let alone a hierophanic fragment of the transcendent.  Epistemologically then, 
the postmodern sacred cannot be defended by Eliade’s definition of the sacred, 
because it is so entangled within the profane world. 
  Whilst Eliade usually aligns “profane” with the natural world, it should be 
noted that the sacred/profane usually carries other connotations besides that of 
business
47 in the post-Christian West.  Christianity is notable for its spirit/body split, 
in which the “pure” Christian spirit is contrasted to the “temptations” of the profane 
flesh.  In particular, almost all forms of sexuality have been considered profane, 
except monogamous heterosexuality “sanctified” by marriage.
 48  Even now, the 
Catholic Church catechism claims one of the benefits of marriage is that it “helps to 
overcome self-absorption, egoism, [and] pursuit of one’s own pleasure [italics 
added]” (402)—as if marriage and one’s own pleasure are mutually incompatible.   
The spirit/body split has inevitably had gendered dimensions, which have been 
widely critiqued by feminists.  In an argument that is just as relevant for the 
masculinist Christian theological tradition as it is for the scientific rationality she 
critiques, French feminist Luce Irigaray interrogates the neutrality of the 
transcendental position, arguing that in Western culture it has largely been the 
prerogative of white men in to have bodies but to not be bodies. She says: 
 
Men are distanced from their bodies. They have relied upon their sex, their 
language and their technology to go on and on building a world further 
removed from their relation to the corporeal. But they are corporeal. They 
therefore need to reassure themselves that someone really is looking after the 49 
body for them. Their women or wives … are guardians of their corporeal unity 
(49) 
 
The transcendental, in Irigaray’s view, whilst ostensibly neutral, obscures a viewpoint 
that is implicitly masculinist. For Irigaray, masculine ‘neutrality’ is a discursive 
strategy that simultaneously disavows masculine embodiment whilst “marking [. . .] 
the feminine as mute and out-lawed body” (Summer-Bremner 1).  The masculine 
body constructs itself as normal, yet has the privilege to speak from a transcendental 
position—a seemingly objective position outside the specificity of the body.  The 
disdain for the corporeal in the Christian tradition frequently manifests itself as 
misogyny—and vice versa.  The corporeal, by definition, has been historically 
constituted as profane.   
In postmodernity, however, we see the distinctions between sacred and 
profane erased.  Counter-cultural “free love,” feminism and the commodification of 
sexuality in late capitalism
49 have all had their part in diminishing the negative 
connotations of sexuality and corporeality.  By and large, there has been a widespread 
acceptance of behaviour and relationships that were previously considered “sinful” or 
simply immoral—pre-marital sex, de-facto and same-sex relationships.  The notion 
that the sexual act of itself is immoral—and thus in need of matrimonial 
sanctification—has become largely outdated.  This does not, contrary to conservative 
jeremiads, mean that sexual ethics have disappeared, merely that they have shifted to 
an ethics of serial monogamy.  This has meant a shift to the notion that pleasure, of 
itself, is a desirable and worthy goal.
50  Zygmunt Bauman, for instance, argues that 
postmodern identities are formed under a pleasure-seeking role (179). 
This shift to pleasure seeking, however, is not necessarily tied to the sacred.  
Indeed, Bauman points out that “postmodern cultural pressures, while intensifying the 
search for ‘peak-experiences’, have at the same time uncoupled it from religion-prone 50 
interests and concerns, privatised it, and cast mainly non-religious institutions in the 
role of purveyors of relevant services” (180).   Paraphrasing Weber, Bauman calls this 
process ‘this worldly ecstasy’ and argues that the postmodern version “abolish[es] the 
concept of ‘non-peakers’ altogether and declare[s] peak-experience a duty and 
realistic prospect for everybody” (180).  He finds peak-experience to have been 
separated from “religion-inspired practices of self-denial and withdrawal from 
worldly attractions” (180).  Postmodern textual producers deploy “peak-experience” 
to stimulate consumer desire and purchase.  Peak-experience is suggested to increase 
in intensity and fulfillment, with the promise of complete and total ecstasy always just 
over the horizon. 
Whilst Bauman maintains a distinction between traditional forms of religious 
peak-experience (say, the ecstasies of saints or whirling dervishes) and postmodern 
this-worldly ecstasy, the postmodern sacred maintains no such boundaries.  As I have 
argued, the postmodern sacred contains both consumerist and non-consumerist 
implications—cognitively dissonant responses to the same cultural phenomena.  The 
postmodern sacred is, above all, a corporeal experience, for popular culture is first and 
foremost physical—packed with sound and spectacle.  Beaudoin points out that 
“experience is key” for GenX spirituality (73) and it is this individualisation of faith 
that underlines the postmodern sacred.  In its focus on the visceral effects of popular 
culture, the postmodern sacred not only elides the distinction between sacred and 
profane; it relies on it, it revels in it.  Thus we see New Age texts on tantric and sacred 
sex, the re-discovery of more sex-positive Christian writers such as Teresa of Avila 
(Beaudoin 83).   
The profane/sacred split is erased in other ways in postmodernity.  On the one 
hand, we have what might be called the profaning of sacred culture.  The traditional 51 
faiths have been mired in scandal, protected child molesters, collaborated with war-
mongers, such that it is impossible for a contemporary subject to not see the profane 
in traditional domains of the sacred.  Not only that, but there exists a considerable 
industry devoted to distributing various forms of religious kitsch, for the sacred has 
become well and truly commodified in postmodernity.  This can be manifested in 
such commodified relics as dashboard Jesus and the rosary,
51 or in the body of 
religious pop-culture directed at the faithful. 
A good example of the later is the immensely successful fundamentalist Left 
Behind series of novels.  Left Behind, written by Tim La Haye and Jerry Jenkins, is a 
literalisation of a certain kind of American evangelical reading of the apocalypse, yet 
is just as clearly reliant on secular genres like the thriller and the disaster movie as it 
is on an evangelical theological and literary tradition (Gribben 86).  Left Behind, 
which has thus far yielded 12 books and a number of increasingly high-budgeted 
movies since the first novel was released in 1995, dramatises the coming apocalypse, 
the appearance of the Antichrist (interestingly identified with the UN, and not with the 
Catholic Church as is traditional in evangelical Rapture theology).  In contrast to the 
postmodern sacred, Left Behind clearly makes referent to a truth referent outside the 
text—under a certain kind of evangelical reading of the Bible, this is an imaginative 
version of what really will happen.   For the cultural critic, however, Left Behind 
provides an interesting window into the American evangelical movement, since as 
Crawford Gribbens points out, the series provides a “barometer of evangelical cultural 
fear” (92).  It is easy to see the series’ exponential growth as a response to the post-
September 11 landscape specifically, and to evangelical concerns about the 
postmodern world generally.    52 
However, whilst it is important to recognise that much of the postmodern 
swing towards the sacred has been in the form of fundamentalisms that are 
inextricably linked to the postmodern, these disparate movements depart from the 
postmodern sacred in important ways.  They are postmodern in organising on-line or 
present simulacra of religious worship onscreen, and seem to emerge out of a 
postmodern nostalgia for “authenticity”—one of the main rhetorical strategies of the 
fundamentalisms of the Book (Jewish, Christian, Muslim) is a nostalgic discourse on 
modernity as a process of loss, stripping people of their true religion, making society a 
pit of sin, and so on and so forth.
52  Whilst this is undeniably an anti-postmodern 
discourse, the very terms of it have been set from within postmodern culture, and as 
such are hardly that dissimilar from other postmodern nostalgic yearnings.  Zygmunt 
Bauman, for instance, finds fundamentalism to be a characteristically postmodern 
phenomenon, arguing that it takes the cult of counselling and self-help experts to its 
“radical conclusion” (1997: 184), making God the ultimate prescriptive counsellor.  
He argues that the “allure of fundamentalism stems from its promise to emancipate 
the converted from the agonies of choice.  Here one finds, finally, the indubitably 
supreme authority” (184).  So fundamentalism thus both exposes the inadequacies of 
postmodern culture (by pointing out the flaw in “egalitarian” consumerism) and is 
itself implicated in it. 
Where fundamentalisms depart from the postmodern sacred, then, is in 
content, for they are generally not kindly disposed to the individualised spirituality of 
the New Age, nor of the fantastic genres.  It is not, therefore, the project of this thesis 
to claim fundamentalisms and their pop-culture spin-offs as part of the postmodern 
sacred.  Even though they arise out of postmodernity, they are produced with a 
specifically religious audience in mind (as distinguished from the secular audience of 53 
the postmodern sacred), and frequently exhibit a disdain or even hatred of the ethical 
and textual positions of the postmodern.  In contrast then, we have the postmodern 
sacred, in which the sacred is utterly entangled in popular culture.  This can manifest 
itself in the form of an ironic dismissal of religions—say for instance, the popular 
“Jesus Is My Homeboy” T-shirt sported by many a punk in the past couple years, 
Kevin Smith’s “comic fantasy” movie Dogma, or the fundamentalist church parody 
website Landover Church.
53  One could look at the ambivalent relationship between 
popular music and the sacred, for instance, the rock & roll tradition that spans from 
the vicar in the Beatles’ “Eleanor Rigby” through REM’s “Losing My Religion.”  
Similarly one could look at the entanglement of the secular and the sacred in the black 
music tradition of America, in which music stars such as Al Green, and rappers Run 
(from Run DMC) and Mase have all turned to the cloth after their success—and then, 
inevitably returned to the profane music world.  One could look at the invocation of 
the gospel church by disgraced R&B singer R.Kelly, or the theological probings of 
nymphomaniac-turned-Jehovah’s Witness Prince.
54  However, one must ultimately 
limit the scope of a project on the postmodern sacred, whilst pointing to other sites of 
possible investigation.  In my next chapter I shall turn to Jacques Derrida and his 
theory of the transcendental signifier as it has been aestheticised in postmodern 
popular culture.   
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 This starts, of course, with Marx’s famous antipathy towards religion, demonstrated 
in such comments as his “religion is the opiate of the masses.”  Though Marx’s own 
narrative in Communist Manifesto reads like an inversion of a religious millennial 
meta-narrative of redemption, nevertheless postmodernist theory has inherited the 
Marxist disdain and even sometimes disinterest in studies of religion and spirituality.  
Postmodern (often Marxist or post-Marxist) critics like Fredric Jameson and Jean 
Baudrillard have a generally dismissive attitude towards religion.  Slavoj Žižek’s 
position is complicated by his Lacanian background and is in general terms critical of 
the New Age, Buddhism and Islam, though he reserves some hope for the Christian 54 
                                                                                                                                            
legacy in The Fragile Absolute.  The same cannot be said for sociology, however, 
which has a long history of studying religion.   
2 A number of writers have written on religion and spirituality in Buffy the Vampire 
Slayer.  For a general overview on religious themes, see Wendy Love Anderson’s 
article “Prophecy Girl and the Powers That Be: The Philosophy of Religion in the 
Buffyverse.”  See also Agnes Curry’s article on Buffy and its resonances with 
Thomist theology.   
3 Tom Beaudoin has an instructive analysis of “Losing My Religion” in Virtual Faith. 
4Beaudoin in Virtual Faith, for instance, argues that members of Generation X view 
institutional churches with skepticism, if not outright hostility.  Though Beaudoin is 
keen to claim this skeptical attitude towards the institutional churches for specifically 
Generation X, arguably much contemporary thought has at the very least a skepticism 
towards institutions.  The success of Dan Brown’s Da Vinci Code, for instance, relies 
on the premise that the Catholic Church is a secretive, often untrustworthy institution.   
5 Beck and Beck-Gernsheim argue in Individualisation that larger categories like 
class, race and family have disintegrated in the contemporary (2), and as such, people 
are left to find their own way because “there are no historical models for the conduct 
of life” (26).  In practice, individualisation often means the purchase and symbolic 
deployment of commodities as a means of “personal expression.” 
6 This term derives from Derrida’s famous close reading in Of Grammatology of 
Rousseau’s use of the word “supplement”.  Derrida ascribes two functions to 
supplement—firstly, as it is most commonly read, that the supplement “cumulates and 
accumulates presence” (144). So the supplement is, firstly, an addition.  
Simultaneously though, Derrida argues, the supplement “adds only to replace [. . .] it 
intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of” (145).  The supplement, therefore, both 
adds to and replaces the sign.  I shall examine the notion of the supplement further in 
Chapter Four, where I analyse the supplemental relationship between Christianity and 
the New Age in the postmodern sacred.   
7 See for instance Buffy’s comment about religious reliquaries, often used to hold the 
fingers of saints, “note to self: religion creepy” (“What’s My Line” Part 1 2010).   
8 The American Library Association lists J.K Rowling as the fourth most 
“challenged” author in American Libraries between 1990 and 2004, a challenge being 
a formal, written complaint requesting the material be removed from the library.  
Whilst most challenges tend to be due to sexual content or “offensive” language, it is 
clear that J.K Rowling has attracted these challenges due to the fantastic elements in 
her works.  See the ALA website for a full list of challenged authors: 
http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/bannedbooksweek/challengedbanned/challengedbanned.ht
m#mfcb 
9 This, of course, raises the issue of class, and indeed its sedimentation as aesthetic 
taste as described by Pierre Bourdieu. 
10 I have not had time to go into Torchwood, which has only recently begun screening 
here in Australia.  The series is set in contemporary Wales and features a team who 
fight otherworldly monsters who have slipped through a dimensional portal.  In short, 
like The X-Files (which I do discuss in Chapter Two) the series brings into being a 
whole host of supernatural occurrences.  Most interestingly, Torchwood features a 
number of instances of queer sexuality, which is perhaps not surprising given that it 
was created by British Queer As Folk creator Russell T Davies  
11 Jacques Derrida terms God a “transcendental signified,” (Positions 19-20). a 
concept I shall examine in greater detail in the following chapter. 55 
                                                                                                                                            
12 This point has some rather interesting implications for postmodernist theory, for the 
postmodern point that the reality of space and being has somehow been elided by 
media simulation seems to nostalgically place Being into the un-retrievable past. 
Eliade suggests the traditional sacred places the possibility of placing it in the present.  
Clearly, however, millennial longing for the apocalypse shows a disgust with the 
present, for as James Berger points out the world “must end because in some crucial 
sense it has [already] ended” (7).  Given the “end of” discourses that postmodernity 
has accrued (history, the author, originality, rationality, theory, pop music and so on) 
it’s hard not to see how contemporary fundamentalists have taken postmodern 
anxieties and articulated them through older theological language of the ontological 
foundations of space, being and time (or lack there-of).   
13 See Olson’s discussion for a critique of Elaide’s ahistorical and unified conception 
of spirituality.   
14 Think, for instance, of his infamous “disenchantment” thesis, which seems to 
suggest at times the end result of capitalism was a society of technicians disassociated 
from the possibility of a real engagement with the spiritual or even the supernatural.   
15 Baudrillard, for instance, describes in “The Precision of Simulacra” how the map 
precedes the territory in postmodernism and how today it is “the territory whose 
shreds slowly across the extent of the map” (1).   
16 Susan Stewart’s post-structuralist work on nostalgia in On Longing is especially 
relevant here.  Stewart poignantly defines nostalgia as “the repetition that mourns the 
inauthenticity of all repetition” (23) and argues that even as the nostalgic text recalls 
the past into the present it simultaneously recalls its loss.  The nostalgic text aims to 
reproduce the aesthetics and ideologies of the longed-for past but cannot remove itself 
from its position in the present.   Stewart argues that the desire of the nostalgic text to 
remove the gap between signifier and signified (thus creating a stable referent) 
becomes linked with a desire for origins, for original context, and thus original 
signification.  She points that the womb is frequently constructed as the original site, 
“the utopia of biology and symbol united within the walled city of the maternal” (23) 
and it is this idea of pre-birth, birth and beginnings that suffuses nostalgia.  One could 
suggest tht this desire for origin in the womb seems a desire to re-enter a Lacanian 
mirror-stage, before the subject enters the adult imaginary, the world of multi-
accentual signification.  I take this point up in greater detail in Chapter Six.   
17 That sacred time can be accessed only by appropriating suitable “shamanic” rituals 
from an exoticised “primitive” Other. 
18 Though there nevertheless remains the potential for Eliade’s work to be used by 
fascist movements.   
19 See Chapter Five for a more in-depth look at the “return of the real” discourse after 
September 11.   
20 Antonia Levi for instance notes that the anime Wolf’s Rain was translated from 
Japanese into English by fans and made available a mere 22 hours after its first 
broadcast in Japan. 
21 Youtube (http://youtube.com) is a website where people can post and watch video 
clips online.  Most of these clips are popular culture related, excerpts from TV shows 
and music videos.  Myspace, on the other hand, is more of a virtual community.  
Users post profiles of themselves, photos, videos etc, and music artists can showcase 
their songs.  Part of the allure of Myspace is that people can add other people’s 
profiles as their “friends” and send them messages.  Since many celebrities have 
profiles, Myspace promises the possibility of virtually interacting with celebrities—56 
                                                                                                                                            
and then there are the media-hyped stories of bands like the Artic Monkeys becoming 
famous through the site.   
22 Stealing the term from William Burroughs, Bakutman calls the postmodern virtual 
subject, “terminal identity: an unmistakeably doubled articulation in which we find 
both the end of the subject and a new subjectivity constructed at the computer station 
or television screen” (9).   
23 An argument notably made by Francis Fukuyama after the collapse of the Berlin 
Wall and the “victory” of capitalism over socialism.  Fredric Jameson, too, suggests 
that history is over, given that postmodernism is marked by a profound ability to think 
historically in any other way besides the aesthetic.   
24 See Michel Foucault’s “What Is An Author?” for a discussion of the author as a 
function of discourse, required to assign attributes like “creativity” and “profundity” 
to certain types of texts (124).    
25 See for instance, Fredric Jameson’s essay “The End of Temporality.” 
26Žižek’s analysis of the paranoid fantasy of The Matrix is instructive here.  He says 
“our reality is that of the free agents of the social world we know, but in order to 
sustain this situation, we have to supplement it with the disavowed, terrible, 
impending fantasy of being passive prisoners in the prenatal fluid of the Matrix” 
(1999: 26).  In a similar way, American individualism is supplemented by the 
paranoid suspicion and utter subjectification of the conspiracy theorist. 
27 This is a point Baudrillard himself makes with regard to the first Gulf War in his 
provocatively titled The Gulf War Did Not Happen, that the media saturation 
combined with the “surgical” precision of the war combined to make it, in fact, not a 
real war but a virtual war.  He says of the 24 hour CNN coverage: “the closer we 
approach the real time of the event, the more we fall into the illusion of the virtual” 
(49).  Baudrillard takes up these ideas again after September 11 in The Spirit of 
Terrorism but argues that S11 retains the symbolic dimension of an exchange of death 
as well as its virtual simulation.  He says “[t]he collapse of the World Trade Centres is 
unimaginable, but that is not enough to make it a real event.  An excess of violence is 
not enough to open on to reality.  For reality is a principle, and it is this principle 
which is lost” (Baudrillard, 2003: 28) 
28 Patricia Cohen’s obituary in The New York Times, for instance, charmingly quoted 
Alan Sokal and Jean Breaumont’s complaint that “if the texts seem incomprehensible, 
it is for the excellent reason that they mean precisely nothing.”  More kindly, Matthew 
Beaumont in The Guardian arts blog, took the opportunity to ask what comes after 
postmodernism.   
29 See Chapter Five for more on anti-postmodern postmodernism, particularly in 
reference to September 11 and the “return of the real” rhetoric that followed.   
30 Jameson’s analysis of the postmodern can be a little unclear, since it is occasionally 
unclear whether he is talking about the postmodern as a historical era, as a mode of 
aesthetics in art and architecture, or of postmodern theory itself.  For instance, he 
begins Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism with “it is safest to 
grasp the concept of the postmodern as an attempt to think historically in an age that 
has forgotten how to think historically in the first place” (1991: ix), a sentence about 
what theories of the postmodern attempt to do, though confusingly, one could just as 
easily read it as a statement about the intent of postmodernism to think historically, 
which would run counter to the rest of Jameson’s argument.   57 
                                                                                                                                            
31 Jameson sees the pastiching impulse in such texts as George Lucas’s American 
Graffiti, Chinatown, Body Heat, as well as in architecture such as Toronto’s Eaton 
Centre and Los Angeles’s Westin Bonaventure Hotel.   
32 However, it must be noted that the notion of “real world” texts nevertheless 
continues to separate the sitcom or political drama from science fiction, fantasy or 
horror. 
33 They say, “in the passage to the informational economy, the assembly has been 
replaced by the network as the organisation model of production, transforming the 
forms of cooperation and communication within each productive site and among 
productive sites” (295, italics original) 
34Deleuze and Guattari oppose the rhizome to that of the classical metaphor of the tree 
of knowledge, the “system of thought [that] has never reached an understanding of 
multiplicity” (5).   
35Žižek points this out when he suggests that “there are features [of his thought] that 
justify calling Deleuze the ideologist of late capitalism” (2004: 184), using examples 
such as the Deleuzian multiple “intensities” of porn, and the “becoming-machine” of 
Transformers.   
36 Jameson uses the example of Body Heat as a distant remake of James M. Cain’s 
Double Indemnity (Postmodernism 20). 
37 Or, in the case, of postmodern science fiction, to imagine the future outside of other 
science fiction texts.  To return to the previous example, Serenity and the Firefly 
series that spawned it is a perfect example.  An uneasy generic melding of science 
fiction and Westerns, it is grounded entirely in other texts, including classic Westerns 
like the Wild Bunch, the original Battlestar Galactica series, and the philosophy of 
Jean-Paul Sartre.  See the audio commentaries for the Firefly episode “Objects in 
Space” to hear series creator Joss Whedon talking about his use of existential 
philosophy in the series.   
38 See Chapter Six for an in-depth look at nostalgia, and how postmodernism produces 
a desire for a “real” experience outside of its mediations.   
39 Here Paul Heelas’s work on the New Age is especially relevant, particularly The 
New Age Movement: The Celebration of the Self and the Sacralisation of Modernity.  
Heelas argues that one of the characteristics of the New Age movement is the shift in 
terminology away from “religion” which is associated with the traditional churches 
and towards a more properly lived, real “spirituality.” 
40 In which the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published pictures of the Prophet 
Muhammad, provoking protests across the world by Muslims, as well as the re-
publication of the offending cartoons by other newspapers as “free speech.”  See for 
instance, Gwladys Fouché’s article in The Guardian "Cartoon Row Spreads across 
Europe." 
41 A number of writers have talked about re-enchantment as a postmodern 
phenomenon.  See for instance Jane Bennett, as well as George Ritzer.  George Ritzer 
is a major proponent of re-enchantment theory, arguing that contemporary “cathedrals 
of consumption” (for instance, McDonald’s, Disney World and Las Vegas’s casinos) 
work to re-enchant the world in a number of ways.  As Ritzer has pointed out 
elsewhere  in McDonaldisation these cathedrals are highly rationalised, and they 
therefore need to continually re-enchant themselves to attract consumers, for as Ritzer 
says, “no characteristic of rationalisation is more inimical to enchantment than 
predictability” (98).  For Ritzer, re-enchantment provides little more than an 
opportunity for producers to renew the appetites of their consumers.  This is rather 58 
                                                                                                                                            
more pessimistic than Bennett, who retains the hope that affective response to an 
enchanted commodity might provoke more than just the will to consume.   
42 See here J. Lawton Winslade’s article on Buffy’s use of Wicca: "Teen Witches, 
Wicans and "Wanna-Blessed-Be's": Pop-Culture Magic in Buffy the Vampire Slayer." 
43 Olson points out that Eliade presupposes a fundamental unity to the sacred—“there 
is a basic unity underlying all religious experience” (46).  The Sacred and Profane 
theorises generally about the sacred, how it organises space and time, with making 
any distinctions between the pre-modern which he is largely concerned with, and a 
modern which Eliade himself acknowledges to be desacralised.  Thus we end up with 
a universal theory that can only be applied to modernity by inference, since Eliade’s 
distinction between the pre-modern and the modern are implicit, as when he contrasts 
a modern desacralised approach to eating with a pre-modern spiritual approach (14).  
Nevertheless, this remains a profound problem for a writer with Eliade’s aspirations, 
which aspires to be a “general introduction to the histories of religion” (18).Whilst 
Eliade at times makes clear that particular religious traditions are indeed a product of 
their histories (16), he is unable or unwilling to incorporate that insight more fully 
into his methodology.  That particularising gesture is lost in his haste to make 
pronouncements of universality of the (unitary) religious experience.  Eliade’s elision 
of the differences between different religious traditions is profoundly problematic for 
the postmodern critic, attentive to concerns of gender, race, class and sexuality, since 
that elision ends up being an erasure of the specificity of different traditions.  Alice 
Kehoe argues in regard to Eliade’s appropriation of shamanism that it amounts to an 
“arrogant cultural imperialism that denies full humanity to the first nations of the 
Americas” (n.pag). 
44 Or at least, did have an ontological foundation prior to the destabilising effects of 
postmodernism. 
45 As indeed people continue to do in many parts of the world right at this moment. 
46 For instance, the Passion of the Christ, the Left Behind movies, and to a lesser 
extent The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe.   
47 The alignment of business with the profane can be seen in Christianity’s long-
standing antipathy towards capital, starting with Jesus’ clash with the money-lenders 
in the Temple as described in Matthew 12:12.  The opposition between the sacred and 
business is notable, for instance, Christianity, Judaism and Islam all have prohibitions 
on usury, though to different degrees of strictness.  Resentment against money-lenders 
was often a flare for anti-semitism in the Middle Ages, famously shown in the figure 
of Shylock in Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice.   
48 The Catholic catechism describes the sacrament of marriage thus: “In his mercy 
God has not forsaken sinful man.  The punishments consequent upon sin, ‘pain in 
childbearing’ and ‘toil in the sweat of your brow,’ also embody remedies that limit the 
damaging effects of sin.  After the fall, marriage helps to overcome self-absorption, 
egoism, pursuit of one’s own pleasure, and to open oneself to the other, to mutual aid 
and to self-giving” (402) 
49 Say in the ubiquity of pornography and porn-derived culture—the Playboyification 
of culture that has resulted in the fame of Paris Hilton etc. 
50 Even the American constitution in early modernity signals the beginnings of that 
shift—alone in the world, Americans have the right to the pursuit of happiness.  
51 The meanings of the rosary are, at best, ambivalent.  It could either be taken as an 
expression of devout Catholicism, or as ironic fashion item—the later being employed 
by fashionistas and Goths alike from Madonna onwards. 59 
                                                                                                                                            
52 See Karen Armstrong’s The Battle For God for a comprehensive explanation of 
how fundamentalisms arose in the twentieth century as a reaction to modernity and 
the legacy of colonialism. 
53 Accessible online at http://www.landoverbaptist.org/ 
54 Although he had long explored spiritual themes, Prince released a Jehovah’s 
Witness concept album called “The Rainbow Children” in 2001.   60 
Chapter Two 
‘Something Up There’: Transcendental Gesturing in New Age 
Influenced Texts 
 
 
 
Spike sacrificing himself to save the world on Buffy (“Chosen” 7.22) 
 
The last few years have seen religion return to public discourse in the West 
with a vengeance, from the September 11 attacks on New York to the increasingly 
political significance of the Christian Right in America.  Much of which has been in 
the form of religious fundamentalism(s) (however contested a term this may be).  To 
some observers, the return of religion has marked a polarisation of society between 
secular and religious, demonstrated in the “blue state/red state” theorising of a divided 
America in the aftermath of the 2004 election.  Religious scholar Massimo Introvigne 
argues that whilst there is a general increase in interest in religion or the spiritual, 
little of this has benefited traditional institutions.  He points out that half of the 
citizens of the European Union identify themselves as “religious” without attending 61 
church services.  Interestingly, this means that this group of people, who believe in a 
sometimes rather nebulous form of God, often distinguished from the God of 
Christianity and its churches, “paradoxically represent the real religious majority 
group in Western Europe” (Introvigne n.p.).  It is arguable that this group represents a 
significant group in the U.S and Australia too.  This group, who believe in some kind 
of spiritual power without necessarily belonging to a religious institution, are just as 
likely to encounter the sacred in popular culture as in a church, synagogue or mosque. 
In Virtual Faith, his study of contemporary spirituality, Tom Beaudoin 
suggests that the chief point of contact with spirituality for Generation Xers is in 
popular culture, as distinct from organised religion.  For Beaudoin, the 
spiritual/commodity relationship is not the paradox that many might see.  In fact, he 
argues compellingly that the sacred is not divorced from culture; rather, it is an 
intrinsic part of it.  The images of Christianity are able to be appropriated by products, 
recontextualised and reworked into different places within the culture.  One should 
keep in mind Jane Bennett’s point about the multiplicity of possibilities and meanings 
the enchanted commodity can create, which might include the contradictory meanings 
of other-worldly contemplation and this-worldly consumption. 
Whilst there are examples of popular culture texts that can be placed within an 
identifiable religious tradition, (Mel Gibson’s Passion of the Christ, for one
1), 
arguably pop culture is rife with many more texts that are not.  What this chapter shall 
look at though, is a detraditionalised method of reading spirituality in which religious 
signifiers are disconnected from their context, in which spirituality is to be found only 
in a series of fragmented moments.   The moments I shall mostly drawn from in this 
chapter are to be found in television series Dead Like Me, Angel and The X Files, 
though one could easily pick from any number of other culturally relevant texts—TV 62 
series Buffy,
2 Angel, Joan of Arcadia and Revelations, the Lord of the Rings books 
and movies, the immensely successful Da Vinci Code novel. 
 
Detradionalisation: Individualised Pleasure 
 
As I argued in the previous chapter, drawing on Lyotard’s work, the 
postmodern is marked by a scepticism towards meta-narratives.  This is manifested in 
not just a skepticism towards discursive formations, but towards the institutions from 
which those discourses have traditionally drawn power—ideological state apparatuses 
(as Louis Althusser termed them) like the education system, the legal system, 
religious institutions, the media, the family and so on.
3  What concerns us most in 
studying the postmodern sacred is the institutional churches find themselves viewed 
with skepticism by many postmodern subjects.  Whilst the Lyotardian point would 
surely be of generalised skepticism, arguably this has been exacerbated in this case by 
such theological fault-lines as female priests, widespread child abuse by the clergy, 
contraception, gay marriage, and acceptance of homosexuality generally.  As Tom 
Beaudoin aptly puts it, “institutions are suspect” (51).  Whilst it is true that some 
sections of society in the West are flocking to the mega-churches of evangelical 
Protestantism, as well as the exponential growth of Islam in the UK, for the post-
secular groups that make up the postmodern sacred’s audience, the morality of 
organised religion is increasingly divorced from their own.  Paul Heelas argues that 
for New Age spiritual movements, the very term religion has become discarded.  He 
says “‘religion’ is associated with the traditional; the dead; the misleading; the 
exclusivistic” (1996: 23).  Similarly, the critique of patriarchal institutions by 
feminists and queer activists has left traditional forms of religion looking decidedly 63 
suspect for those with any kind of anti-sexist, queer-friendly politics.  Rightly or 
wrongly, the New Age is often considered a more female and queer friendly domain 
of religious culture.  So a suspicion of institutions is an integral part of the way in 
which postmodern culture perceives the terrain of religion and spirituality.   
Postmodern scepticism towards religious institutions is the result not just of a 
general distrust of meta-narratives, but emerges from the movement towards what 
Paul Heelas calls a “detraditionalised” society.  He argues that “detraditionalisation 
involves a shift of authority; from ‘without’ to ‘within’ (1996: 2).  That means that 
institutions such as the Church no longer have a significant sway over people’s lives 
unless they choose that for themselves.  As Ulrich Beck and Elisabeth Beck-
Gernsheim argue, contemporary culture is individualised, and tradition is only one 
choice amongst many that one must make in organising one’s life.  
Detraditionalisation therefore problematises the idea of a community of religious 
believers that we find in traditional forms of the sacred; postmodern subjects are not 
born into community, communities are chosen to belong to or to remain in.
4
That detraditionalised shift, from without to within, manifests itself in the 
postmodern move away from the kind of discipline that Foucault argued characterised 
the modern state.  The modern state manifested its power in terms of an internalised 
disciplining of the body and the mind, an internal self-surveillance like the panopticon 
that Foucault famously uses as an example in Discipline and Punish.  The panopticon 
model, however, has been displaced in postmodernity, for the notion of a single point 
of surveillance (which precipitates the internalisation process for Foucault) has 
become impossible, given that postmodern culture is so widely dispersed.  Arguably 
instead, centres of surveillance are multiple and contradictory, the regulatory State 
being contradicted by the dictates of advertising
5 and so on.  Under such a 64 
circumstance, frequently the only commonality is a capitalistic injunction to consume, 
since as Zygmunt Bauman points out, postmodern identities are formed under a 
“pleasure-seeking” role (Bauman 179).  Indeed, if one were to look for a postmodern 
compulsion, one would find, with Žižek, that the postmodern compulsion, such as it 
is, would be most likely “to enjoy!”
6  This marks a remarkable shift from the sober 
Protestant work ethic that Weber suggests fuelled the growth of capitalism in the first 
place, and is suggestive of the postmodern shift from production towards 
consumption—and thus the individualised form of consumption that gives rise to the 
postmodern sacred. 
This shift to pleasure seeking, however, is not necessarily tied to the sacred.  
Indeed, Bauman points out that “postmodern cultural pressures, while intensifying the 
search for ‘peak-experiences’, have at the same time uncoupled it from religion-prone 
interests and concerns, privatised it, and cast mainly non-religious institutions in the 
role of purveyors of relevant services” (180).   Paraphrasing Weber, Bauman calls this 
process ‘this worldly ecstasy’ and argues that the postmodern version “abolish[es] the 
concept of ‘non-peakers’ altogether and declare[s] peak-experience a duty and 
realistic prospect for everybody” (180).  He finds peak-experience to have been 
separated from “religion-inspired practices of self-denial and withdrawal from 
worldly attractions” (180).  Postmodern textual producers deploy “peak-experience” 
to stimulate consumer desire and purchase.  Peak-experience is suggested to increase 
in intensity and fulfillment, with the promise of complete and total ecstasy always just 
over the horizon. 
What the postmodern shift towards pleasure-seeking means for the 
postmodern sacred, though, is that is it needs to be understood first and foremost as a 
pleasurable experience.  It is not meant usually to be instructive, to educate, or to lead 65 
the wandering flock back into the churches.  It is this emphasis on pleasure that 
demarcates the postmodern sacred from evangelical attempts to create popular culture 
of their own, for instance in the surreal religious amusement parks of the United 
States such as Orlando’s “Holy Land,” or evangelical DVD releases like the CSI-
derived Miracle Scene Investigators.
7  Although it is not without its own implicit 
moral instructions (if often of a rather different sort, say of “tolerance” or the ethical 
responsibility to consume rather than religiously derived morality), popular culture in 
order to succeed as popular however, must be primarily a visceral and pleasurable 
experience. 
Indeed, part of the postmodern skepticism towards religious institutions is 
based on a perception that they are anti-pleasure, or at the very least regulate it.  This 
is manifested in discussions over contraception and abortion; to a postmodern culture 
that has almost entirely uncoupled heterosexual sex from the possibility of 
pregnancy—and thus allowed a relatively historically unique opportunity for sex to 
signify primarily pleasure—the Catholic Church’s stance on contraception seems a 
very decidedly unpostmodern anti-pleasure.  Indeed, the conceptualising of desire as 
sin is a profoundly foreign concept to postmodern subjects
8 used to their desires 
(particularly sexual) being provoked in order to sell just about anything.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 66 
Popularising the New Age: Oprah and the New Age 
 
 
 
“If only he’d joined a mainstream religion, like Oprahism, or voodoo”  
Futurama, “Hell is Other Robots” (1.09)  
 
This de-traditional, New Age shift arguably holds true for a significant part of 
the wider culture, more than merely those involved in New Age and/or Eastern 
practices like Buddhism, Taoism, yoga and meditation. Slavoj Žižek even goes so far 
as to call the New Age the hegemonic discourse of global postmodern capitalism 
(2001: 12).
9  While this overstates the case considerably—especially in an America 
where the religious Right has increasingly made its political and cultural presence 
known—it is nevertheless true that the New Age has become a significant part of the 
Western spiritual landscape.  New Age terminology has become part of the everyday 
discourse of the West, popularised by talk-shows, and a never-ending supply of self-
help experts and pop psychologists—most significantly on Oprah Winfrey’s talk 
show.  Whilst Oprah began as a sensationalist talk show not too dissimilar to modern 
day freak shows like Donahue, Jerry Springer and Ricki Lake, over the course of the 67 
90s, Oprah began to evolve to become a more “quality” talk-show.  In 1997, she 
began what she called her “change-your-life” TV.  Oprah, in the decade since, has 
specialised in the combination of New Age spirituality and self-help.  Favoured guests 
on Oprah have included Gary Zukav, author of Spirit of the Soul, John Gray, author 
of self-help hetero-gender essentialist tract Men Are Mars, Women Are From 
Venus.
10  Segments like “remembering your spirit” explicitly evoke New Age of 
conceptualisations of the self as a spiritual being, usually one that has lost its way and 
been covered over by the “baggage” of late capitalism.  This clearly recalls Paul 
Heelas’s point that for New Agers, “truth [. . .] come[s] by way of one’s own 
experience.  For this alone provides direct and uncontaminated access to the spiritual 
realm” (1996b: 21).  Oprah and her assorted experts help her viewers get in touch 
with their “real” selves, in far greater numbers than any previous New Age group. 
On one level, this emerges out of a dissatisfaction with consumer capitalism, 
but whilst projects like the “Angel Network” encourage community activism, this is 
still, as Kathryn Lofton points out, a highly consumerist version of spirituality.  She 
points out caustically that 
 
the only way religion or religious belief works for Oprah is if it is carefully 
coordinated with capitalist pleasure.  Thus, the turn to ‘spirituality’: the non-
dogmatic dogma that encourages an ambiguous theism alongside an exuberant 
consumerism. (616) 
 
Indeed, as Lofton makes abundantly clear, Oprah’s spirituality invariably comes 
attached to a product of some sort.  There is her magazine O.  There is Oprah’s 
infamous “book club,” which single-handedly has the power to make bestsellers out 
of the books she chooses.  The books on Oprah’s book club tend to be heart-warming, 
another way to remember one’s spirit.  Here reading fiction is constituted as self-
improvement, not so much of one’s mind as one’s soul—“part of a commitment to 68 
change people by changing how they view, and participate in, the world around them” 
(Parkins 148).  There are the endless array of products personally approved by 
Oprah—shows with titles like “Oprah’s Favourite Things” encourage viewers to 
model their own consumption on Oprah’s presumably more spiritually enlightened 
preferences.  Then there are the experts on her show who frequently have books and 
products of their own to hawk.  All these work to position Oprah as one of what 
Bauman calls the “‘prophets’ of peak-experience, [. . .] those able to consume “more 
refined products [. . .] in a more sophisticated manner” (1997: 181).  Oprah teaches 
her viewer how to consume in a more spiritual manner.  The obvious paradox of 
Oprah’s brand of spirituality then is that while it seems to emerge as a response to the 
excesses of consumerism, it poses a consumerist solution to that problem.
11  
 
 
 
Homer talking with God on The Simpsons (“Homer the Heretic” 4.03)  
 
Of course, what separates Oprah from the postmodern sacred is that Oprah is 
supposed to be factually “true.”  The texts of the postmodern sacred are fiction.  The 
incredible success of Oprah has helped popularised New Age ideas and symbols, to 
make them familiar and more easily appropriable for fictional usage.  Oprah has 
helped popularise an individualised, de-traditional approach to spirituality and 
religion.  Oprah and her guests, however, rarely explicitly condemn “organised” 69 
religion—that would only alienate viewers.  Instead, we see a New Age model of 
inclusion, one that sees figures like angels appropriated from Christianity, and “spirit” 
being made vaguely equivalent to God.  As Wendy Parkins points out, the “spiritual 
discourse spoken by Oprah and her guests [in the 1998 season] was broadly inclusive, 
speaking of ‘karma’ and ‘grace’ in equal parts” (149).  Of course, such a relativist, 
New Age perennialist outlook is bound to infuriate Christians; even as it includes 
Christian motifs it has implicitly discarded Christianity’s exclusive purchase on 
spiritual truth.   
It is easy then to see how the postmodern sacred takes the “real world” New 
Age ideas of people like Oprah and then transfers them into fictional texts.  The 
postmodern sacred takes a suspicion of institutions as its departure point, but it is also 
unwilling to discard the entire symbolic tradition of Western Judeo-Christian 
religions.  Indeed, it is often keen to claim the ground of “real” spirituality for itself, 
against hypocritical religious dogma and religious figures who appear more intent on 
maintaining power than in seeking after the sacred.  This is, of course, a reductive 
reading of religious institutions, one that often takes the excesses of 
“fundamentalism” as metonymic of the entire wide sweep of Christianity.  Indeed, 
one suspects the success of Dan Brown’s The Da Vinci Code rests precisely on this 
premise, on not just its conspiracy theory approach to religion (that is, that Jesus and 
Mary Magdalene had children together) but upon its opposition of “real” spirituality 
to the institution of the Catholic Church.
12  Whilst the postmodern sacred is unwilling 
to accept the authority of religious institutions in discerning truth, it is nevertheless 
happy to use the symbols associated with those institutions.  The postmodern sacred 
often takes a willful delight in the symbolic pilfering from religious traditions, taking 
pleasure in heretical reconfigurings. 70 
An example of the distance between much contemporary popular culture and 
organised religion occurs in The Simpsons episode “Homer the Heretic” (4.03).  In 
the episode, Homer has a number of dreams in which he converses with the Christian 
God.  Like Homer, even God would prefer to be “watching football” than attending 
church.  In fact, Reverend Lovejoy “really displeases” God.  In this version of 
detraditionalised spirituality, we see Homer’s “heresy” of not attending church allied 
with bodily pleasure—sleeping in, Homer dancing in his underwear, eating waffles.  
Traditional Christian practice is suggested to be boring, judgemental and hypocritical, 
embodied by Reverend Lovejoy and Homer’s irritating neighbour Ned Flanders.  
Homer says to God “I’m a not a bad guy, I work hard, and I love my kids and why 
should I spend half my Sunday hearing about how I’m going to hell.”  Significantly, 
though, this episode also features Homer at his most spiritual—attired in monk’s garb, 
he communes with nature in his backyard.  Homer says “so I figure I should just try to 
live right and worship you in my own way” (4.03)—a postmodern religious statement 
if ever there was.  Whilst the episode ends with the normative closure of Homer being 
rescued from a fire by a multi-faith fire engine crew and rejoining his church, God 
consoles him by saying “don’t feel bad Homer, 9 out of 10 religions fail in their first 
year” and then with the open-ended statement “the meaning of life is…”  This leads to 
an ambivalent closure to the episode at best, whilst Homer has rejoined the flock, it is 
obvious that meaning cannot be found in organised religion.  The Simpsons is, of 
course, a realistic text of sorts (if rather tenuously in this particular episode), so one 
would not technically consider it as part of the postmodern sacred, but this particular 
episode evocatively sums contemporary postmodern approaches to religion.  The 
question then, is how does the postmodern sacred make use of these individualised 
and de-traditionalised New Age ideas and practices? 71 
 
 
The Transcendental Signifier or, the New Age in pop culture 
 
 
George looking at the afterlife on Dead Like Me (“Pilot” 1.01) 
 
The French post-structuralist Jacques Derrida provides an interesting way into 
thinking through how both New Age and Judeo-Christian ideas might function in 
popular culture.  Derrida’s thoughts about religion are tremendously complex and 
more usually considered in terms of Judaism and Christianity (see for instance Caputo 
1997, Caputo et al 2005 and Cixous 2004).  Derrida argues that God functions as a 
“transcendental signified,” inhabiting a position outside the usual realm of 
signification (1981: 19-20).  He argues that while signs usually function as both 
signifier and signified,
13 the transcendental signified breaks down the chain of 
meaning, and no longer functions as a signifier.  In such a linguistic economy, this 
means, as Kevin Hart points out, that the Trinitarian Christ signals perfect meaning, 72 
the complete conflation of the sign of presence and presence itself—“since Christ is 
God, what He signifies is signified in and of itself” (Hart 8).  One recalls, too, the 
theological tradition of defining God tautologically in the Jewish Bible because of his 
“I am Who I Am” statement in Exodus 3:14.  Karen Armstrong suggests that “He 
[God] certainly did not mean, as later philosophers would assert, that he was self-
sufficient Being” (30).  Rather, the statement is designed to evade the question—
“Hebrew did not have such a metaphysical dimension at this stage and it would be 
nearly 2000 years before it acquired one [. . .] So when Moses asks who he is, God 
replies in effect: ‘Never you mind who I am!’” (1999: 30).  Interestingly, both these 
examples show how a history of readings has modified the subject in question.  Even 
God, as Armstrong shows, has a history.   
So the transcendental signified—God—is a function of language, a way of 
“nam[ing] the nameless” (Caputo, 2005: 37) as Derrida eloquently puts it.  
Significantly, too, Derrida argues that God works as a guarantor of meaning, for in the 
metaphysical-theological tradition people have only been able to speak imperfectly to 
one another.  The Biblical story of the Tower of Babel, for instance, has usually been 
taken to illustrate the folly of aspiring to match God, but humanity’s punishment as a 
result of that folly was that language became a source of antagonistic separation 
between different peoples.
14  Perfect meaning is for the Biblical God and God alone.   
But metaphysics and theology are haunted by the possibility—even 
inevitability—of their own failure.  The dream of “pure” meaning might be the pre-
condition for translation, but as Derrida shows again and again, translation does not 
leave the text un-modified.  The text can always be shown to exceed itself, to have 
currents that run counter to its explicit purpose.  And this is an idea that Derrida 
himself rigorously applies to his own corpus; for instance, Geoffrey Bennington’s 73 
Jacques Derrida was accompanied by a “Circumfession” by Derrida, a deconstruction 
of an explanation of deconstructive theory.   
Of course, it should be noted that God is merely one example of a 
transcendental signified for Derrida, however.  Drawing on Derrida, Mark C Taylor 
points out that:  
 
this does not mean [. . .] that every sign refers directly or even indirectly to 
God.  The point to be stressed is that some notion of the transcendental 
signified is required by any referential system that gives priority to the 
signified over the signifier.  While not always explicitly named God, the 
transcendental functions as the purported locus of truth that is supposed to 
stabilise all meaningful words” (1984: 105).   
 
Derrida argues that the transcendental signified structures the entire history of 
Western metaphysics as a guarantor of meaning and furthermore that the distinction 
between signifier and signified begins to break down once one begins to question the 
possibility of such a “pure” meaning (1981: 19-20).  Whilst meaning—the signified—
is usually privileged over the signifier, that distinction becomes collapsed by the 
Derridean insight that the signified is itself a signifier.  For as Taylor says, 
“consciousness, therefore, deals only with signs and never reaches the thing itself” 
(1984: 104).  Rather than “representing” a pure Platonic idea or material object 
outside of signification, we find, only and ever, more signs.  Most especially then, 
God is a mutable sign whose meanings are shaped by a history of signification. 
Whilst Derrida explores (and disrupts) the metaphysical and theological 
implications of the transcendental signified, in this chapter I propose to modify his 
concept in my reading of New Age style narratives to what I will term the 
transcendental signifier.  The transcendental signifier is a recurrent trope of the 
postmodern sacred, a way of gesturing towards the transcendental without using the 
specific language of theology.  Rather than referring to God or heaven, the New Age 74 
uses such transcendental signifiers as “spirit,” “the afterlife,” “the great whatever.”  
Frequently detraditional spirituality posits the notion of something “up there,” unable 
to be conceptualised any further.  This often has the feel of a sort of lay negative 
theology, God—or spirit, or energy, or whatever you want to call it—is unable to be 
explained except by recourse to what it is not, the world down here of signs and the 
exchange of meaning.  Whilst traditional theology has holy texts and a history of 
theological interpretation with which to buttress the transcendental signified, New 
Age-ised language will often strip the transcendental signified to its barest,
15 leaving 
only the notion that there exists something else not of this world.  So the 
transcendental becomes even more significant in talking about the shift towards a 
New Age language of spirituality than in the Judeo-Christian model, which retains 
certain anthropomorphic features in the Godhead, and Christ (for Christians).  The 
New Age takes the transcendental signified and disconnects it from the figure of God, 
who is associated with the “dead” traditional religions.
16
The transcendental signifier works most clearly in the postmodern sacred as a 
means of making some kind of gesture towards the transcendent without having to tie 
that (fictional) ontology to any established real-world religious tradition.  Gesturing to 
the transcendent is a characteristic textual strategy of the postmodern sacred, for it 
allows the pleasure of play with the transcendent without the commitment or even 
need for belief that an established religion would have.  It fits perfectly with the 
postmodern sacred’s vacillation between belief and unbelief, and demonstrates its 
comfort with the seemingly more ethically palatable New Age.
17  The transcendental 
signifier is suggestive rather than descriptive, and perhaps that is all it can ever be 
(although we shall see in the following chapter how the corporeality of the image 
functions in a different way in the postmodern sacred).  More kindly, it is perhaps an 75 
admission of the human inadequacy—since we cannot definitively know what the 
supernatural or transcendent is, it is best not to try.  And any definitive reading would 
run counter to the New Age idea of discarding “dogma,” which places the 
transcendent largely in the individual’s experience of it. 
My argument is that the postmodern sacred uses the language of the New Age 
–“spirit” instead of God–as a means of grounding its textual universes outside of the 
bounds of traditional religion (but not as an ontological grounding of reality itself).  
Massimo Introvigne argues that “popular culture [. . .] confirms that stories our 
generation of non-belonging believers [. . .] like to tell and hear are not about secular 
universes, but involve notions of a Higher Power.  These stories, however, more often 
than not, have no sovereign, omnipotent transcendent God” (n.p.).  The television 
series Angel provides a useful example,  for the titular hero is sent on missions 
relayed by his sidekicks Doyle and Cordelia from the “Powers That Be,” a phrase that 
is both suggestive of a surplus of meaning and absent in actual detail.  These “Powers 
That Be” fulfill some of the traditional roles that God has occupied; sending Angel on 
his quests for Good and on his road to personal redemption, yet it remains unclear if 
these powers have created the world, or have any power to intervene personally, and 
so on.  Interestingly the character Cordelia ascends to a “higher plane of being” in the 
finale of Series 3 (“Tomorrow” 3.22), again a phrase more redolent with New Age 
connotations than with those of the Judeo-Christian tradition.  One needs to note, 
though, that even though the postmodern sacred uses the language of spirit, it is not 
necessarily making a statement about the ontological nature of reality itself (though 
characteristically postmodern irony would refuse to disallow that as a possibility 
either).  These are fantastic texts, after all, not meant to be read in a straight-forward 
Realist fashion.  Much of the relationship between the postmodern sacred and 76 
“reality” is metaphorical,
18 what science fiction theorist Darko Suvin would call an 
“estranged” relationship to realistic representation.
19   
The postmodern sacred’s use of the transcendental signifier can be seen 
clearly in the television series Dead Like Me.  Dead Like Me is the story of George, 
an 18 year old who is killed by a toilet seat dropped from the space station Mir.  After 
her death, rather than go to heaven or indeed hell (because she’s “not that 
interesting”), she remains on Earth and becomes a “Reaper,” a harvester of souls.  
Though Dead Like Me is set largely in a realistic universe—this is no futuristic sci-fi 
or medieval fantasy world—it does nevertheless dramatise and embroider a post-death 
cosmology.  Death is set in motion in this world by “gravelings,” small malevolent 
creatures.  People’s deaths are almost always inevitable and fated, the details given to 
George’s boss Rube, with a location and ETD (Estimated Time of Death).
20  While on 
the one hand, we see the Reapers go on living after their deaths (some seventy years 
or so in Rube’s case); they themselves do not know what happens to people when 
they die.  Reapers get to go on living like the rest of us, more or less, having to hold 
down day jobs they hate, balance relationships, and enjoy the pleasures of life like 
“delicious key-lime pie” (“Pilot 1.01) and so on.  So what is significant about the way 
Dead Like Me characterises the after-life is that the final destination where people go 
after their deaths is never specified—Rube says “it’s not for us to know” (“Pilot,” 
1.01).  But it is, however, gestured to, “the great whatever” as George puts it 
(“Curious George,” 1.03).  We see manifestations of the afterlife and the recently 
deceased follow, but the Reapers themselves can’t follow.  The afterlife is 
individualised and varies depending upon the person who has just died—it is, 
amongst other things, a carnival, the cliffs of Dover, a Hindu goddess.  The sacred, 
then, becomes amorphously pluralistic, able to be manifested in multiple ways, 77 
though always with the same transcendental source.  This is, once again, a common 
New Age point
21 that has been taken up by the postmodern sacred’s fictional texts 
and used for its own pop-cultural pleasure. 
Thus it is that the postmodern sacred is notable for the way it separates this 
transcendental gesturing from traditional anthromorphised theology.  The afterlife 
could be a Christian heaven or hell, but it could just as likely be a fun fair or Hindu 
goddess.  Any kind of definitive theological reading is impossible in the world of 
Dead Like Me.  Similarly with God, when George asks Rube about the existence of 
God, his response is a blunt “you tell me,” and other theological figures such as 
angels are reconceptualised as “upper management types” (“Pilot,” 1.01).
22  On one 
hand, this could be seen as a failure of imagination for the postmodern sacred, an 
inability or unwillingness to fully conceptualise other realms of existence.  On the 
other, gesturing to the transcendent is one way in which the postmodern sacred 
opposes its spirituality to the religious traditions.  It suggests that the real spirituality 
has got very little to do with traditional theology, indeed it largely discards the 
concept of God—or at the very least it is at pains to distinguish itself from the God of 
the Jewish, Christian and Islamic traditions.  Instead, Dead Like Me provides a New 
Agey, vaguely Eastern style philosophy.  As Rube says, “life and death have to exist 
in perfect harmony.  Yin and Yang, call it what you want, but that balance has to be 
maintained” (“Pilot” 1.01).  But if Dead Like Me draws on Eastern ideas, it 
appropriates them into a decidedly Western viewpoint—conspicuously absent are 
ideas like re-incarnation.  Dead Like Me thus ultimately proves unable to provide 
many answers for the questions it poses about the afterlife, and perhaps this is to be 
the credit of the show that it refrains from giving us easy or familiar answers (it’s not 
for us to know).  Thus we end in the real world rather than the transcendent; the last 78 
episode “Haunted” (2.15) ends with George affirming the pleasures of living (sort of), 
saying, “it’s not so bad, being dead like me.”  Interestingly, this ending comes quite 
close to the religious dogma Dead Like Me attempts to distinguish itself from.  
George is “dead” in this world with something else to look forward to after, 
possessing a surer knowledge of the here-after than any believer can have.  It might be 
“not so bad” being dead like her but there is always the prospect of going somewhere 
else.  Dead Like Me would surely be more radical if there was nowhere else to go, but 
as it is, this suggests that there remains a remarkably strong continuity between the 
New Age and Judeo-Christianity.   
The co-ordinates for many of the New Age style SF/fantasy universes were 
arguably set by Star Wars, which combined portentous seriousness with pop-Buddhist 
ideas and an absence of formal “real world” religious institutions.  Star Wars, of 
course, provides another key example of the transcendental signifier with its 
suggestive phrase “The Force.”  Whilst it predates most of the texts I have analysed 
by at least 15 years (and thus is occurring in a slightly different cultural context), the 
initial Star Wars trilogy remains one of the key touch-stones for visual science fiction 
and fantasy.  It is arguable that Star Wars’ use of the transcendental signifier 
precipitates at least part of the postmodern sacred’s move towards nebulous New 
Aged conceptions of spirit.  In the concept of “the force,” George Lucas clearly draws 
more on Eastern, or at least New Age, ideas—the force is roughly analogous to the 
“chi” in Taoism.  Indeed, more than one writer has read Star Wars as a Buddhist text 
(see for instance Matthew Bortolin’s The Dharma of Star Wars).  One of the many 
disappointments that fans had with the second trilogy is that George Lucas decided to 
explain “the Force” in pseudo-genetic terms, creating the less satisfying concept of 
“midi-chlorians” to explain the Jedis’ mystical powers.  It’s arguable then that the 79 
power of the transcendental signifier lies in being suggestive, in not telling too much.  
But Star Wars is not alone in using New Age style transcendental signifiers—other 
ways of conceptualising the transcendental signifier in the postmodern sacred include 
fantasy author Robert Jordan’s “the Light” in his Wheel of Time series,
23 “heaven 
dimensions” in Buffy, and a kind of barely articulated divine Providence in Peter 
Jackson’s Lord of the Rings movie adaptations.   
So, whilst light on details, the postmodern sacred is characteristic for its 
suggestion that spirituality exists through what we might call a surplus of meaning.  
The postmodern sacred, then, frequently makes recourse to symbol rather than to 
didactic explanation; shifting from a literal relationship to religion to a metaphorical 
one.  This has, of course, certain theological precedents in the Christian tradition, for 
as Avery Dulles argues, “revelation never occurs in a purely interior experience or an 
unmediated encounter with the God.  It is always mediated through “symbol [that] 
suggest[s] more than it can clearly describe or define” (Dulles 131).  Although Dulles 
is clearly describing a Christian model of divine revelation, symbol that suggests more 
than it can describe sums up rather well the postmodern sacred’s use of the 
transcendental signifier in pop culture.  In Christianity, this mediation of symbol 
could occur in any number of contexts; the symbol of the Cross can be found in 
Church art, worn as jewellery, and ritually enacted in bodily movement in churches, 
homes and even on sporting fields.  In the postmodern sacred, however, we find that 
there is no transcendent revelation (or hierophany as Eliade would term it), instead we 
find that it is the symbol that is fore-grounded, in order to grasp at a transcendent that 
is almost, by definition, unrepresentable. 
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The Alien as Transcendental Signifier 
 
 
  Samantha Mulder’s alien abduction on The X Files (“Little Green Men” 2.01) 
 
The transcendental signifier emerges in a slightly different manner in 
supernatural/horror texts like the hugely popular fin de siecle television series The X-
Files, as well as its many imitators like The 4400, Supernatural and even the 
Superman prequel series Smallville (which has an X-Files influenced litany of weird 
occurrences).  I shall restrict my analysis here largely to The X-Files, which is the 
most culturally significant of those texts I have mentioned.  The structure of the 
majority of the X-Files series is simple.
24  The series centres on two FBI agents, Fox 
Mulder and Dana Scully, working on the “X-Files,” the cases the FBI has designated 
unsolvable by conventional explanations, and possibly involving the paranormal.  
Mulder is the believer, formulator of exotic theories involving such unlikely 
protagonists as aliens or ghosts, which are of course frequently found to be the truth.  
Scully, on the other hand, is the sceptic, the scientist recruited by the FBI to de-bunk 
Mulder’s work on the paranormal.   
The X-Files works as a text of the postmodern sacred in a number of ways.  
Firstly, it exhibits a postmodern distrust of “official” meta-narratives, centring largely 81 
on the activities of the US Government, its Army and law-enforcement agencies.  
Behind that very obvious paranoia (and paranoid is surely the best way to describe the 
series), though, one sees in The X-Files a Lyotardian skepticism towards 
Enlightenment-derived meta-narratives of scientific rationality.  The series, instead, 
entertains the possibility of the supernatural, with a particular interest in aliens (and 
the government’s cover-up of their existence).  A short list of the series’ plotlines 
would include an on-going alien abduction narrative, a man with pyrokinetic powers 
(“Fire” 1.12), a boy with stigmata (“Revelations” 3.11), and killer cockroaches (“War 
of the Coprophages” 3.12).  In short, The X-Files lets back in what modern science 
has sought to banish.  As Lavery et al argue that, “for many viewers, their weekly 
experience with the show is an unsettling, sometimes frightening experience that 
powerfully interrogates a consensus reality that excludes the paranormal” (12).   
While the series slogan “the truth is out there” suggests on one level an unfashionable 
attachment to truth, the truth is ultimately unknowable on The-X Files; since as 
Lavery et al point out, episodes frequently end without full resolution or explanation 
(17).  This is certainly in part because of the serial nature of the television series—full 
narrative closure must be differed for another week or even another series in order to 
maintain a viewing audience—but it’s worth pointing out that many dramatic episodic 
TV shows wrap up their plot strands weekly, only to begin anew the next week.  Yet 
even “one-off” episodes of The X-Files remain as open-ended as those involving 
long-time plotlines (such as the alien abduction of Mulder’s sister, for example).   But 
Mulder’s search to find the answers to his sister’s abduction however only finds 
merely more questions.  Truth on The X Files, while continually posited as findable, 
is forever out of reach, deferred for another week.  Conspiracies overwrite each other, 
rendering previously taken for granted knowledge suspect.  That lack of narrative 82 
closure seems to bespeak both a suspicion towards epistemological certainty—we can 
never really truly know the entirety of the truth—as well a postmodern play with 
narrative itself.   
While it might seem that The X-Files shows simply a tabloid-fuelled 
credulous postmodern willingness to entertain the most ludicrous of beliefs, arguably 
the series is more subtle than its lurid plotlines might suggest.  After all, the 
emblematic poster behind Mulder’s desk says “I want to believe”—not “I believe.”  
The series, then, is about wanting to believe in the supernatural, or the extra-
terrestrial, not being able to.  But Mulder’s take on the supernatural is scarcely the 
only position on the show (though it does seem to be the dominant one).  The counter-
balance to Mulder’s willingness to believe is Scully’s scepticism.  Scully is the voice 
of Reason and rationalism, a medical professional, who believes that life is 
explainable.  More often than not, the deficiencies of scientific rationalism are 
exposed; most of the events on The X Files are only partially explainable.  But it’s in 
the interplay between the two agents (and not just the sexual chemistry) that makes 
The X Files work—a series that only featured Mulder would have been far less 
entertaining, since the series requires the presence of rationality in order to expose its 
weaknesses (but not discard it entirely).  So, like the postmodern sacred generally, 
The X-Files is caught between belief and unbelief, unwilling to trust in rationalist 
meta-narratives, but equally unable to shed that legacy to truly believe in the 
supernatural.   
Interestingly, in some ways, the alien has become more of an 
epistemologically sustainable belief than the sacred for some secularists.  As Lynn 
Schofield Clark points out, by the 1990s some 27% of the American population 
believed that aliens had visited the earth (5).  As scientists have discovered precisely 83 
how large the universe is, the idea that life has only occurred on this one planet has 
become questionable.  Of course, this belief in alien visitation—with a particular 
focus on the “alien crash” that supposedly occurred in Roswell, New Mexico
25 in 
1947—is fuelled in some part by a recurrent fictional representation of the alien in 
science-fiction narratives like ET, Close Encounters of the Third Kind, and of course 
The X-Files.    
Throughout its run from 1993 to 2002, The X-Files doled out equal doses of 
conspiracy theorist paranoia about the American government and supernatural 
spookiness in the form of aliens, monsters and so on.  Whilst New Age style 
narratives use a language appropriated from the New Age to gesture towards the 
transcendental, in The X-Files it is the alien which functions as the transcendental 
signifier—specifically the “little grey men” often associated with alien abduction 
narratives.  Alien “encounters” in The X-Files are often rendered in the same way as 
encounters with the divine—deserted areas, a flash of white lights, mysterious 
occurrences, lapses in space and time.  Alien encounters work as another version of 
Eliade’s hierophany—a fragment of a barely explainable transcendent.  Alien 
encounters are literally transcendent; they come from above, and most definitely 
appear as “a reality of a wholly different order from ‘natural’ realities” (Eliade 10).  
Like the divine, aliens are both mysterious and powerful, unknowable, unpredictable.   
An example occurs in the episode “Little Green Men” (2.01) in which we see 
a flashback of the kidnapping of Mulder’s sister.  The room is bathed in white light, 
an alien appears at the doorway, and Samantha floats out of the window, never to 
appear again.  Aliens in The X Files, particularly in Mulder’s search for meaning in 
his own life, in some ways recall what Hugh Ruppersberg calls “the alien messiah,” 
(32) the redemptive figure in films such as ET, Close Encounters of the Third Kind, 84 
and Cocoon.  Yet if those films largely invoke, as Ruppersberg says, “a messiah 
figure [. . .] whose numinous, supra-human qualities offer solace and inspiration to a 
humanity threatened by technology and the banality of modern life” (33), The X Files 
offers no such solace.  The alien in The X Files may appear as transcendent and 
utterly Other, and as such as miraculous at times, but it is far from comforting.  
Instead, like Otto’s mysterious tremendium, alien abductions on The X Files provoke 
both awe and terror.   
Thus, the line between The X-Files’ hyper-paranoid search for the extra-
terrestrial and American evangelicals is not as firm as one might think; both use the 
figure of a corrupt and secretive government, for instance.  Read from another angle, 
The X-Files’ tag-line “the truth is out there” resembles nothing so much as an 
evangelical slogan, and Mulder’s quest for truth that of a prophet.  Both conspiracy 
theory and evangelical survivalist are simultaneously invested in modern social forms 
(the nation, the government, capitalism, the nuclear family and so on) and estranged 
from them.  The government creates these conspiracies—and it’s interesting to note 
the conspiracy theories surrounding September 11—but at the same time provides the 
possibility for recovering the truth.  It’s hard not to think of this as a redemptive 
fantasy inherent in liberal democracy itself, that the State will redeem itself somehow.   
Although the series does use the alien as a variation on the transcendental 
signifier, it should be noted that it also features New-Age styled transcendental 
gesturing to “spirit” as well.  Generically speaking, The X-Files occurs somewhere at 
the intersection of conspiracy theories, UFO abduction narratives and New Age 
spirituality, and as such has a reverence for Buddhist and particularly Native 
American spiritual practises.  The series three episode “The Blessing Way” (3.01), for 
instance, sees FBI agent Fox Mulder undergo a Navajo healing ritual.  Mulder floats 85 
in a bed in the middle of space, talking with his dead father and mentor.  The presence 
of the Navajo—codemakers for the US government in World War 2—is of course 
given a conspiracy theory gloss suitable for the show’s pre-millenial paranoia.  
Regardless, the episode and others like it suggest that real spiritual experience may 
occur anywhere if you choose to see it.  While the episode continues the tradition of 
white American appropriations of Native American, it is characteristically New Age 
in doing so, universalising “inner truth” even as it co-opts specific native traditions.   
In the broadest sense, however, The X-Files is polytheistic, dramatising 
countless versions of the supernatural to construct a strange, mysterious, even 
occasionally sacred world.  The supernatural people, animals and creatures found in 
The X-Files produce an Weberian style enchanted world—not a sentimentalised pre-
modern Arcadia but a world brimming with capricious, even malign, inexplicable 
powers.  Almost every encounter with the supernatural provokes a mysterious 
tremendium mixture of awe and terror, something most obvious in the 
transcendentally signified alien abductions.  More than any other text in the 
postmodern sacred, and perhaps this is a function of its frequent references to the 
horror genre, The X-Files retains some of the power the sacred has to terrify.  
Significantly though, like many of the texts of the postmodern sacred, The X Files 
maintains scepticism towards Christianity, yet it is unwilling to entirely discard its 
symbolic power, or the possibility of a “real” Christian supernatural/spiritual 
experience.  We see this most clearly in “Revelations,” (3.11) an episode in which 
Scully must deal with her discarded Catholic faith, and ponders whether there might 
be something beyond the scientific rationalism through which she explains the world.   
 
 86 
Fragments 
 
 
   Spike draped on a cross on Buffy (“Beneath You” 7.02) 
 
Interestingly, although the postmodern sacred is notable for its suspicion, even 
hostility, towards traditional religious institutions, it nevertheless draws on those same 
traditions for its symbolic power.  The question, then, is how to recycle religious 
motifs without an epistemological grounding that would tie the postmodern sacred to 
those suspect institutions.  As I argued in my first chapter, one of the ways in which 
the postmodern sacred can be understood is through its use of the characteristically 
postmodern textual strategy of pastiche.  The postmodern sacred, like the New Age,
26 
borrows liberally from many different traditions—Buddhist, Christian, Taoist, Native 
American, Celtic and Jewish—though perhaps because of the general suspicion with 
which the West holds Islam, it is far less likely to embrace elements of Islam.  All of 
these traditions have similar textual elements available for symbolic appropriation—
holy books and histories of interpretation, religious symbols and paraphernalia, rituals 
and ritualised bodily movements.  Perhaps unsurprisingly given their origin in a post-
Christian West, the texts using religious signifiers in a detraditionalised fashion such 
as Buffy have mostly used Christian signifiers.  Similarly, fantasy epics like Lord of 
the Rings have used Christianity creatively in their parallel universes, from 
metaphoric Christ figures (Aragorn, Frodo, C.S Lewis’s Aslan) to sacramentals such 87 
as Elvish lembas bread.  The Taoist Ursula LeGuins’ writing remains a notable and 
significant exception within the genre, with her Earthsea series
27 infused with Taoist 
concerns about the ethics and responsibility of (magical) behaviour.   
Interestingly, the third Star Trek incarnation, Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, 
provides an indicator of the cultural shift involved in the postmodern sacred.  Rather 
than the roving spaceships of the other four series (Star Trek, Star Trek: Next 
Generation, Star Trek Voyager,
28 Star Enterprise), DS9 is set on a space station near 
the planet of Bajor.  The series begins with the Federation taking control of an old 
Cardassian space station at the request of the Bajoran provisional government.  Bajor 
had been occupied by the Cardassians for the previous 50 years, and the Bajoran 
people fought a guerrilla war.  As such, DS9 is partly set in an estranged 
postcolonialist context.  Whilst earlier versions of Star Trek largely provide an atheist, 
rationalist viewpoint, Deep Space Nine is the spiritual exception in the Star Trek 
mega-text.
29
In the first episode “Emissary” (1.01), Deep Space Nine Commander 
Benjamin Sisko discovers a wormhole to an undiscovered quadrant of space, the 
Gamma quadrant.  Inside the wormhole, Sisko encounters a race of aliens who seem 
to exist outside of space and time.  These aliens occupy a central place in the Bajoran 
religion, who call them “The Prophets,” and the wormhole itself “the Celestial 
Temple.”  Over the course of the series, the Prophets are suggested to have sent 
“orbs” to communicate with the Bajoran people, and to intervene in their destinies.  
Indeed, in “Destiny” (3.15), their prophecies come true.  Because of his encounter in 
the wormhole, Sisko becomes an unwilling religious figure for the Bajorans, who dub 
him “The Emissary.”  Sisko finds it difficult to surrender (shades of New Age 88 
language already) to his role as the Emissary, preferring the atheist rationality of Star 
Fleet, although over the course of the series he learns to adjust to his religious role.   
Like many of the fictitious religions in the postmodern sacred, the Bajoran 
faith’s chief real-world referent is Buddhism, with Buddhist style robes, references to 
meditation and chanting.  But if Buddhism seems the chief referent, references to 
Christianity nevertheless abound (say in the Catholicism-recalling realpolitik that 
occurs behind the scenes in the election of the Bajoran spiritual leader).  While the 
series is limited by the necessity of conforming to an identifiably “Star Trek” style, it 
nevertheless suggests an interesting sea-change within science fiction—direct atheism 
is to be avoided, and an ambivalent relationship to the sacred, refracted largely 
through the New Age, is to be attempted.
30  Peter Linford suggests that in Deep Space 
Nine, “religion is significant only to the extent it impacts on the [individual] believer” 
(99).  In this, Deep Space Nine follows a New Age model of individualised 
spirituality, disconnection from history and wider cultures.  Ultimately, “the position 
DS9 finally holds is that where religion exists, then so be it.  Where it is absent, so 
much the better” (99).   
Slavoj Žižek makes the point regarding Star Wars: Revenge of the Sith, that 
given Star Wars’ version of the New Age (and a certain kind of pop-Buddhism), that 
it is unsurprising that the metamorphosis of Anakin into Darth Vader is tinged with a 
Christology
31 (2006: 101).  Whilst it is true that the postmodern sacred quite often 
associates aspects of Christianity into its visions of evil (say in the use of King James 
Bible style language by vampires in Season 1 of Buffy, or perhaps the monotheism of 
the Cylons in Battlestar Galactica), it needs to be noted that this use of Christ as a 
figure for Evil is only one of a number of New Age-ised tropes in the postmodern 
sacred.  The postmodern sacred is as likely to make use of Christ-figures in its 89 
characterisation of heroes; to turn to Buffy again, say in the titular heroine’s quite 
literal “leap of faith” to her death at the conclusion of Season 5 (“The Gift” 5.22).  
Yet as Jana Reiss rightly points out, that Christ-coding redeems only Buffy herself, 
ultimately “on Buffy the redemption process starts—and ends—with the individual, 
an approach that has more in common with Buddhism than Christianity” (119).  
Whilst it is true that the New Age-ised postmodern sacred remains skeptical towards 
the institutions of Christianity, and even delights in the heretical speculation of texts 
such as the Da Vinci Code, one must not mistake that anti-institutional impulse as 
specifically or solely anti-Christian.  One must instead recognise that the postmodern 
sacred remains highly indebted towards Christianity as its primary symbolic source, 
even as it looks elsewhere for an ontological foundation for its textual universes.  It is 
thus best understood as post-Christian; even as it defines itself against religious 
institutions it remains fixated on such typically Christian themes of sacrifice and 
redemption, as well as Christian symbols like the Cross or holy water.   
Avery Dulles’s insight about symbol, however, need not be solely applicable 
to a Christian tradition, for the idea that symbol suggests more than it can describe is 
quite clearly characteristic of the postmodern sacred.  Those symbols, however, are 
freely appropriated from various spiritual traditions, often without any real 
contextualisation.  Meaning, then, resides in the play of signification, or recognising 
spiritual signifiers without holding to their religious traditions of origin.  Indeed, the 
postmodern sacred can often manifest the paradoxical relationship of relying on a 
religious tradition for its symbolic power—say in the evocative Christ-symbolism 
scene of the usually mocking Buffy the Vampire Slayer in which Spike drapes 
himself across a cross, asking Buffy “can we rest now” whilst his flesh steams 
(“Beneath You,” 7.02). 90 
Jacques Derrida’s argument about trace texts seems particularly apt when 
considering the postmodern turn towards pastiche.  He argues that, rather than signify 
to a “real world” outside the text, texts contain traces “that [continue] to signal not in 
the direction of another presence, or another form of presence, but in the direction of 
an entirely other text” (1982: 65).  Whilst Realist epistemologies appeal first and 
foremost to a verisimilitude with the “real,” Derrida argues compelling that texts work 
as palimpsests of other texts.  This argument seems most compelling in considering 
texts of an unreal nature, those that do not attempt to reproduce some version of the 
generally accepted real.  This might also explain the often derivative nature of these 
texts, for they can have a stronger relationship with other texts of the same genre than 
they do with an estranged real-world referent.  The texts of the postmodern sacred are 
even more indebted to their textual predecessors, they exist as the result of the textual 
sedimentation of signs (and indeed the history of interpretation of those signs).  For 
example, one could choose to foreground any number of trace texts in the fantasy 
genre—children’s literature, medieval romances, pastorals, historical bodice-
rippers—whilst some scholars have found resonances with Thomas Aquinas’s 
theology, amongst others.  Even though one could argue that the genre attempts to 
present a version of the medieval, it is arguable that this comes first and foremost 
through the textual sedimentation of medieval literature through the aforementioned 
literary genres, as well as the inescapable influence of figures like Tolkien. 
Perhaps it is fitting then that the postmodern sacred should emerge as so 
culturally vital in age that, as Fredric Jameson argues, has forgotten how to think 
historically.  This inability to think historically is undoubtedly bound up in the 
inability to conceive of a real world outside of the text, and this is manifested in not 
only the un-noted simulation of other texts, but also in the constant and explicit 91 
intertextuality of many postmodern texts.
 32  The postmodern sacred’s invocation of 
religious signifiers, then, is hardly exceptional.  Indeed, while postmodern textuality 
may often be taken as a play on genre, and on the pleasure of recontextualising signs 
into new contexts, the postmodern sacred may also be taken as a play with belief—
specifically the belief that those appropriated symbols imply.  Symbols in this 
circumstance may then be taken as metonymic of the belief of the communities of the 
traditions that the postmodern sacred cannot quite allow itself to believe in, since the 
death of God narrative remains as important in the postmodern as the death of belief 
in the scientific meta-narratives that were supposed to replace him.  As Mark C 
Taylor poignantly says, “postmodernism opens with the sense of irrevocable loss and 
incurable fault.  This is inflicted by the overwhelming awareness of death—a death 
that “begins” with the death of God and “ends” with the death of our selves” (1984: 
6).  The postmodern sacred’s vacillation between belief and unbelief is peculiarly 
resonant.   
If as I have argued, the postmodern sacred refuses to make any 
epistemological claims about the nature of “reality,” then the question arises, what 
precisely is the point of both transcendental gesturing and the pastiche of religious 
signifiers?  It is too easy, as many religious scholars have done, to claim popular 
culture as a new site of resurgent belief in religion, and highly simplistic to map 
textual consumption onto a real-world belief (say, Christianity with Lord of the 
Rings).  Yet it is just as simplistic to entirely dismiss the rise of such texts in the 
context of a postmodern turn away from modernist atheism.  The postmodern sacred 
needs instead to be understood as the play of belief, as a movement between belief 
and unbelief.   92 
The transcendental provides an ontological framework from which the 
postmodern sacred feels free to pastiche religious signifiers from different and even 
contradictory traditions.  These religious fragments are moments that are subsumed 
within the transcendental gesture.  Even though they do, usually, come from religious 
traditions, they do not possess the same ontological value in the postmodern sacred; 
they are used instead to gesture to a transcendent distinguished from the God of 
organised religion.  The question, then arises, what happens in postmodern texts when 
a corporeal God does appear?   
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 though one could go back further and look at Cecil B DeMille’s Christian epics, for 
example. 
2 There is an established body of scholarly work on the way Buffy treats religion, see 
for instance papers by Massimo Introvigne and Wendy Love Anderson.  I turn to 
Buffy in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
3 Writing in the late Sixties, Althusser separates ISAs that function by ideology from 
the Repressive State Apparatuses that function by violence or the threat of violence—
the police, the courts, the army and so on.  He argues that the ISAs “ensure subjection 
to the ruling ideology or the mastery of its ‘practice’” (133).  Although it is clear that 
these apparatuses exert a continued cultural power, arguably the emphasis in 
postmodernity has shifted from the institutions to the information matrix of the media, 
which is now a more dispersed form of power, spanning not merely local media, but 
potentially sources from anywhere across the world on the Internet (and not only 
traditional forms like newspapers archived online but blogs or websites potentially 
run by any person with the computing ability to post their thoughts online).   
4 Beck and Beck-Gernsheim say “people used to be born into traditional societies, as 
they were into social classes or religions. Today even God himself must be chosen” 
(23). 
5 An example of this dispersal of centres of power would be the utter gap between the 
ultra-Right Fox News in the United States and the centre or marginally centre-left of 
the rest of the American networks.  Depending on the media source, the “facts” of 
public and cultural life can be wildly differing, as manifested by the number of Fox 
viewers who believed in George W Bush’s mythical WMDs, the culpability of Iraq in 
September 11 and so on.   
6 Žižek says that there is the “paradox of pleasure becoming duty in a 'permissive' 
society. Subjects experience the need to 'have a good time', to enjoy themselves, as a 
kind of duty, and, consequently, feel guilty for failing to be happy” (1999b: n.pag) 
7 This kind of capitalistic religious pop culture has been skewered, again, by The 
Simpsons in the episode “She of Little Faith” (13.06) in which Mister Burns adds 
advertising to the town’s church and a giant Vegas-style façade that features Jesus as 
a kind of Marlboro man.  Lisa asks “why is Jesus holding a lasso?” to which Homer 93 
                                                                                                                                            
replies “because he’s all man.”  The vignette is a deft critique of the American 
tendency to turn Jesus into a phallic action hero.   
8 Although Long notes the tendency for otherwise a-religious straight people to slip 
into a religious language of “sin” in order to articulate their discomfort with 
homosexuality (7).   
9 He says, “at the very moment when, at the level of the ‘economic infrastructure, 
 ‘European’ technology and capitalism is triumphing world-wide, at the level of 
‘ideological superstructure,’ the Judeo-Christian legacy is threatened in the European 
space itself by the onslaught of the New Age ‘Asiatic’ thought, which [ . . .] is 
establishing itself as the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism” (12).   
10 The one recurring guest who perhaps fits this New Age list the least is tough-
talking psychologist Dr Phil, whose brand of “common-sense” pop-therapy holds the 
individual entirely responsible for the course of their lives.  It’s arguable that the 
Texan Dr Phil is the Republican Red State counterpart to Oprah’s Blue State 
Democrat.  Yet the commonality between Dr Phil and Oprah is the above-all primacy 
of the individual—which suggests that perhaps neo-conservative individualism and 
liberal New Ageism are not so far apart.   
11 I should also note that Oprah’s brand of spirituality also, as Wendy Parkins points 
out, emerges as a response to the disenchantment of heterosexual women with the 
self-sacrificing ethic encouraged in discourses of romance and motherhood.   
12 The Da Vinci Code takes a pseudo-feminist approach to spirituality from the New 
Age, arguing that there had been hidden tradition of secret spirituality, dedicated to 
celebrating a hazy version of the sacred feminine that has long been suppressed by the 
Church.  Perhaps inevitably, given that he is not renowned as a feminist, Brown’s 
sacred feminine rests largely on the authority of recuperating heroic masculine figures 
like Leonardo Da Vinci. 
13 Derrida suggests that one cannot make absolute distinctions between signifier and 
signified.  However, “that this opposition cannot be radical or absolute does not 
prevent it from functioning, and even from being indispensable within certain limits—
very wide limits” (19).  
14 Derrida in “Des Tour De Babel” suggests the Tower of Babel story in the Hebrew 
Bible has traditionally worked as “the myth of the origin of myth, the metaphor of 
metaphor, the narrative of narrative, the translation of translation, and so on” (104).  
Curiously, however, he argues the sacred, however, is “transferable and 
untranslatable.  There is only letter, and it is the truth of pure language, the truth as 
pure language” (133).  He gives the example of prophecy, in which the event of the 
sacred merges with the act of language.  This article is puzzling given Derrida’s 
penchant for demystifying the meta-narratives of a “pure” language, he seems in the 
concluding passages to re-establish ground for the sacred as transcendental signifier, 
as an untranslatable signature.   
15 Though of course, some New Age movements will pastiche together some rather 
elaborate cosmologies to give themselves an ontological foundation.   
16 Although it is arguable that a New Age transcendental signifier is at times like God, 
a sort of god after one has discarded the God of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.  The 
question of whether those Gods are, in fact, the same is one for those better suited to 
theological discourse, suffice to say, for the purposes of the average postmodern 
subject, the three are usually considered as one.   
17 Though one should also note at this point the concurrent perception of New Age 
teachers as rip-off artists--cult-leaders intent on fleecing their followers for money, 94 
                                                                                                                                            
power and sex.  How this relates to the postmodern sacred is an interesting question, 
though the postmodern sacred is perhaps more comfortable in talking in a New Age 
vocabulary of personal happiness and fulfilment, it nevertheless must retain some 
scepticism towards the occasional attempt at a New Age meta-narrative. 
18 Conversely, the postmodern sacred will also rely on a literalisation of metaphor or 
religious symbol, as in the oft-stated literalisation of the “high school is hell” 
metaphor in Buffy the Vampire Slayer.   
19 Suvin coins the term “estranged cognition” in order to describe the way that science 
fiction allows readers to perceive the world as new and unfamiliar.  He argues that “in 
SF the attitude of estrangement—used by Brecht in a different way, within a still 
predominantly “realistic” context—has grown into the formal framework of the 
genre” (1979: 7).  Suvin’s theorisation has been highly influential, Marxist theorists 
have followed his lead in suggesting that SF is constitutively more progressive than 
other fantastic texts, for its estrangement historicises the present more thoroughly.  
Carl Freedman for instance, distinguishes SF from the “irrationalist” estrangements of 
fantasy and horror (262); even as he seeks to find more properly historical 
estrangements in the fantasy work of Samuel Delaney.   
20 We’re told exceptions do occur, that sometimes people don’t show up for their 
“appointment” with the Reapers.  Rube says, “it’s rare but it happens” 
(“Reapercussions” 1.04).   
21 Heelas argues that the New Age is marked by what he calls its perennialised 
outlook, the notion that “the same wisdom can be found at the heart of all religious 
traditions” (New Age 29).   
22 Another example occurs in Buffy the Vampire Slayer.  When a vampire asks Buffy, 
the champion of good and the subject presumed to know, if there’s any proof of the 
existence of God, she answers with characteristic irony, “nothing solid” 
(“Conversations With Dead People” 7.05).  Importantly, this exchange occurs after 
she has died, gone to some kind of heaven and been returned by magic.  In the 
postmodern sacred, death rarely provides concrete answers to theological questions.   
23 The title of the series itself is interesting enough in positing a pop Buddhist or 
Hindu cyclical notion of time.  Indeed, the central premise of the series is the that hero 
Rand is the re-incarnation of a legendary hero from another Age called The Dragon, 
who, now half-mad, has taken up residence in his brain.  One should note the 
capitalisation of the names of Things and People is one formal feature of generic 
fantasy aimed at producing a sense of meaning, and is often tied to transcendental 
gesturing in the genre. 
24 I exclude here the later series which did not feature both agents.   
25 Roswell has become clearly the most recognisable of UFO locations, a fact played 
out for instance, in the television series Roswell which ran from 1999 to 2002.  Set in 
the present, Roswell is the story of three alien teens with supernatural powers living in 
Roswell, New Mexico.  The trio believe themselves to have been involved in the 
infamous alien incident, having been “incubated” on Earth for 40 years and found as 
human-appearing 6 year olds 10 years prior to the action of the series commencing.  
The series reads like a mixture of The X Files and Buffy the Vampire Slayer’s 
teenage angst, albeit without the texture of either.   
26 Paul Heelas makes this point about the New Age’s synthesis of differing traditions.  
He notes, though, that the New Age resolves these differences by recourse to the 
primacy of the self, a constant emphasis on “self-spirituality.” For New Agers, 95 
                                                                                                                                            
“autonomy and freedom are highly valued; and authority lies with the experience of 
the Self, or more broadly, the natural realm” (Heelas 29).   
27 Incidentally LeGuin’s series pioneers the idea of a wizarding school 20 years before 
J.K Rowling’s Harry Potter series.   
28 See Darcee McLaren and Jennifer Porter’s “(Re)Covering Sacred Ground” article, 
for a discussion of  New Age spirituality in Star Trek:Voyager.  Chronologically, 
Voyager was brought into production after Deep Space Nine.   
29 Robert Asa, for instance, suggests that “classic Star Trek, like the radical 
theologians of the 1960s, declared that God was dead and enthroned science in the 
Deity” (51).   
30 Of course, the following series suggest other changes.  Whilst Voyager is a return 
to Next Generation style adventuring, and is largely devoid of originality, the latest 
Star Trek spin-off Enterprise is interesting for another reason.  Enterprise is a prequel 
to the original series, set several hundred years before, before the foundation of The 
Federation.  As such, it avoids the utopian elements of the original series, and instead 
raises Star Trek’s usual subtextual imperialism into an explicitly American, jingoistic 
narrative.   
31 Žižek says “since the ideological universe of Star Wars is the New Age pagan 
universe, it is quite logical that the central figure of Evil should echo Christ—within 
the pagan horizon, the Event of Christ is the ultimate scandal” (2006: 101). 
32 See for an extreme example, the cartoon sitcom The Family Guy.  Family Guy not 
only implicitly draws on The Simpsons and its referents in 1950s household sitcoms, 
but explicitly references many other shows (Star Trek, and The Brady Bunch to name 
just a few) in constant “flashes” on the family’s TV screen, memories etc.   96 
Chapter Three 
Of Gods and Monsters: Literalising Metaphor in the Postmodern Sacred 
“God doesn’t want you… but I still do”  
Darla, to Angel (Angel, “Dear Boy” 2.05) 
 
“We separate angel and monster to our peril”  
(Ingebretson, 2001: xiv) 
 
 
 
Oz (Seth Green) flourishing a crucifix at a vampire on Buffy (“Harsh Light of Day” 
4. 03) 
 
Whilst in the previous chapter, I argued that the postmodern sacred’s truth 
claims in its fictional worlds consist largely of the transcendental signifier, in this 
chapter I shall look at how the postmodern sacred literalises metaphor—in particular, 
how the “real” textual presence of gods and monsters works.  What precisely does it 
mean for the postmodern sacred to dramatise the presence of gods, demons, angels, 
and so on?   97 
 
Gods 
 
It is often hard to know what to make of the literal presence of Gods in the 
postmodern sacred.  On the one hand, it often seems to confirm the lack of belief in 
anthromorphised Gods, since, as Darko Suvin points out, elements of religion only 
become available for textual appropriation once belief in them has in some measure 
died.
1  The transformation from religion into “myth,” of course, already implies the 
loss of belief in the myth.  It’s unsurprising that the living beliefs of the Jewish, 
Christian and Muslim traditions have a certain kind of ambivalence towards 
representation since as Baudrillard points out, there is the sense that the simulacrum 
nature of representation will in some way dissolve the possibility of God (Baudrillard, 
1994: 4).  Jews and Christians maintain the impossibility of truly representing God,
2 
and the Muslim tradition adds the law against showing the Prophet.  Of course, 
Western tradition has nevertheless represented God—one usually thinks of the 
patriarchal figure with white beard and booming voice—but as often as not, the 
fantastic texts that make up the postmodern sacred have tended to prefer the 
polytheistic pantheons of pagan mythologies such as the Greek, Norse, Celtic and so 
on. 
Whilst the postmodern sacred will occasionally explicitly draw on “pagan” 
traditions such as the Greek
3 or Norse myths, it is more generally polytheistic in the 
sense that it relativises religious traditions, each being equally valid. As Paul Heelas 
points out, the New Age has a perennialised outlook in which each tradition contains 
its own truths.  In this kind of syncretic outlook, monotheisms remain powerful 
symbolic traditions, however their claims to exclusive purchase on the transcendental 98 
truth are to be minimised and largely ignored (except of course as a reminder of the 
problematic history of organised religion that postmodern spirituality opposes.  
Arguably then, we are not dealing with simply a return to pre-Christian polytheism, 
we are dealing with a post-Christian polytheistic pop culture, one that feels free to 
pastiche from many different religious and mythical traditions.  Of course, Judaism is 
haunted by the ghost of polytheism, since God’s “thou shalt have no other God before 
me” commandment clearly presumes the existence of other gods.
4  Christianity, too, 
can be said to in some ways be polytheistic given the centrality of the doctrine of the 
Trinity to the Christian tradition.  However, what separates the two from postmodern 
polytheism is an ostensible commitment to the monism of the one true God. 
A consummate example of postmodern polytheism would be the shifting 
employment of religious iconography by the pop singer Madonna.  Born an Italian-
American Catholic, Madonna’s earlier work (for example “Like A Virgin,” “Like A 
Prayer”) draws explicitly on Catholic Christian iconography.  As time progresses, 
Madonna’s appropriations include a Hindu prayer on “Ray of Light” and Jewish 
Kabbalah on “Isaac” (and it’s striking that the celebrity approved version of Kabbalah 
often downplays its Judaism
5 for a more New Age friendly pop-Buddhist version of 
“spirit” or “overcoming the ego”).  Madonna’s shifts illustrate her exemplary 
postmodern ease with the deployment of religious images without the need to remain 
fixed in one religious tradition.  Similarly, they illustrate the individualisation process 
as described by Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, for the management of the “life 
biography” is best exemplified by the often contradictory and relativised meanings 
attached to the Madonna public persona.  In the marketplace of postmodern religion 
and spirituality, today’s ultimate truth quickly becomes yesterday’s out-dated belief, 
thus the postmodern response is to not believe too hard (and for liberals isn’t that part 99 
of the scandal of “fundamentalism,” that belief in any one truth remains possible in 
late capitalism?).  
Given the heretical polytheism of postmodern polytheism, it’s not by accident 
that Slavoj Žižek savages the New Age as a contemporary form of Gnosticism, for the 
claims of contemporary New Agers and the Gnostics can be strikingly similar.
6  
Elaine Pagels’ groundbreaking work points out that the Gnostics themselves “claimed 
to offer every initiate direct access to God of which the priests and bishops might be 
ignorant,” (Pagels, 1979: 27) a claim also made by contemporary New Age mystics.
7  
The success of the Da Vinci Code has succeeded immensely in acquainting the 
general public with Gnostic ideas, indeed it is highly likely that the near future will 
see more pop-culture works drawing on the discoveries of Nag Hammadi.  The 
postmodern sacred’s emphasis on the self, and the primacy of the self’s experience, 
means by its very nature it is able to absorb practically any religious or spiritual 
tradition for its textual pastiches. 
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The Corporeal Image 
 
 
 
The mysterious return of the 4400 (“Pilot” 1.01) 
 
“I pray the Lord my soul to keep, what about the rest of me?”  (Her Space Holiday, “The 
Weight of the World,” The Past Presents the Future) 
 
In an interview with the formidable triangle of John D. Caputo, Kevin Hart 
and Yvonne Sherwood, Jacques Derrida asks a number of pertinent questions to the 
subject of representing God(s). He says: 
 
What are we doing when we name God?  What are the limits of this naming?  
Now we know that in many Abrahamic traditions God is nameless, beyond the 
name.  In Jewish traditions, God is the empty place, beyond any name.  But 
we name the nameless.  We name what is nameless.  And when we name 
“what is not,” what is or is not nameless, what do we do?  (Caputo et al 2005: 
37) 
 
Derrida is, of course, talking here in a theological sense, concerned with the 
possibility of talking of God in a theological or philosophical sense, the possibility of 101 
God-as-truth.  However, his questions illuminate a paradox of the postmodern sacred, 
the gap between the transcendental signifier and the frequent corporeal representation 
of Gods.  To modify Derrida’s question into a pop-culture context, what do we do 
when we name and show what is not? 
What is or is not nameless is often also a question of what is or is not 
corporeal, the real-world referent to which the sign refers.  Corporeality is, after all, 
often the precondition through which objects are presumed to exist (and hence 
become nameable).  If one can see or touch a thing then it exists, if not, then one must 
see its effects (as with the wind).  Typically theologians and lay people alike have 
used the second reasoning by which to “prove” God’s existence, by pointing to his 
effect on the natural world, history and people.  Of course, that proof lies largely in 
the eye of the beholder—the true believer might see God’s wrathful punishment in the 
tragedy of Hurricane Katrina, whilst the sceptic might see a more prosaic combination 
of natural weather phenomena and human neglect.   
Given that the literal presence of Gods (and their counter-balance monsters) 
has not been definitively proven to exist in the same way that, say, religious 
monuments dedicated to those Gods can be said to exist, it is arguable that Gods 
remain a construct of language and image.  Whilst theorists like Foucault, Derrida and 
Butler
8 have in various ways theorised the textuality of the “real world,” Gods remain 
as pure text—Baudrillardian simulations without a real-world referent.
9  As Derrida’s 
concept of the transcendental signified suggests, much of religious tradition can be 
defined only by what it is not, the world of the profane and the corporeal.  However, 
as Derrida argues regarding negative theology, that evacuation of the knowable 
corporeal nevertheless grounds itself in a transcendental referent, a restatement of a 
real divine Being in a way that Baudrillard, for instance, would certainly refuse.  The 102 
logic of negative theology is that we may not be able to describe God, since he is 
beyond our level of understanding and thus ultimately unknowable, but he 
nevertheless exists.  For the secular West, however, and in this I would include people 
of religious belief as well, the possibility of a really existing divine is radically 
unthinkable in a certain sense, for if Jesus were to appear now, it is possible that he 
would be considered a cult-leader, a charlatan or even a madman.  Or, possibly, given 
the postmodern condition, Jesus would become a celebrity.  
Whilst it is true that many people believe literally in their religions, it is also 
true that religion exists as much as a metaphor than as literality.  The appearance of 
the “body of Christ” in the Eucharist, for instance, is a metaphor; the body of Christ 
does not literally appear.  Similarly, religion is almost entirely articulated through 
ordinary people (say, the Pope), the era of Gods, prophets, disciples and saints
10 with 
supernatural abilities is long past.  The appearance of a real, undeniable divinity—or 
even merely supernatural—would prove a massive rupture in the ontological 
foundation of reality, of scientific and philosophical knowledge.   
The fact that the undeniable existence of the supernatural would considerably 
problematise our notions of “reality” is played out dramatically in the television series 
The 4400.  The premise of the series is that 4400 people who have mysteriously 
disappeared over the last hundred years suddenly reappear on the shores of a lake in 
the American North-West.  What makes this even more mysterious is that event 
begins by the tracking of what appears to be a comet, which then changes course and 
slows down until it appears as a ball of white light over the lake, then the ball seems 
to explode and a crowd of people appear through the mist.  A conversation between 
two Homeland Security agents is suggestive of its X-Files-like slippage between the 
divine and the alien: 103 
Diana Skouris: “there had to be some kind of intelligence behind it” 
Tom Baldwin: “as in the hand of God?  Or little green men?” 
Skouris: “I’m not discounting anything” (“Pilot,” 1.01) 
As the series progresses after this one, unexplainable event, it becomes apparent that 
the “returnees” have been endowed with superhuman abilities, such as healing, 
telekinesis, an ability to predict the future, and so on.  In short, a not uncommon set of 
abilities of the sort often claimed in the real world by various prophets and holy 
figures.  These abilities seem to have a largely positive, almost mystical, effect on the 
world; indeed one plot line centres on the immaculately conceived baby Isobel’s 
extraordinary powers. 
The series thus initially investigates the implications of what a real, 
measurable (notably we see the event relayed through TV news reporting) 
supernatural event would actually cause.
11  The uncertainty of the first episodes, 
however, is not sustained by the series, for by the end of the first season we find out 
that the 4400 were in fact taken by humans from the future and returned with 
superhuman powers in order to prevent the eventual demise of the human race.  So 
what seems to be initially a radical rupture in Realist epistemology—the singular and 
unexplainable (re)appearance of the 4400—ends with the reassuring affirmation of 
human capability, as the superhuman abilities of the 4400 become explained by a 
narrative of the advanced technology of the future.  Even this, however, is given a 
mystical spin, as the 4400’s abilities precipitate a kind of “butterfly effect” chain of 
events designed to improve the present.   
What should be apparent, then, from the fictional treatment of the supernatural 
in texts like The 4400, is that even though postmodernity is marked by a noticeable 
anti-rationalist swing, nevertheless the burden of Enlightenment scepticism and 104 
scientific rationalism remains heavy.  There are many pre-modern beliefs that have 
been irrevocably banished as “superstition” (for instance, the magic powers of 
witches).  What the postmodern sacred does, though, is temporarily suspend the 
“rational” laws of the universe that prohibit Gods and monsters from existence, 
dramatising for our pop-culture pleasure the possibility that such creatures can, in 
fact, really exist.  It resuscitates some of those beliefs, albeit in modified ways, in the 
guise of the fictional (although if the texts themselves are fictional, the boundary 
between fact and fiction seems at times remarkably permeable in postmodern culture).  
While it frequently uses the transcendental signifier, the postmodern sacred also 
dramatises the existence of “real,” corporeal Gods.  Gods, beings endowed with 
supernatural beings, walk on the screens of contemporary fantastic texts.  Xena: 
Warrior Princess showed a host of Greek and Roman Gods, Buffy has Glory, an evil 
“hell-God,” and the two Stargate series have a complicated array of phoney Gods and 
transcendent beings.  Constantine, which I shall turn to towards the end of the chapter, 
features a more Christian figuring of a transcendent unseen God, a very real Devil, 
and a duplicitous arch-angel Gabriel.   
So, in the light of Enlightenment scepticism, the point is then that a corporeal 
God would require rather less belief than a transcendent one whose actions can appear 
second-hand.  To represent a corporeal God or Goddess then, as the postmodern 
sacred so frequently does, is to attempt a text that in some ways mimics the holy texts 
of religious tradition, because it shows a more direct encounter between character and 
the sacred, unmediated by such texts as the Bible.  It mimics the encounter of belief, 
but belief itself is always-already foreclosed by the generic expectation produced by 
reading and viewing fictional texts (and unreal texts most of all).  One notable 
exception is the infamous “all descriptions of artwork, architecture, documents and 105 
secret rituals in this novel are accurate” introduction to Dan Brown’s Da Vinci Code, 
which undoubtedly gave the book a veneer of non-fiction, thus shifting the boundaries 
of generic expectation for its readership.  Largely however, the texts of the 
postmodern sacred are explicitly and unproblematically read as unreal.  Thus the 
postmodern sacred’s representation of Gods is a play with the possibility of the 
corporeality of the transcendent, not an affirmation of itself.  
Of course, Baudrillard would insist that the postmodern pastiche of religious 
symbols in fact dramatises the simulacral nature of religion.  Paradoxically, in its 
seeming presence in the media, it exposes the death of God, for the divine has become 
just another symbol for appropriation.  In that sense, Baudrillard is right, for the 
sacred has become another set of symbols for postmodern play.  However, it does not 
therefore follow that postmodernism necessarily entails the death of belief—indeed it 
is arguable that religious fundamentalisms are inherently postmodern.  Even as they 
rail against the postmodern world, they nevertheless use postmodernist strategies, 
relying on global media and the reign of the simulated symbol.  However, the 
postmodern sacred is not to be confused with religious fundamentalisms, even as it is 
related to them in the same spiritual, post-rationalist postmodern turn.  Unlike the 
various fundamentalisms which are marked by a seeming certainty, the postmodern 
sacred is caught somewhere between belief and unbelief, unwilling to discard or 
discount any symbolic tradition.  The postmodern sacred, as I noted in my first 
chapter, is a play with belief, a belief by proxy diffused into a fictional text.   
So that means of course that the postmodern sacred is different from religious 
texts such as the Torah or Qur’an in that it is not generally supposed to be believed in.  
For instance, the addition of “Jedi Knight” to the 2001 UK census list of religions
12 
does not in any way presuppose belief or practice (although talking with some Star 106 
Wars fans might lead you to believe otherwise!), merely a passionate attachment to 
the Star Wars text and a carnivalesque inversion of the categories of religion and 
entertainment.  So the postmodern sacred’s representation of Gods and monsters must 
almost inevitably occur in non-realistic “secondary” worlds.  This of course raises the 
question, is it now epistemologically possible to represent God in a Realist sense?  
Any postmodern representation must inevitably have to take into account the 
possibility, for instance, that the divine visitations of the past may have been 
undiagnosed mental illness (schizophrenia for instance).
13   
 
Gods in the Postmodern Sacred 
 
 
Bender talking with God (Futurama, “Godfellas” 3.20) 
 
The fantasy genre exemplifies the postmodern sacred’s use of Gods 
particularly well.  While Gods are conspicuously absent from the genre’s most 
significant work, J.R.R Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings,
14 more contemporary fantasy is 
not always so reticent.  A number of interesting examples occur in the writings of the 
enormously popular David Eddings (and in his later works co-written by his wife 107 
Leigh Eddings).  Eddings’ initial, and most popular, fantasy series entitled The 
Belgariad features prominently the corporeal presence of Gods and other supernatural 
presence.  The Belgariad is the fairly standard Sword-in-the-Stone style narrative of 
an orphan peasant boy named Garion (later known as Belgarion) who, over the course 
of the series, discovers that the Aunt who raised him and his itinerant grandfather are, 
in fact, the millennia-old disciples of the God Aldur.  Garion learns that it is his 
destiny to slay the “evil” God Torak and become the ruler of a country named Riva 
and Overlord of the “good” countries of the West (as distinguished from Torak’s 
East).  Readers will notice immediately the racial overtones of this geography, which 
is confirmed by the racial coding of Torak’s people as Asian(ised), and the West as 
white—variously, medieval English (the Arends), Viking (the Alorns), and 
Romanised (the Tolnedrans).
15  As is common in many fantasy series, The Belgariad 
features an elaborate cosmology for its secondary world.  The world of The Belgariad 
was created by the God “UL,” although it features 7 other Gods each worshipped by a 
race of people.  All of these Gods appear at some point in the series, as well as in its 
sequel series The Mallorean, which concludes by replacing the dead Torak with a new 
God, Erriond. 
Eddings’s series works in a number of ways.  It provides firstly a comfortably 
conservative essentialist view of gender, race and sexuality. In doing so, it confirms 
Rosemary Jackson’s point about Tolkien-esque fantasy
16 when she says that its 
historical perspective is that of the fairy tale, it does not have the ability to disturb the 
contemporary.
17  Essentialism is, above all, unproblematic in Eddings—the series 
works not only to naturalise identity but to erase the conflict produced by hierarchies 
of gendered, raced and classed identities.  In replacing one “evil” god with another 
“good” god, the 10 books of the Belgariad and the Mallorean work as a kind of racist 108 
cosmological therapy, healing the wounds of a world disrupted by the appearance of 
racialised Other.   
Secondly, the series works to produce an exceptional subject in the form of 
Garion, simultaneously ordinary (in terms of appearance, initial social status, 
egalitarian beliefs) and extraordinary (agent of prophecy, a King, slayer of a God).   
This fantasy of the ordinary/extraordinary arguably serves as a form of wish-
fulfillment for the average, unexceptional postmodern reader.  One wonders whether 
the postmodern egalitarian promise of celebrity—that anyone can be a celebrity given 
the right access to media, hence reality TV—is after-the-fact mapped back onto a pre-
modern textual model of exceptional heroes selected by destiny.   
Thirdly, the Belgariad is, like most fantasy series, highly generic, and thus 
makes heavy use of the characteristically postmodern method of textual pastiche.
18  
The Belgariad combines classical, medieval and invented tropes, endlessly pastiching, 
recontextualising and renaming various historical and mythical periods and figures to 
flesh out its world.  These include: a Merlin style figure in the form of Belgarath the 
Sorcerer, heroic kings, medieval knights and damsels-in-distress, and various magical 
creatures such as trolls, harpies, unicorns, dryads, invented species such as 
“hrulgin”and “eldrakyn” and of course the ubiquitous dragon.  Thus the pleasures of 
the Eddings text are to be found in the density of the secondary world building, the 
vertigo of cliché piled upon cliché, creating in the process a text seemingly built of 
sheer referentiality
19 (although a conservative essentialist version of gender and a 
heteronormativity predicated on the utter expulsion of queers would probably explain 
much of its appeal as well).    
Interestingly given the aforementioned absence of any kind of God in Lord of 
the Rings, the trope of corporeal gods (often taken from pagan pantheons) in modern 109 
fantasy is fairly common.  The existence of gods in The Belgariad is such that it is 
completely taken for granted—even though the gods have long since “withdrawn” 
from the world (only to re-appear intermittently).  The gods may be considered 
capricious, and not worthy of worship, but their existence is not usually debated 
(although the heroes must at times manipulate various unbelieving skeptics with more 
worldly explanations).  The heroes are largely disciples of a God, and interact with a 
number of other Gods, most prominently the “evil” God Torak.  The Belgariad thus 
dramatises a world in which the “problem” of unbelief is entirely banished.  For the 
postmodern reader, unable to trust with certainty in the meta-narratives of either 
scientific rationalism or traditional religion, the epistemological certainty of the 
corporeal God must be immensely seductive, providing the pleasure of the miraculous 
(not just tied to Gods but to the genre’s use of magic as well) without a real-world 
need for commitment or even belief.   
Allied with the corporeal existence of Gods is a fundamental belief in Good 
and Evil.  Garion lives with a “dry voice” in his head who guides him into his 
predestined place as champion of Good and fulfillment of prophecy.  It should be 
noted that Garion’s shift in class status from farm boy to King in no way 
problematises the class structure, even as he espouses a more democratic ideal than 
the other medieval aristocracy.  Like many fantasy texts, destiny is of extreme 
importance in The Belgariad, which is signaled by the chess referencing titles of the 
individual books.  Prophecy guides Garion along his path, it is necessary.  The various 
companions that aid Garion throughout his quest are all given significant names like 
“the Guide” or “the Eternal Man.”  It is arguable that this notion of destiny is a vague 
reworking of a Christian notion of divine Providence, though it is just as clearly the 
legacy of heroic epics like Beowulf and the Iliad, in which superhuman heroes are 110 
marked out by destiny from birth.  Interestingly in Eddings there is the suggestion that 
the Gods are as beholden to destiny as humanity, which seems to problematise the 
radical separation between human and God that is presupposed by the notion of the 
Judeo-Christian transcendental God.  Regardless, the series can be seen as emblematic 
of the tendency of much of the fantasy genre to explicitly stage the presence of real, 
knowable, corporeal Gods in textual form.   
Another example of the corporeal God occurs in the Futurama episode 
“Godfellas” (3.20). “Godfellas” sees the robot Bender, adrift in space, become God to 
a tiny race of aliens called Shrimpkins, who have become lodged on his stomach.
20  
Because robots in Futurama require alcohol to function, Bender gives his one 
commandment to his faithful servant Malachi—“God needs booze.”  The Shrimpkins 
build a brewery which maims many of Bender’s followers, while pestilence kills 
much of the rest.  Bender is moved to tears by their plight, but his tear-drop is the size 
of a river to the Shrimpkins, which washes away Malachi’s son.  Bender saves the 
child—“this looks like a job.. for God!”—which results in the rest of the Shrimpkins 
praying for miracles of their own.  One village prays for wealth, so Bender flips down 
a coin which accidentally crushes them to death.  Farmers pray for sunlight, so Bender 
gives them light which sets their fields on fire.  He blows the fire out, which also 
blows the people away into space.  A breakaway “heathen” group on Bender’s 
backside ceases believing him in him, so the faithful Malachi begs Bender to 
intervene.  By this point, however, Bender has decided to leave matters in the hands 
of the Shrimpkins—“every time I intervene, I only make things worse.  You’re better 
off solving your own problems.”  Non-intervention, though, ends with an apocalyptic 
war between the two groups.  Bender floats on in space, where he meets the real God, 
who appears as a giant, flickering constellation of stars.  God commiserates with 111 
Bender about his struggles with divinity—“you were doing well until everyone 
died”—and proposes a surprisingly funny and sophisticated theory about divinity: 
 
God: being God isn’t easy.  If you do too much, people get dependent on you.  
And if you do nothing, they lose hope.  You have to use a light touch, like a 
safe cracker or pick-pocket. 
Bender: Or a guy who burns down a bar for the insurance money 
God: Yes, if you make it look like an electrical thing.  When you do things 
right, people won’t be sure you’ve done anything at all. 
 
Though God sends Bender back to earth in what Leela calls “by a fair margin the least 
likely thing that’s ever happened,” the episode ends firmly with an affirmation of 
human agency.  As Bender says, “you can’t count on God for jack.  He pretty much 
said so himself.”
21   
Whilst this episode renders the notion of a God active in human events 
decidedly suspect, it nevertheless suggests that miraculous is the true province of the 
divine.  The episode concludes with God repeating, to the camera, “when you do 
things right, people won’t be sure you’ve done anything at all.”  God’s intervention 
into the mundane (in the form of the unlikely event of returning Bender to Earth) 
works clearly as a (textual) hierophany, a brief intrusion of the sacred into the 
profane.  Moreover, God’s repeated affirmation of divine inscrutability suggests that 
the sacred can only ever occur erratically; to do otherwise would interfere with free 
will.  Most subversively, it affirms agnosticism as a legitimately spiritual position 
(since “people won’t be sure” of the existence of God).   
“Godfellas” thus dramatises a number of interesting points about the sacred.  
Firstly, it has the postmodern sacred’s characteristic skepticism towards organised 
religion and dogmatic truth, as well as a fair helping of heretical humour.  Bender’s 
attempts to be a good God for the Shrimpkins are a comedy of errors that only end in 
disaster.  The genocidal sectarianism of the Shrimpkins might be somewhat of an 112 
atheist cliché (atheists often cite religious wars like the Crusades as evidence against 
religion on the whole, rather than separating between violent, dogmatic interpretations 
of religion and the traditions themselves), but it is nevertheless a pertinent one in 
these days of the much-touted “Clash of Civilisations.”
22  Like many other 
postmodern texts, the episode suggests that institutional churches are of little practical 
use.  Fry visits the “First Amalgamated Church” (a combination of the Jewish, 
Muslim and Buddhist faiths) and asks the priest “is there anything religion can do to 
help find my friend?”  The priest replies, “well, we could join together in prayer.”  
Fry asks, again, pointedly, “uh huh..  but is there anything useful we could do?”  Not 
only are churches of little use on a day-to-day basis, but the episode suggests that real 
spiritual experience is to be found outside of church, anyway.  Bender finds God 
alone in an unoccupied part of space, just as saints in the Christian tradition found 
God alone in the desert.  Like other postmodern texts featuring corporeal Gods, 
Futurama at once affirms the possibility of God and distances itself with more than a 
dose of irony. 
Of course, it would be a mistake to read Futurama utterly seriously—indeed to 
do so is to miss the point.  The show is, after all, a science fiction comedy.  Futurama 
is a postmodern text par excellence, redolent with irony, pastiche and lightning quick 
references to other pop-culture texts.
23  Whilst Futurama, like all science fiction texts, 
has an estranged relationship to the real, the series frequently moves between a 
satirical comment on the real
24 and a playful exploration of the possibilities of its 
fictional universe.  “Godfellas,” one suspects, lies somewhere in between the two, a 
disavowed comment on real-world spirituality that begs not to be taken seriously.   
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Stargate 
 
 
The Asgard alien Thor on Stargate: SG1 
 
The science-fiction series Stargate SG-1 takes the motif of the corporeal God 
from another angle.  Whereas Futurama’s God appears as a flickering constellation, 
many of Stargate’s “Gods” appear as human, albeit with deep, synthetically altered 
voices.
25  Stargate provides an interesting mix between the transcendental signified 
and a rationalist, Realist demystification of “primitive” religion.  The series 
dramatises Arthur C. Clarke’s Third Law, that “any sufficiently advanced technology 
is indistinguishable from magic,” taking the premise to its logical conclusion—that 
any sufficiently advanced technology would be indistinguishable from divinity.  This 
occurs largely in the form of an alien species called the Goa’uld, a parasitic race that 
take control over their human hosts, who remain unable to speak or use their bodies in 
any way (though the original personality remains hidden deep in the unconscious).  
The Goa’uld use such advanced technology that they are able to pose as Gods to their 
pre-modern worshippers, enslaving much of the galaxy and of course threatening the 
Earth on a regular basis.  Besides the usual SF props of interstellar space-ships 114 
(shaped like pyramids in this case), personal shields and laser guns, the technology of 
the Goa’uld also gives them the superhuman seeming abilities of life spans of several 
thousand years, and the ability to die and then be brought back to life.
26  The personae 
of the Goa’ud are taken for the most part from Egyptian mythology, although Hindu, 
Chinese and Babylonian Gods have also been used.   
Significantly, Stargate poses another alien race called the Asgard, who have 
themselves taken their personae from Norse mythology, as the “good aliens” to be 
opposed to the diverse but racially Othered Goa’uld.  Although they are initially 
contacted in the form of holographic simulations of Norse Gods like Thor, the Asgard 
themselves appear as the familiar “little grey men” of alien abduction narratives.  
Being both powerful and benevolent, the Asgard in some ways fit what Hugh 
Ruppersberg calls “the alien messiah” (32) model.  Colonel O’Neill’s first visit to the 
Asgard home world is rendered in blurry white, a definite numinous experience.  And 
the Asgard do save Earth more than a few times over the course of the ten series.  Yet 
the Asgard prove to be as fallible as the Goa’uld, unable to save themselves from their 
Replicator enemies without help from the SG:1 team.  It is arguable that the 
redemption offered by the alien messiah struggles to fit the constraints of episodic 
television, which must continually affirm human capability instead.   
Besides advancing a dubious politics of race
27 and a largely benevolent 
American imperialist agenda,
28 Stargate at once affirms the real presence of super-
natural beings from many of Earth’s religious (mostly dead) traditions, and works to 
demystify those apparent divinities, pointing out the fallibility and mortality of both 
the Goa’uld and the Asgard.  On the one hand, it is a play with belief, namely, that the 
various religions were in fact literally true, albeit in disguised ways.  In this sense, 
Stargate seems an attempt to wed myth to post-Enlightenment rationalism, recalling 115 
some of the more bizarre New Age alien-based versions of spirituality (Chariots of 
the Gods for example).  But unsurprisingly, Stargate, on the whole, comes down on 
the side of an Enlightenment-based scientific rationality and works to problematise 
belief, although given its American context it takes pains to separate its critique from 
that of the Judeo-Christian God.
29   
The episode “Absolute Power” (4.17) however, is a notable exception, 
featuring a mystic boy whose attire and demeanour clearly reference Tibetan 
Buddhism, with his supernatural wisdom, an ability to transform into pure white light, 
and a habit of speaking in cryptic metaphors.  Similarly, “Meridian” (5.21) sees 
Daniel Jackson, one of the key characters of the show, die but “ascend” to a higher 
level of being.  This event begins the series’ pre-occupation with a race called “The 
Ancients,” the race of aliens that originally built the Stargate system, who had 
themselves discarded their physical form and become pure energy.  Builders of the 
lost city of Atlantis (which becomes the setting for a Stargate spin-off), the Ancients 
developed technology far more advanced beyond the Goa’uld, who were mere 
scavengers after the Ancients disappeared.  When Jackson eventually re-appears, he 
has both supernatural powers and incredible knowledge, but the Ancients it seems, 
live by a code of non-intervention in the free will of “lower” beings.  Needless to say, 
eventually the heroes of SG:1 find this ethic impossible to understand, and Daniel 
himself is sent back to the human plane after intervening in the Earth war with the 
Goa’uld Anubis.   
In an interesting combination of pop-spirituality and scientific rationality, 
ascension in Stargate is suggested to be both a matter of evolution, and of meditation 
into the right psychological state.  In a Stargate Atlantis episode entitled “The Tao of 
Rodney” (3.15), Dr Rodney McKay, the supreme scientific rationalist on Atlantis, is 116 
caught in an accident with an Ancient machine that hastens his evolution, to the point 
where his choices are death or ascension.  He says: 
 
the universe may seem mystical to those without understanding, when in truth 
anything and everything can be quantified.   Look, all that hocus-pocus is just 
a way of getting the brain into the proper electro-chemical state to allow the 
final physical evolution, at which point the matter which makes up this body 
will turn into pure energy. 
 
  
McKay attempts to give a rational explanation for what is otherwise suggested to be a 
mystical experience, measuring his brain’s synaptic levels to see that he reaches the 
right state for ascension.  However, McKay struggles to “let go” enough to make the 
spiritual transformation that Daniel Jackson does in “Meridian.”  The more 
sympathetically inclined Dr Weir argues with McKay, in which she makes the 
characteristically New Age distinction between spirituality and religion: 
 
Weir: I know, spirituality to you is a load of mumbo-jumbo, but it does help 
people find peace with themselves. 
McKay: but you have to believe. 
Weir: I’m not talking about religion.  I’m talking about shedding yourself of 
guilt, of anger, of ill-feeling, of anything that makes you feel shame.  And then 
you can focus all of your energy on ascending. 
 
 
On the point of death though, McKay finds himself floating in a “big empty space”, 
where he “momentarily thought of how difficult it is to rid oneself of ego, and that 
existence without the individuality of consciousness would be pointless.”  In that 
space, of course, McKay thinks of a way to return his body to its usual, non-evolved 
self, choosing to live rather than ascend.  Both Weir and McKay’s descriptions clearly 
evoke a version of “Eastern” spirituality, suggesting spiritual progress to be about 
“letting go” of negative emotions.  The episode sees a number of characters make 
New Age style comments—Weir suggests Rodney is struggling to accept the problem 
“can’t be solved with science,” military commander Shepherd advises Rodney 117 
“release his burden” and helps him meditate, while the stoic soldier Ronan tries “not 
to let things I can’t change bother me.”  So, whilst Stargate infrequently evokes “real” 
mystical experience (as opposed to the advanced technology which it usually uses), 
when it does so, it does so clearly outside of the bounds of traditional Christian 
theology.  “Real” spiritual experience thus remains only possible within the terms of 
the amorphous transcendental signified “Spirit” that characterises New Age 
movements.   
So, while the transcendental signifier tends to be the postmodern sacred’s 
attempt at an ultimate truth claim for its universes, the corporeal God is a much less 
grandiose claim, for the corporeal God is almost always merely one of a number of 
supernatural entities.  Whilst the New Age-ised postmodern sacred sees almost any 
spiritual tradition as possessing some kind of truth (or of expressing the same eternal 
truth in a different fashion) it nevertheless retains the typical postmodern inability to 
hold firmly to any meta-narrative.  It remains profoundly ambivalent as to the 
possibility of belief, playing with the corporeality of Gods but unable to truly concede 
their existence.  Anthromorphic Gods are very much considered part of the past (and 
its attendant patriarchal, homophobic and racist baggage), the New Age vocabulary of 
Spirit much less so.   
The postmodern sacred marks, then, not just the collapse of the separation 
between sacred and profane but the return of the supernatural to the (post)modern.  
Theorists of the Gothic have noted that the genre works in part as a return of the 
repressed, which is suggestive in both psychoanalytic and textual terms.
30 It’s easy to 
see how the Gothic might betray a fear of the return of the aristocracy, or the French 
Revolutionary Reign of Terror, but it is just as easy to see the Gothic return of the 
aspects of the supernatural that the Enlightenment was said to have banished as 118 
“superstition.”  The postmodern sacred, however, takes that Gothic return and applies 
it not just to monsters, but to the monotheistic God, to angels and to “pagan”
31 Gods 
as well.  In doing so, it betrays an insight that perhaps Gods and monsters are not so 
far apart as has been traditionally thought. 
 
Monsters 
 
Monsters occur throughout the postmodern sacred, they are the counter-
balance to the super-natural “good” of these texts.  These monsters are almost always 
taken from myths and legends—dragons, werewolves, vampires and so on—although 
some, like the Gravelings in Dead Like Me, are original
32 and specific to their texts.  
Literary scholar Edward J Ingebretson begins his work At Stake with the insight that 
angels and monsters are more closely related than has typically been thought.  He 
says: 
 
Fear and dread, of course, are traditional markers of divinity.  In this monsters 
are more like angels than not.  On the other hand, angels, in the terror they 
inspire (see Titian’s Annunciation, for example), are more akin to monsters 
than not.  Indeed, a characteristic of all angelic visitations is that they are 
terrifying.  Scripture tells us that ritual salutation of the angel is “Be not 
afraid!”  The regularity of this greeting suggests that a bracing fear should 
mark the angel’s visit, since it betokens mystery as well as grace; since the 
angel challenges as well as comforts.  (Ingebretson, 2001: xiii) 
 
 
Ingebretson’s point is a well-made one, and suggests that any analysis of the sacred 
will need to take account of the co-mingling between religious awe and the awful that 
discourses of the spiritual should provide.  The sentimentalising of angels as 
“guardian angels” clearly sees the sacred stripped of its potential for terror.  As Mark 
Edmundson bitingly suggests, contemporary depictions of angels are the “spiritual 
equivalents of smiley faces” (80).  Whilst the postmodern sacred is rife with examples 119 
of these sorts of “facile transcendence,”
33 it is arguable, too, that the postmodern 
sacred is also an attempt at the sublime—that is, an attempt at presenting the 
unpresentable.
34   
The postmodern sacred, then, depends on both images of the transcendental 
and the monstrous, whilst there are indeed differences between the two; they are 
nevertheless necessarily dependent upon one another.  Judith Halberstam points out 
that “monsters have to be everything that the human is not and, in producing the 
negative of human, make way for the invention of the human as white, male, middle 
class, and heterosexual” (22).  This invention of the human clearly applies to the 
postmodern sacred’s heroes, whose heroism oftens lies in their affirmation of the 
normative (and concurrent banishing of the non-normative abject as embodied in 
monsters).  And it’s not overstating the case to suggest that often the superhuman in 
the form of the hero is merely that same construction of the human writ large.  Think 
of Superman, whose affirmation of “truth, justice and the American way,” is merely a 
celebratory version of straight, white, middle-class masculinity tied to discourses of 
criminality and the nation-state.   
  The television series Dark Angel ties together both senses of the monstrous 
that Ingebretson describes.  The title refers not only to the black hair of the heroine 
Max Guevera, and to her Latino ethnicity, but to the dual status of the character.  Max 
is both monster—she is the product of genetic manipulation by a secret government 
organisation called Manticore, bred and trained to be a supersoldier—and angel, as 
she works in traditional super-hero mode to correct the injustices of an post-
apocalyptic near-future.
35  Dark Angel at once plays with racist fears of 
miscegenation (not un-coincidentally, Max is part-cat, and goes into “heat,” 
literalising the stereotype of the animalised, over-sexed Latina) as well as suggesting 120 
that traditional models of the human (white, male) have become insufficient.  And of 
course, one can see in the dual figure of Max the simultaneously fear and desire that 
the “kick-arse” post-feminist heroine inspired for many straight male viewers, the 
interplay between the sexually-coded “hotness” and the fear of being dominated by 
the supernaturally strong heroine.
36  Whilst Max is physically strong and 
psychologically capable, the straight white men of Dark Angel are either ineffectual—
the rich, wheel-chair bound Logan and the uptight Normal—or Evil, the Bad Father 
head of Manticore, Colonel Lydecker. 
The Buffy spin-off Angel shows the vacillation between monster and angel in 
even starker relief than Dark Angel, with its central conceit of the character Angel, the 
vampire with a soul.  Angel is cursed by gypsies with a soul, which he can lose upon 
experiencing a moment of perfect happiness, in which case he transforms into the 
soul-less Angelus, a violent and brutal killer.  Angel works as a private investigator to 
“help the helpless,” trying to atone for the crimes (sins?) he committed as Angelus.  
Angel is quite clearly a narrative of redemption.  Whilst the series usually has a clear 
demarcation between the personas
37 of Angel and Angelus, it nevertheless maintains 
a continuous tension between the two, contriving on numerous occasions to 
resuscitate Angelus.  Angel must remain constantly vigilant, guarding against the 
desires that trigger his transformation into Angelus—namely, sexual desire, which 
effects his initial change in Buffy when he and Buffy sleep together.  This fraught, 
guilt stricken relationship to sexual desire, needless to say, is remarkably Augustinian, 
where “spontaneous sexual desire [exists] as the proof and penalty for original sin” 
(Pagels, 1989: 112).  In naming the distinct personalities, and maintaining a tension 
between the two, Angel foregrounds the dual nature of the monster and the angel, 
even as it points out that artificiality of the separation.   121 
Nina Auerbach argues compellingly that vampires embody the particular fears 
of their immediate milieus into which they are published.  She points out that that 
“since vampires are immortal, they are free to change incessantly” (5).  Auerbach 
traces the cultural anxieties which vampires embody—from the “dangerously close 
friends” (6) of pre-Dracula English writers like Byron (11) to the Reagan-esque 
vampire of American films in the 1980s affected/infected by the AIDS epidemic.  
Vampires offer a dizzying array of cultural fears, from Marx’s famous image of the 
capitalism-as-vampire, to more predictable fears of racial miscegenation
38, the 
“monstrous” working class, phallic women and effeminate men
39 and so on.  Whilst it 
is beyond the remit of this thesis to fully explore the capacity of monsters to personify 
cultural fears, they are of course highly significant for the study of popular culture.  
Judith Halberstam in Skin Shows suggests that, given their multi-
significations, for critics to attempt to pin monsters to one specific meaning (say, 
Dracula as capitalist) is a reductive and flawed critical enterprise, one that the texts 
themselves refuse (84).  She says, “What we should resist at all costs, therefore, is the 
impulse to make the monster stabilise otherness.  What the monster does [. . .] is to 
call into question the project of interpretation that seeks to fix meaning in the body of 
the monster” (84).  Implicit in Halberstam’s work is a warning that the attentive critic 
should not, in their haste to ascribe metaphorical readings, ignore the corporeality of 
monsters; that is, the affective response of the reader/viewer to the literal presence of 
creatures who do not, can not, exist in the real world (and in Realist texts of the 
same).   
Halberstam’s Skin Shows, while problematically shifting its historical 
perspective from nineteenth century Gothic novels to late twentieth century splatter 
films with nary a point in-between, is nevertheless highly useful in thinking through 122 
contemporary approaches to the monstrous.  As she points out, late twentieth century 
films like Silence of the Lambs
 
reproduce the terms, conditions and technologies of nineteenth-century horror 
but tend to shift the position of monstrosity within those narratives.  The 
monster, eventually, is no longer totalising.  The monstrous body that once 
represented everything is now represented as potentially meaning anything—it 
may be the outcast, the outlaw, the parasite, the pervert, the embodiment of 
uncontrollable sexual and violent urges, the foreigner, the misfit.  (27) 
 
 
Implicit in Halberstam’s statement here is a Jamesonian acknowledgement of 
pastiche.  Postmodern horror might pastiche older signifiers of monstrosity but the 
meanings of such monstrosity have shifted significantly.  Postmodern monstrosity 
here is figured as an excess of meaning, a movement from one signifier to another to 
another (there is nothing outside of the text).    
Halberstam approvingly quotes Oscar Wilde’s “those who go beneath the 
surface do so at their own peril” (178), which is indicative of her own argument that 
postmodern horror is a genre of surfaces, a play of signs, whether they be textual or 
corporeal.  The monstrous is very much a monstrosity of technology, for as 
Halberstam says: 
 
the appeal of the Gothic text [. . .] lies in its uncanny power to reveal the 
mechanisms of monster production.  Like the bolt through the neck of 
Frankenstein’s monster in the modern horror film, the technology of 
monstrosity is written upon the body.  And the artificiality of the monster 
denaturalises in turn the humanness of its enemies.  (106) 
 
 
Those Gothic technologies end up scrambling the binaries of a misogynist and 
heterosexist world—between self and other, male and female, straight and queer, 
white and black, human and inhuman.  Halberstam argues that both the heroes 
(Stretch) and the monsters (Buffalo Bill, Leatherface) of postmodern horror films 
fashion posthuman bodies for themselves, suturing new technologies onto the old.  123 
Halberstam’s project, then, is a similar one.  She says that “by refusing to make the 
human into a refuge from monstrosity, this book imagines a posthuman monstrosity 
that is partial, compromised, messy and queer” (188).  One wonders, however, that 
even given the potential of an affective response to such queer posthumanity, whether 
a still dominant humanism will largely re-inscribe those bodies as monstrous.  The 
question, of course, hinges on whether the normative closure of many Gothic texts 
simply re-instates the “normal” or whether the Gothic code scrambling that 
Halberstam describes so vividly has problematised the normative beyond the hope of 
re-habilitation.  Here I find myself perhaps more pessimistic than Halberstam, for 
though it is true that part of the pleasure of the Gothic is a partly (pre-dominantly?) 
disavowed affective response to a monstrosity of Otherness, just as surely part of the 
pleasure is the inevitable demise of the Other—the Other being violently put back in 
its place.  While Halberstam’s reading is a sophisticated work arguing for subversive 
acts of reading by women, queers and people of colour, she also understates the 
ideological conservatism that Gothic texts can provoke.  
Nevertheless, Halberstam’s work is an imaginative and intriguing reflection on 
the Gothic and the categories of human and monstrous.  Skin Shows suggests that, 
first and foremost, one should resist the easy moralising that Gothic texts can 
provoke, the apparently straight-forward relationship between monstrosity and the 
immoral.  Monstrosity is, all too frequently, the visible sign of a subject guilty even 
prior to committing a crime.  Although many of the texts I have analysed are not 
specifically Gothic, that insight is nevertheless widely applicable, given that the 
postmodern sacred is always constructing monsters for its heroes to fight.  The Gothic 
always arrives as a moment of utter terror in the postmodern sacred text, be it the 
demonic imagery of Mordor in Lord of the Rings, the intermingled awe and terror at 124 
the appearance of the alien in The X-Files.  Any analysis of unreal texts must account 
for the generic mixing between Gothic, horror, science fiction and fantasy.
40   
Whilst I have argued there is a strong link between Gods (and other sacred 
creatures like angels) and monsters, arguably Gods are less diverse in the meanings 
they carry.  Whilst Gothic monsters contain our cultural anxieties writ large, Gods are 
precisely the inverse.  They do indeed function as “meaning-making machines” as 
Halberstam terms it (22), but they are usually meanings of a very different kind—as 
images of “goodness,” desirability and cultural privilege.  These privileges almost 
inevitably produce the ideal (angelic, pure) subject as the same straight white male 
subject that Halberstam argues is inversely produced by the Gothic—or produce a 
passive, desexualised and idealised white female subject (as personified in the Virgin 
Mary).  Thus the conventional image of Jesus, for instance, betrays a racial bias at the 
heart of Christian representation.  Whilst historians have argued that by today’s 
standards Jesus would be considered a person of colour, representation has and 
continued to portray Jesus as a white man.   
It is not surprising, then, that Gods and angels are perhaps less likely to inspire 
the constant shift of meanings than monsters.  Gender, sexuality, race and class are 
less fluid than in the Gothic, where multiple versions of these can exist in the same 
text, indeed the Gothic in its incoherence threatens to destabilise all meaning by 
simultaneously telling too much and not enough
41 (Halberstam 23).  Gods and angels 
do, however, shift over time, if more slowly than monsters, indeed postmodern texts 
often take great glee in their revision.  For instance, God has been envisioned as a 
woman in Dogma (played by Alanis Morissette), and as a black man in the woeful 
Jim Carrey “comedy” Bruce Almighty (played by Morgan Freeman).  And, as my 
previous chapter has argued, most significant of all has been the New Age 125 
precipitated shift away from the figure of God into an amorphous, non-corporeal 
conceptualisation of “spirit.”   
Angels, too, have seen a shift in their representations.  Whilst traditionally 
they have been the subject of both awe and dread, they have more recently been 
considerably domesticated (Edmundson 80).  Indeed, while it is true that angels have 
been largely inherited from Christianity,
42 today’s angels have been disconnected 
from that context and now, more often than not, are consumed in a detraditionalised 
and de-institutionalised fashion.  Angels are frequently used as signifiers of the 
transcendent—for instance, in their sentimentalisation as “guardian angels”—without 
that necessarily implying the existence of a sovereign God, or Christ, and so on.  
One text that explicitly restores the dread to angels is Tony Kushner’s Angels 
in America.  Whilst Christian conservatives have been at pains to insist on the utter 
irreconcilability of Christianity and queers, Kushner foregrounds the homoerotic trace 
of Christianity.
43  Angels appear as the harbinger of doom in Kushner, as well as hope 
for the queer community after the decimation of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s.  
Interestingly, in imbuing angels with the dual sense of awe and dread, Kushner’s text 
is the exception; far more common is the sentimental and comforting image of the 
angel in such pop-culture texts as Touched By An Angel.   Thus Kushner’s work is a 
kind of deconstructive reading of the Bible—simultaneously faithful and heretical.  
As a/theologian Mark C Taylor says, “an a/theology that draws on deconstructive 
philosophy will invert established meaning and subvert everything once deemed holy.  
It will be utterly transgressive” (1984: 6).  Similarly, Ingebretson’s reading of the 
Matthew Shepard case
44 inverts the economy of the sacred and the profane, showing 
how easily the profane queer “monster” Matthew Shephard can be transcribed into an 
angelic, Christ-inflected martyr.
45   126 
It’s not surprising then, that the separation between Gods and monsters in the 
postmodern sacred begins to fall apart.  The postmodern sacred returns the 
supernatural in a fundamentally polytheistic way—the simultaneous return of the God 
of fundamentalisms, the transcendental signified of New Age and pop-Buddhism, the 
rediscovery of Gnosticism, the co-mingling between monstrous and angelic.  Whilst 
fundamentalists are at pains to distinguish themselves from the rest (and of course 
manifest a number of important differences), they are nevertheless part of the same 
cultural moment, a moment in which the postmodern distrust of Enlightenment meta-
narratives has produced a vast number of post and anti rationalist offspring.  Perhaps 
it is unsurprising then that we see sometimes a peculiarly literal approach to the text 
shared by both the postmodern sacred and the fundamentalists that generally oppose 
its “witchcraft.” 
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Hell Is A Place on Earth 
 
 
Promo poster for Constantine, starring Keanu Reeves 
 
Literalising metaphor—making the text embodied—is another key textual 
strategy of the postmodern sacred.  This occurs in terms of place as well as 
supernatural entities.  The movie Constantine, starring The Matrix’s Keanu Reeves, is 
an interesting, if flawed, text that moves between cosmic “dimensions.”  Adapted to 
film from the comic-book Hellrazer, Constantine, is indicative of a supernatural 
comic-book approach to the after-life (see also Hellboy), a visual corporeality to 
heaven, hell, purgatory and so on.  The titular character John Constantine is a 
supernatural detective, unable to enter heaven because of his own suicide.  
Constantine attempts to buy his way into heaven by killing as many demon “half-
breeds” that cross-over into the human dimension as possible.  The movie poses 
heaven and hell as literal places, dimensions of existence that both overlap with the 
human and that exist outside of it.   128 
Like the TV series Angel, with which it shares some striking similarities, 
Constantine’s real world setting is Los Angeles, the City of Angels.  Interestingly, 
Constantine imagines hell as a version of a Los Angeles freeway.  In the DVD extras 
for the film, the director points out the hell scenes were conceived as a perpetual 
version of the first seconds after a nuclear explosion.  Hell, then, could be considered 
a post-apocalyptic version
46 of Los Angeles, or at the very least a Los Angeles in 
decay.  In making Los Angeles hell, Constantine plays with some established 
conventions of religious visual texts.  Throughout its history Los Angeles has been 
conceived as both heaven and hell, a place of eternal sunshine and apocalyptic 
disaster (especially in the form of earthquakes), the place where stars are born and 
dreams are shattered, and so on.   
Naming is of some significance in Constantine, in suitably postmodern ways.  
We have of course the setting in Los Angeles, and to hammer the point home, John’s 
client/love interest is called Angela (that is, Angela).  John’s name, too, has religious 
connotations, recalling both Constantine and in his initials, Jesus (JC).  The Jesus 
coding is most striking in the scene in which John ascends to heaven, arms stretched 
out like an inverted Christ on the cross.  This occurs after John’s decision to sacrifice 
himself in order to secure Isobel’s (Angela’s dead sister) place in heaven.  More 
interesting than the Jesus coding, which recurs in a number of other texts in the 
postmodern sacred, is the Constantine reference.  Constantine, of course, was the 
Roman emperor who converted to Christianity in 312, and legalised Christianity the 
following year, in doing so ultimately prompting Christianity’s move from marginal 
cult to state sponsored religion.  Yet John Constantine, who is written more in the 
mould of a hardboiled noir character, is hardly helping to convert the world.  Born 
with the powers to see the supernatural world, he is aware of the two worlds, yet he 129 
hardly believes.  “God is a kid with an ant-farm” he says cynically.  It’s arguable then 
that the naming of Constantine is little more than a postmodern affectation, meant to 
signal a vague “religiousness” specifically linked to the Roman Catholicism it draws 
upon, but without any particular metaphorical resonance.  
One influential text in this literalising of metaphor has been Buffy the 
Vampire Slayer.  Post-Buffy, fantastic texts tend to label a great many monsters as 
“demons,” (see for instance, Charmed), and to refer to hell and heaven “dimensions.”  
Although it is hardly original in this, Buffy and (and its spin-off Angel) has certainly 
popularised the literal hells.  Although we never see it (merely the threshold), Buffy 
refers frequently to heaven and hell.  For instance, Buffy sends Angel to hell at the 
end of the second season, and goes to a heaven dimension after dying in “The Gift” 
(5.22).  The high school setting itself is built over the literal boundary between Earth 
and hell (“The Hellmouth” as the show calls it).  Then you add the abiding metaphor 
of Buffy the Vampire Slayer, which is that high school really is hell—you boyfriend 
really does turn into another person after you have sex (“Innocence” 2.13), mean kids 
really do hunt in packs(“The Pack” 1.06), the lunch lady really is trying to poison the 
students (“Earshot” 3.18), and so on.  The heaven and hell “dimensions” show how 
Buffy and Angel combine Christian and New Age conceptions of the afterlife—the 
term “dimensions” is clearly New Age influenced.   
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Postmodernism and Metaphor 
 
“God has become a sign; or, perhaps more precisely, the [. . .] sign has become God” 
(Taylor, 1993: 170). 
 
As Baudrillard argues, the camera in postmodernism flattens out the culture.  
Fredric Jameson, too, points out that “the emergence of a new kind of flatness or 
depthlessness [is] perhaps the supreme formal feature of all the postmodernisms” 
(1991: 9).  It is arguable that in many ways the postmodern world has lost the ability 
to think metaphorically.  Recall the characteristic tic of TV chef Jamie Oliver (“the 
Naked Chef”), who describes practically everything as “literally,” even though he is 
already discussing literal objects and subjects (eg, you put it in the oven and it is 
literally 5 minutes before it’s done).   Indeed, it is unsurprising that the capacity for 
metaphor has been lost in a media which has seen the extraordinary boom of “reality” 
TV in the last decade or so.  This is not to suggest that the “real” has returned in 
postmodernity (see Chapter Five for an in-depth discussion of this), rather, that it is 
precisely in this extraordinary fidelity to the “real” that a hyper-reality is introduced 
that paradoxically evaporates the real.   As Baudrillard argues, “the collapse of reality 
into hyperrealism [occurs] in the minute duplication of the real” (1983: 141).   
But while Baudrillard and Jameson trace this cultural movement much earlier, 
it is only through the judicious use of CGI (Computer Generated Imagery) technology 
that this has truly flourished on film.  Along with other computer based technologies 
like Photoshop “re-touching” of photographs, Autotune pitch-correction in music, the 
rapid embrace of CGI by postmodern visual culture has arguably accelerated 
postmodern hyper-reality.
47  Advances in CGI special effects have transformed film 
and TV in the last decade or so.  This turn is especially relevant given that one formal 131 
aspect that all of the visual texts of the postmodern sacred have in common is a 
reliance on special effects.  CGI makes unreal texts, traditionally known for their 
unconvincing settings and models, appear far more “realistic.”  Alec Worley suggests 
that “CGI affects a realistic texture often indistinguishable from photographed reality, 
allowing the physical world the mutability of a cartoon” (80).  CGI means that texts 
can depict the supernatural abilities of Gods and monsters, or the demonic imagery of 
hell or supernatural whites of heaven more convincingly or at least with more 
“realistic” detail.  Alien or futuristic worlds, spaceships, magic spells, and all the rest 
are rendered spectacularly in CGI.  CGI has permeated the film industry—a great 
many contemporary films are filmed in front of blue screens and then have minor 
things like setting and even character added in post-production.  Famously, George 
Lucas added the horribly bad Jar Jar Binks CGI character in Star Wars: The Phantom 
Menace, an idea repeated in the form of the house-elf Dobby in the film version of 
Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets.  Importantly too, if less obviously, CGI has 
spread to other filmic techniques like the way the colour palette is adjusted frame-by-
frame in post-production—more green in the case of Peter Jackson’s Lord of the 
Rings—and this is hardly confined to the explicitly unreal genres of science fiction 
and fantasy.   
But while this newest version of hyper-reality seems to make a certain kind of 
sense with regard to realistic texts—duplicating the real in extraordinary detail—what 
effect could it have for texts that are explicitly unreal?  Paradoxically, I think hyper-
reality makes unreal texts appear more “real” (fleshing out their details far more 
fully)—and in doing so confirms their own hyper-reality.  Unreal texts are no longer 
in opposition to a reality principle; the real/unreal opposition has become collapsed.  
What CGI means, therefore, is that texts are made very obviously simulacra; there is 132 
no real-world equivalent for the worlds these texts create, whether they are set in the 
“real world” or not.  Although often the domain of the expensive big budget films, 
many of these film techniques are spreading to TV—if they’re not used already—an 
awful amount of shows already have that that filmic look to them generally (Angel for 
instance), and have CGI effects (for instance, the spaceships on the latest revival of Dr 
Who).   
As well as the obvious postmodernist implications, what CGI means for the 
postmodern sacred is that texts are able to depict supernatural events in spectacular, 
hyper-real detail.  The visual impact of the texts is arguably inextricably tied with 
their use of special effects; it is part of what makes audiences affectively respond.  
Annette Kuhn suggests that 
 
in science fiction cinema, spectacle can become an end in itself: spectacular 
visual effects and sounds temporarily interrupt the flow of the narrative, 
inviting the spectator to contemplate, with awe and wonder the vastness of 
deep space or the technological miracles of future societies. (1990: 7) 
 
 
Now, this might seem to suggest a kind of pop sublime, but it is hardly psychological 
in the sense that the Romantics would assume.  This is the sublime as mere spectacle, 
immediate and ultimately forgettable.  It is arguable that this is one way, perhaps the 
key way, that the postmodern sacred “does” religion (instead of merely citing it), as 
an ecstatic, peak experience for its audience.  But capitalist re-enchantment is 
necessarily a temporally limited one; it has the built-in obsolescence required for 
repeated consumption.   
The supernatural then becomes not a matter for imagination, or as something 
that cannot be quite grasped, it becomes very obviously, one more sign on the screen 
along with the setting and characters.  The special effect, then, becomes supernatural 
in some sense; it makes the supernatural appear real.  On the other hand, the 133 
supernatural eventually becomes just another special effect.  What is awe inducing 
one year becomes passé the next as the technology advances—and then there is the 
fact that at a certain limit where spectacle becomes numbing rather than wondrous 
(for instance, the 20 minute long freeway chase in The Matrix Reloaded).  Textual 
producers thus have to continually up the ante, creating ever more epic sets and 
effects in an effort to re-produce the same awe. 
So, although hyper-reality as described by Baudrillard clearly precedes CGI, 
CGI accelerates the cultural shift in postmodern approaches to the text.  And by 
making the unreal appear as real, it expands the palette of the hyper-real.  As we have 
seen in the various examples of Constantine, Buffy, Stargate and so on, the tendency 
of postmodern texts is to literalise concepts which are always in some way 
metaphorical.  Heaven, Hell, purgatory, even God, have always been ideas as much as 
literal places.  At times, as Constantine shows, this seems a return to a medieval 
Christianity, snipping off half-remembered fragments of Roman Catholic theology to 
pastiche a thoroughly postmodern collage. 
Bizarrely then, even as it entirely bends the idea of the real, this literality 
embodies a curiously naïve approach to the text, similar in some ways to literalist 
fundamentalisms.  Literalist Christian fundamentalism emerges precisely at a time 
that the mainstream Christian denominations have made their religions metaphorical. 
“Hell is a state of mind,” declared John Paul II.  The cliché of the Anglican clergyman 
who doesn’t actually believe in the specifics of the Virgin Birth and so on is certainly 
not entirely unfounded. 
But this literality of place and supernatural creatures is, interestingly, not 
really at odds with the transcendental signifier.  The transcendental signifier is a way 
of gesturing “beyond” this existence, it is a signifier largely emptied of content.  The 134 
New Age’s perennialist habit of seeing disparate traditions as drawing on the same 
wisdom tends to disconnect signifiers from their ideological context.  And as I have 
argued, the postmodern sacred occurs at the meeting point of New Age and 
Christianity (and less frequently drawing on Judaism and Islam), so inevitably 
different texts are bound to combine these aspects in different ways.  It’s not that 
surprising that the more Christian text of Constantine imagines the after-life in far 
more corporeal terms than New Age-y texts gesturing to the transcendent.  Significant 
too is the fact that the transcendental signifier is often gesturing towards an 
amorphous individualised transcendent—even those that are basically versions of the 
Christian heaven (modified, one imagines to be more inclusive of marginalised 
groups, less judgemental and so forth).  These rather more corporeal images however 
are more oriented towards the Christian hell than heaven.  Edward J Ingebretson has 
argued in Maps of Heaven, Maps of Hell that American Christian writers have often 
used the imagery of hell to chide the faithful towards the straight and narrow.  Even 
without that moral purpose, it’s not surprising that the hell appears rather more 
fleshed out in the postmodern sacred than the vague gestures towards heaven, since it 
has rather more of a cultural imaginary to draw on.  This interplay between 
Christianity and the New Age plays itself out in numerous ways, for instance, 
sometimes in apocalyptic forms.  Apocalypse is a recurrent trope through-out Western 
culture, and is hardly restricted to religious belief—nuclear, environmental and viral 
civilisation-destroying apocalypses
48 have all featured heavily in the recent 
imagination.  In my next chapter I shall address in greater depth the problem of 
Christianised pop-culture as supplemental to the traditions from which it draws, in 
particular looking at Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings and Peter Jackson’s film 
adaptations.   135 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 He says “fantastic fiction is entirely—and more clearly than other genres—a 
creature of history: everybody (from Walter Scott on) agrees that it is not thinkable 
before overriding mythological or religious belief suffers an epochal political 
breakdown, as a consequence of which some of its aspects and elements become 
available for fictional manipulation” (2000: 216). Whilst Suvin is talking specifically 
here about the fantasy genre, it is arguable that this is true for the other supernatural 
genres that make up the postmodern sacred, science fiction and horror.   
2 See, for instance, the story in Exodus in which Moses sees only the back of God’s 
body.  Moses says "Oh, let me behold Your Presence" (Exodus 33:18) to which God 
replies, "I will make all my goodness pass before you...and you will see My back; but 
My face must not be seen...you cannot see My face, for man may not see Me and live" 
(Exodus 33:18-23). 
3 See for example, the highly unfaithful rendering of the Greek and Roman gods in 
Xena: Warrior Princess and Hercules: The Legendary Journeys.   
4 Karen Armstrong notes the polytheistic belief implicit in early Judaism.  She argues 
that the covenant between God and the Jews only makes sense in a polytheistic 
setting—“The Israelites did not believe that Yahweh, the God of Sinai, was the only 
God, but promised, in their covenant, that they would ignore all the deities and 
worship him alone” (1999: 31).   
5 Kabbalah Centre director Michael Berger’s book Becoming Like God, for instance, 
never specifically mentions Judaism.  On the relationship between Kabbalah and 
Judaism he gives a typically New Age perennialist response: “I don't know too much 
about Buddhism, but I know that there certainly are similarities. Of course since 
Kabbalah is such an inter-spiritual wisdom, it makes a lot of sense that there are a lot 
of similarities between it and other spiritual teachings” (Phillips, n.pag). 
6 In particular, see the “Gnosticism?  No Thanks!” section in On Belief.  Žižek moves 
there from a discussion of Gnosticism to a discussion of New Age Buddhism as the 
“ideological supplement” of late capitalism (2001: 16).  Interestingly, Žižek sees 
posthuman cyberspace as fulfilling the Gnostic dream of “the self getting rid of the 
decay and inertia of material reality” (33).   
7 Paul Heelas points this out in his The New Age Movement.   
8 Butler’s Gender Trouble, for instance, theorises the corporeal body as a product of 
language, problematising the pre-existence of a body before the intervention of the 
regulatory discourses that produce it as knowable.   
9 Even as that simulation is taken by believers as truth, or indeed with the 
transcendental signified, as providing an ontological foundation for all truth.   
10 This ignores, of course, the Catholic Church’s increased drive to canonise new 
saints under John Paul II’s leadership, though one is tempted to point out that it is 
precisely the lack of a credible supernatural element in contemporary Christianity that 
these saints are suppose to fill.   
11 Although conversely, the media framing suggests the intrinsic role of the media 
simulacra—events strike as “real” only so far as they have been always-already 
mediated through the TV coverage.  Hyper-reality is what strikes us as real now.   136 
                                                                                                                                            
12 The BBC website carried the story at the time:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1589133.stm 
13 This is an idea played with in the finale of the first series of Joan of Arcadia.  Joan, 
who has been talking through-out the series with a very literal God, is diagnosed with 
Lyme disease and realises that the visitations may have just been a symptom of her 
illness.   
14 It should be noted that Tolkien’s posthumously published The Silmarrillion does 
prominently feature Gods in its creation story for Middle Earth, rendered in King 
James style language.   
15 The Nyssians provide an interesting mediation between East and West, suggested to 
be dissolute in drugs and sexual excess, and generally suspicious (signaled by the use 
of the snake as Nyssian totem), but not Evil in the same way that the Angaraks are.  
Of course, the second series called the Mallorean complicates the matter considerably, 
bringing the Angaraks redemption in the form of their new God Erriond.   
16 She says, “it is a form which discourages reader participation, representing events 
that are in the long distant past, contained and fixed by a long temporal perspective 
and containing the implication that their effects have long since ceased to disturb” 
(33). 
17 Jackson’s argument holds true for Eddings and Tolkien, perhaps, far more than 
other forms of fantasy or fairy tales.  Angela Carter’s feminist revision of fairy tales, 
for instance, can hardly be considered to not disturb its readers.  See the Jack Zipes 
edited collection Don’t Bet On the Prince for feminist fairy tales and criticism by 
writers such Carter and Joanna Russ.     
18 See my first chapter for a discussion of pastiche and postmodernism as described by 
Fredric Jameson. 
19 A comparable musical analogy might be the work of the Australian group The 
Avalanches, whose album Since I Left You was made from the fragments of hundreds 
of samples.   
20 Fans of Matt Groenig’s other more famous series The Simpsons will note the 
similarity of this episode to one of the vignettes in “Treehouse of Horror V11” (8.01), 
in which Lisa becomes God to a small race of people living on a tooth she had been 
doing a science experiment on.     
21 Interestingly, this episode of Futurama in some ways recalls Terry Gilliam’s 1981 
science fiction comedy Time Bandits, which features a bumbling God.  In Time 
Bandits, God “refuses to let on whether He has a design in everything, or is just 
making it up as He goes along” (Worley 142).  A similar kind of ambivalence to the 
divine is clearly at work in “Godfellas.”   
22 Samuel Huntington’s theory, which appeared in the early 90s but was taken up 
more widely post September 11.  See Chapter Five for more on this.   
23  A key touch-point is the science fiction series Star Trek.  The first Futurama 
episode begins with a Star Trek referencing monologue: “space.  It seems to go on 
and on forever.  But then you get to the end and the monkey starts throwing barrels at 
you” (“Space Pilot 3000” 1.01).  The series 4 episode “Where No Fan Has Gone 
Before,” (4.11) features many of the cast members from the original series.   
24 See, for instance, the episode in which a giant ball of garbage “old” New York had 
sent into space returns on a collision course with the Earth (“A Big Piece of Garbage” 
1.08).   
25 It is interesting to note that the effect of the vocal device on the female Goa’uld 
renders their voices decidedly masculine.  Given that the Goa’uld are generally coded 137 
                                                                                                                                            
as innately evil in the series, it is possible to read such an effect as either mobilising a 
fear of female masculinity, or of transgendered femininity.   
26 True to Stargate’s demystifying position, these are explained by the use of an alien 
device called a “sarcophagus,” which revives the dead and increases the life of the 
living, albeit at the cost of rendering them evil.  While this means resurrection is no 
longer constituted as miraculous within the textual universe, there is nevertheless 
something uncanny (if slightly predictable, given their status as villains) about the 
Goa’uld returning from death so often.   
27 There are a number of examples of Stargate’s dubious racial politics besides the 
racial Othering of the Goa’uld.  The episode “The Warrior” features the Jaffa 
rebellion leader Kytano (later revealed to be the Goa’uld Imotep), whose language 
recalls Martin Luther King and whose “fanatic” tactics simultaneously recall Malcolm 
X and suicide bombers.  Also, one of the other chief enemies of SG1, the intergalactic 
mechanical pests the “Replicators,” are revealed to be the creation of Reese, an 
android who “turned out wrong” (played by African American actess Danielle 
Nicolet).   
28 It is not coincidental that Stargate is currently the only show on television with US 
Army approval, to the extent of a 4 star general appearing on the show as himself.   
29 The episode “Threshold” (5.02) sees the brain-washed Teal’c regress back to his 
earlier belief that the Goa’uld Apothis is his God.  He has a conversation with Major 
Carter that deftly dodges critiquing the Christian God: 
Teal’c: do you believe in a God, Major Carter? 
Carter: this isn’t about me. 
Teal’c: How would it be if you were punished for loving your God as I love mine? 
Carter: It’s not the same. 
Teal’c: I can’t help what I believe. 
Carter: You believe in freedom, Teal’c, in justice, in protecting people from false 
Gods.  You despise everything Apothis was.   
30 For instance, Edmundson says “Gothic is the art of haunting, and in two senses.  
Gothic shows time and again that life, even at its most ostensibly innocent, is 
possessed, that the present is in thrall to the past.  All are guilty.  All must, in time, 
pay up” (5). 
31 Despite its reclamation by New Age and/or Wicca communities, the word “pagan” 
is itself problematic, deriving as it does largely from an implict Christian and 
Eurocentric view of the “real” God. 
32 Well, as original as any postmodern text can be! 
33 Edmundson uses this term to describe the ease with which pop-culture bestows 
transcendence on the American subject. 
34 I take this idea of the sublime from Lyotard’s reworking of Kant.  He says, “[the 
sublime] takes place [. . .] when the imagination fails to present an object which 
might, if only in principle, come to match a concept” (Lyotard, 1984b: 78). 
35 This is remarkably similar to the genetically mutated superheroes of X-Men, 
although Dark Angel ties the monstrous to the conspiracy theories familiar from The 
X-Files.   
36 Of course, one could quite easily make a psycho-analytic reading here—the desire 
for/fear of castration by the phallic heroine.  Clearly one can see a certain male 
masochistic economy of desire working here.   
37 This boundary is occasionally problematised, for instance in the Buffy episode 
“Doppelgangland,” where we see Willow and an alternate-universe vampire double.  138 
                                                                                                                                            
Willow frets over her vampire double being “kinda gay”, Buffy tries reassuring her by 
saying “just remember Willow, a vampire’s personality has nothing to do with the 
person it was.”  Angel begins with an open-ended “well actually…” but then clumsily 
covers with “that’s a good point.”  Of course, the vampire double’s queerness 
foreshadows Willow’s coming-out in the following season.     
38 See, for instance, Eugenia Delamotte’s article “White Terror, Black Dreams,” 
which suggests that the nineteenth century’s process of essentialising race produced 
Gothic texts that both expressed white fears of a racialised Other as well as the fear 
that whiteness itself does not exist (17).   
39 It is arguable that the queer and/or effeminate man has become the symbol of 
postmodern anxiety—from Silence of the Lamb’s Buffalo Bill creating a female 
“skin” for himself, to the homoerotic Tom Ripley in the film version of The Talented 
Mister Ripley.  This is not in any way confined to strictly Gothic texts, the femme 
queerboy figures as a metaphor for ultimate Evil in the lisping Voldemort in the 
fantasy film Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire, is conflated with a dissolute 
Frenchness in the Terry Gilliam’s woeful Brothers Grimm, and so on.   
40 More alarmingly, Ingebretson’s work argues fairly conclusively that the 
presentation of “real life” news is largely a matter of Gothic monstrosity—and that 
rarely contains the ambivalence that Halberstam finds among postmodern horror 
texts, policing instead the boundaries of gender, sexuality, race and class.   
41 Helberstam says “Gothic [. . . ] is the breakdown of genre and the crisis occasioned 
by the inability to “tell,” meaning both the inability to narrate and the inability to 
categorise.  Gothic, I argue, marks a peculiarly modern preoccupation with boundaries 
and their collapse.” (23) 
42 Christianity is, of course, not alone in featuring angels, since Christianity inherits 
angels from the Jewish faith, and the Qu’ran too contains angels.  However, in the 
West at least, angels are largely Christian or Christian-derived.   
43 There is, of course, something very queer at the heart of Christianity.  The focus on 
Christ’s body creates the conditions for a (usually disavowed) homoerotic gaze, one 
that is recognisable in the Christian tradition, say in the works of Michelangelo.  
Similarly, a focus on Christ’s suffering on the cross suggests a sadomasochistic 
economy of desire.  As Žižek points out, viewed from another angle, Passion of the 
Christ resembles nothing so much as a gay S/M film (Žižek, 2006: 358).  See also the 
thoughtful queer theological musings of Marcella Althaus-Reid on subjects such as 
the Bi-Christ, Mary as drag queen and vanilla theology and Ruth Vanita’s Sapphic 
reading of the Virgin Mary.   
44 The well-publicised case in which a freshman student at the University of 
Wyoming was tied to a fence and struck 18 times in the head with a pistol, and left for 
dead.  Shephard spent 5 days in a coma and then died.   
45 Ingebretson says of Shephard: “to read the perverse implications of this body is to 
read against the grain of sentimental Christianity, which tosses the monstrum out, 
leaving only the bathos of a simpering Jesus, my best friend.  Theologically Jesus who 
is The Christ is a hybrid—a bodied and bloodied Christ.  In both its aspect of body 
and blood the image circulates a mixture of taboo, religiousness (blood, histrocially), 
monstrousness, as well as legal criminality” (281).   
46 See the following chapter for more on apocalypse in the postmodern sacred.   
47 Re-touched photos change a person’s appearance, Autotune changes a singers’ 
pitch to be more in tune.  Both illustrate the same postmodern principle, artificially 139 
                                                                                                                                            
removing the “blemishes” of the real to produce hyper-real simulations of appearance 
and singing ability.     
48 This has played out in both scientific discussions and popular culture.  Recent 
popular culture examples of these include nuclear apocalypse on TV series Gideon, 
environmental apocalypse in movies like Armageddon (giant meteor heading towards 
Earth), The Day After Tomorrow (global warming), and viral apocalypse in Outbreak 
and 28 Days Later. 140 
Chapter Four 
That Dangerous Supplement: Christianity and the New Age in Tolkien’s 
Lord of the Rings 
 
 
Cate Blanchett as Galadriel in Peter Jackson’s Lord of the Rings 
 
In my previous chapters, I have argued that much of the postmodern sacred 
can be considered a pop culture profoundly influenced by New Age thinking.  
However, I have also pointed towards a strong Christian influence, such that the 
postmodern sacred can also be considered a post-Christian discourse.  While many 
critics would like to claim popular culture texts as one or the other (usually Christian), 
I argue that this is a reductive critical enterprise and instead prefer to consider both of 
the two as intrinsic parts of the postmodern sacred.  Both positions tend to assume an 
already existing belief on the part of either textual producer or consumer (or indeed 
both), a position which simply cannot be assumed for the mass audiences of 
postmodern pop culture consumption of a text does not necessarily mean an 141 
ideological affirmation—although it can—let alone a belief in the religious/spiritual 
movements from which it draws.  Rather than assume a real-world belief, it is 
arguable that texts assume merely knowledge of the religious references.  So, given 
that cultural binary between Christianity and the New Age, I would in this chapter 
like to consider how the two work together in terms of Derrida’s notion of the 
supplement.   
The critical usage of the supplement stems from Derrida’s famous reading in 
Of Grammatology of Rousseau’s use of the word “supplement”.  Derrida ascribes two 
functions to the supplement.  Firstly, as it is most commonly read, the supplement 
“cumulates and accumulates presence” (144).  The supplement is, firstly, an addition.  
But, simultaneously, Derrida argues, the supplement  
 
adds only to replace [. . .] it intervenes or insinuates itself in-the-place-of.  
Compensatory and vicarious, the supplement is an adjunct, a subaltern 
instance that takes-(the)-place.  As substitute, it is not simply added to the 
positivity of the presence, it produces no relief, its place is assigned in the 
structure of emptiness.  (1976: 145) 
 
 
 The supplement, therefore, both adds to and replaces the sign.  Derrida argues that 
this is the primary function of language itself, since “the sign is always the 
supplement of the thing itself” (145).  The supplement becomes opposed to the 
referent, speech to writing, nature to culture and so on.
1  It is no accident, then, the 
supplement as described by Derrida is the figure of a certain kind of danger, for 
supplements “transgress a prohibition and are experienced within culpability” (165).  
Derrida argues that what he calls metaphysics “consists of excluding non-presence by 
determining the supplement as simple exteriority, pure addition or pure absence” 
(167).  Yet as Derrida makes clear, the supplement also works to confirm the rules it 
transgresses, making possible the production of metaphysics  —“that within which 142 
metaphysics can be produced but which metaphysics cannot think” (167).  Given the 
impossibility of producing a pure presence, metaphysics must make recourse to the 
supplement of writing, bemoaning that fact even as it makes use of it. 
Rousseau, of course, uses the figure of the supplement to describe his 
masturbatory habits.  Masturbation is “that dangerous supplement” to (heterosexual) 
sex with a partner.  My use of the supplement in a study of popular culture has a 
number of fortuitous resonances.  First, one can see a number of interesting parallels 
between fandom (fan culture) and masturbation—often solitary pursuits, on the edge 
of a heterosexual reproductive economy.  The stereotype of the male nerd is that of 
one who lives at home with his parents past adulthood, is unable to find a “real life” 
girlfriend, and is intoxicated with the seductions of pop culture babes—a stereotype 
that does not reflect the extremely varied forms of fandom which range across age, 
gender, race, sexuality and so on.  Popularly however, the dangers of fandom are of 
perpetual male adolescence, of an inability to enter a fully sexual adult world.  One 
should note the implicitly heterosexuality of the stereotypical male nerd, as well as the 
concurrent spectre of queerness needing to be banished by the public avowal of 
heterosexual desire (say in the cultish adoption of such sex symbols as the impossibly 
proportioned videogame/movie character Lara Croft).  Recall the un-named Comic 
Book Guy on The Simpsons, overweight, sarcastic, pedantic, single and socially inept.  
Fandom becomes constituted as compensatory, defined by what it apparently lacks 
(social interaction, sexual relationships and so on).  Thus overzealous fans are told to 
“get a life.”  Fandom supplements, it adds (to the subject’s absences), and it replaces 
“a life.”   
So the supplement brings with it a certain danger, for it challenges the 
ontological boundaries of the subject.  I began this chapter by noting the binary of 143 
New Age and Christianity in Western culture.  For the New Age, Christianity is often 
seen as an out-dated, dogmatic faith.  Christianity, on the other hand, can see the New 
Age as either invented mystifications, or at worst, as evil satanic practices (seen, for 
instance in the fundamentalist denunciations of Wicca as “witch-craft”).  Yet despite 
this, they are nevertheless in dialogue with another, and neither remains unmodified 
by that dialogue.  The supplement can work for both positions—New Age tropes can 
appear in the most “Christian” of texts, just as Christianity can unexpectedly appear in 
more New Age texts.  Both will seek to exclude the presence of the other as 
supplemental and excessive; for Christians, the New Age as pagan, heretical, 
narcissistic and for the New Age, Christianity as patriarchal, heterosexist and so on.  
Yet both are necessarily entangled within each other, the point being the impossibility 
of a “pure” Christianity or New Age.  A key example would be the common trope of 
angels, which I discussed in the previous chapter.  While angels form a key part of 
Abrahamic religions, the New Age takes the angel and disconnects it from its 
religious, largely Christian history, in the West.  That disconnection, however, is 
inevitably partial, for in using the angel signifier, the New Age cannot but also recall 
a Christian angel, even as it attempts to repurpose its meanings.  Given that the New 
Age is polytheistic in the sense of a relativised sense of meaning; its attempts to 
oppose itself to Christianity are predictably flawed, with the inevitable appropriation 
of Christian signifiers.  Similarly, Christian attempts to separate from the New Age 
are doomed, given the inter-relationship between the New Age, pop psychology and 
pop culture.  Postmodern subjectivity is at least partly a New-Age-ised subjectivity, 
with such New Age derived ideas as “spirit,” “finding oneself,” and “being true to 
oneself” being an integral part of postmodern narratives of the self.   144 
The postmodern sacred in itself can also be considered as supplemental, 
working in addition to “real” spiritual texts as well as intervening and replacing.  The 
danger that pop culture can itself replace the holy texts is one that religious writers 
constantly feel the need to defend against.  Pop culture can often seem to provoke a 
greater affective response than religious tradition proper, partly one imagines because 
of the greater need to entertain, though also a less ideologically restrictive dogma 
probably has its place as well.  Pop culture produced specifically by and for a 
religious audience—for example Christian rock—is often “decaf” pop culture, pop 
culture with the “offensive” bits like sex and violence removed (which of course 
ignores the fact that most holy texts tend to have more than their fair share of those 
things).  Similarly, the devotion to their chosen texts and attention to the smallest pop-
culture minutiae that fans display is surely problematic for those who prefer that those 
devotions be restricted solely to religious traditions.   
Warding against the danger of the supplement, or trying futilely to shore up 
the fictional “pure” presence of pop culture, Christianity or the New Age strikes me as 
particularly pointless for a critic to engage in.  Although some writers (usually 
Christian) seek to claim particular pop-culture texts for their beliefs,
2 I believe it is a 
more productive critical enterprise to trace the appearance/disappearance of both New 
Age and Christian tropes.  In this chapter, I shall examine in detail J.R.R Tolkien’s 
fantasy epic Lord of the Rings and its Peter Jackson-directed film adaptations.  In 
particular, I shall examine the Biblical motif of apocalypse in the texts, before 
discussing the inter-relationship between Lord of the Rings and the New Age.   
 
 
 145 
Reading Tolkien 
 
Arguably Lord of the Rings has a singular impact on the modern fantasy genre, 
one cannot underestimate how influential Tolkien’s work as been.  Though Ursula Le 
Guin, for instance, sees the earlier Lord Dunsany as a more significant writer to the 
fantasy genre (75), I find myself in agreement with Brian Attebery’s contention that 
The Lord of the Rings is the key defining text in the genre, its “fuzzy centre” (qtd 
Pennington n.p.).  Whilst fantasy has been and remains a fairly elastic genre, many of 
the aspects of Tolkien’s work have been taken up as key facets of the genre.  
Tolkien’s creation of a “secondary world” has remained the dominant form of modern 
fantasy, relegating other forms such as the “alternative history of this world” model to 
secondary strands of the genre.  Similarly Tolkien’s medievalism has become largely 
constitutive of the genre,
3 though this has frequently been entangled with Celticised 
New Age medievalism.  It should be noted that Tolkien is himself indebted to any 
number of sources; Nelson for instance finds echoes of Algernon Blackwood and 
Lord Dunsany, whilst the influence of Beowulf, medieval romances and indeed 
Tolkien’s contemporary and friend C.S Lewis have been noted by any number of 
writers.  Yet, with the exception of Lewis’s Narnia series (which has proved a 
perennial children’s lit favourite), the fact remains that these influences have come to 
the fantasy genre largely through Tolkien.   
As I mentioned earlier, Tolkien is the most widely theorised of fantasy writers, 
4 yet I find much of the theory singularly unhelpful in illuminating my thesis about 
the postmodern sacred.  Jes Battis points out that current Tolkien studies, from literary 
and language studies, biography, religion to fantasy and science-fiction studies, “do 
not maintain any sort of meaningful dialogue with each other” (910).  Perhaps this is 146 
due to the fact that Lord of the Rings resists totalising readings, it “creates 
problematic and incomplete readings, for it occupies several literary modes—epic, 
romance, pastoral, and fantasy
5—without firmly attaching itself to any of them” 
(Battis 909).  Important theoretical work from Marxist, postcolonial, feminist and 
queer perspectives has been done on Tolkien, though these have frequently ignored 
the spiritual aspects of both the text(s) and their consumption.
6
On the other hand, many theorists have noticed the religious aspects of 
Tolkien’s work, yet I find their work incomplete in explaining the postmodern 
reception of both books and movies.  Much religious work has pointed to Tolkien’s 
own avowed Catholicism, using this to perform totalising readings of the books as 
definitively Christian—a reading that often ignores, for instance, the striking pagan 
aspects of Tolkien’s work, undoubtedly influenced by his work on Beowulf.  This 
biographical approach (see for instance, Calderott’s Secret Fire) often relies heavily 
on Tolkien’s letters, which both explain his own approach to Christianity 
(Catholicism in particular) and provide readings of his work.  This approach proves 
problematic in a number of ways.  First, it relies on the author to provide definitive 
and totalising readings of his own work—an idea which has been thoroughly refuted 
by post-structuralists who argue that the meaning of a text always remains elusively 
outside the grasp of its own author.  Secondly, these documents used to “prove” this 
reading of Lord of the Rings are themselves supplementary texts with their own 
contestable meaning.  Calderott, for instance, relies on Tolkien’s letters, academic 
essay “On Fairy Stories” and minor stories such as “Leaf by Niggle.”  Arguably these 
texts (particularly the letters) have only been read by a tiny minority of Tolkien’s 
audience and thus cannot considered to be providing the typical reading context for 
the Lord of the Rings’ general reception.   147 
Work on Tolkien’s relationship to the religious has not been limited to an 
academic audience; many religious writers have written to assure moderate Christian 
audiences that fantasy and speculative fiction are not the Satanic works evangelicals 
have often claimed them to be.
7  As with the aforementioned religiously inclined 
academic writing, works aimed at a non-academic religious audience have relied 
heavily on biographical readings of Tolkien’s own life.  Importantly, too, these have 
used simplistic approaches to the text reliant on the notion that one can extract the 
theological “wisdom” from Tolkien’s vast works—a method that clearly lacks the 
nuances suitable for academic research.   
Thus, my analysis of Tolkien and his place in the postmodern sacred is 
intended to argue a number of points.  First, that Tolkien’s work displays a number of 
Christian religious signifiers, without this necessarily meaning that the work is 
Christian or that this reading refutes the frequent criticisms of Tolkien on the grounds 
of race, class, gender or sexuality.  Second, that contemporary readers and viewers of 
Tolkien will consume in a postmodern fashion, meaning that there will inevitably be a 
slippage between written and visual text.  Third, that contemporary consumption of 
Tolkien illuminates the “believing without belonging” detraditionalised method of 
spiritual consumption I find characteristic of the postmodern sacred.  Lastly, that 
postmodern consumption of the Lord of the Rings works to incorporate both Christian 
and New Age symbols and ideas, without being tied definitively to either position.   
 
The Religious Trace 
 
As I argued earlier, there exists an ongoing dialogue in contemporary culture 
between the postmodern and the pre-modern.  The Ancient texts that form part of the 148 
Christian Bible—in particular, the Book of Revelations, or the Apocalypse as it’s also 
known—continue to be a vital part of the apparently post-secular West.  Even almost 
two thousand years after it was written, Revelations continues to influence Western 
thought, both religious and secular.  Even a show such as Buffy has Gothic 
paraphernalia (abandoned churches, fashion accessory crosses) which show the 
ineffectiveness of contemporary Christianity.  But Revelations affects other modes of 
postmodern texts that lack Buffy’s insouciant irony.   
Tolkien’s influence in the genre that he has helped spawn, fantasy fiction, 
means the genre can be intensely spiritual.  For instance, Ursula Le Guin’s Earthsea 
series shows the strong influence of her Taoist beliefs, and many authors such as 
Katharine Kerr and Juliet Marillier draw heavily on Celtic mythology for a religious 
underpinning to their secondary worlds.  However, due to the strong influence of the 
genre’s chief canonical text, Lord of the Rings, Christianity (or at least a Christian 
symbology) is the genre’s predominant religious system.  C.S Lewis famously wrote 
his hugely popular Narnia series as a Christian allegory, with Aslan as his Christ-
figure.  Yet, because fantasy is set in secondary worlds, both like and unlike our own, 
it’s generally not appropriate to talk of a didactic Christian purpose, for fantasy 
usually presents an estranged version of “the real.”  Rather, we should talk of the 
influence of Christian thought upon what Rosemary Jackson calls “marvelous” 
worlds.  It is my argument that Lord of the Rings connotes different aspects of a 
Christian derived and inflected—if now post-Christian—epistemology, namely 
apocalypse and post-apocalypse. 
Though one could use, perhaps, other theories of intertextuality to advance this 
argument, following on from my previous chapter, it is by using Jacques Derrida’s 
notion of the trace that I wish to interrogate the relationship between Lord of the 149 
Rings and the Book of Revelations.  Derrida refutes the appeal to “the real world” that 
both writers and readers of texts often make, arguing instead that all texts contain the 
traces of other texts encoded within them.  The explicit unreality of the fantasy genre 
suggests why this method is appropriate, for if there is one genre that particularly 
illustrates the sedimentation of texts, it is the fantasy genre, pastiched as it is from 
many sources.  Derrida consistently attacks the notion that philosophy, or indeed 
literature, can ever deliver the full presence the sign promises to deliver, texts “signal 
not in the direction of another presence, or another form of presence, but in the 
direction of an entirely other text” (Derrida, 1982: 65).  And that text itself, rather 
than being that other form of presence, signals again to an entirely other text.  Thus 
Derrida makes one of his more aphoristic comments that “there is nothing outside the 
text.”  This is not to suggest that the world is a giant library, rather, that any text will 
inevitably rely on other texts in order to make meaning, no text can wholly supply its 
own context, so those texts will leave traces able to be drawn out by the careful 
reader.  Though deconstruction has mostly been used within a general context of 
atheism—especially within the English and Cultural Studies that embraced it as a 
reading methodology—as Kevin Hart points out, “the viability of atheism as a context 
for deconstruction is not in question here; but what is in question is the often 
unspoken assumption that there is a natural or inevitable link between deconstruction 
and atheism: for that is exactly what transmutes a matter of context into a matter of 
totalisation” (43).  In particular, Hart chides Gayatri Spivak for warning, in the 
introduction to Of Grammatology, that the vertigo of deconstruction is not mystical or 
theological—a supplemental warning in a text that deconstructs supplemental 
attempts to totalise meaning.  Of course, Derrida’s own late “religious-ethical turn” 
(for instance, the extended reading of Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling in The Gift 150 
of Death) perhaps serves to illustrate the applicability of deconstruction for religious 
study, but to re-read that definitively into Derrida’s earlier work like Of 
Grammatology (say, that différance is theological)is to mark another intervention of a 
different kind. 
So the question then arises which traces will be foregrounded, and which will 
be foreclosed from the start by the critic.  In Lord of the Rings, one could choose to 
foreground any number of trace texts—the Bible, medieval romances, pastorals—
whilst some scholars have found traces in Peter Jackson's movies of kung-fu movies,
8 
amongst others.  It is the project of this chapter to foreground those traces in Lord of 
the Rings that are of a spiritual nature, without necessarily arguing that it is being 
consumed, read or watched to affirm a theology of any kind.  In the following section, 
I shall mostly make recourse to the Christian apocalyptic tradition in order to draw 
forth those spiritual traces. 
 
Traces in Lord of the Rings 
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As I pointed out earlier, much scholarship on Tolkien and religion has 
simplistically claimed the work as Christian because of its concern for good, evil and 
the responsibility of power.  Claiming those beliefs as specifically Christian is 
incredibly patronising, suggesting that athiests and agnostics aren't concerned with 
morality.  Still, regardless, it is quite clear that Lord of the Rings conceptualises Good 
and Evil in Christian-inflected binaristic terms.  The goodness of many of its chief 
characters seems to be innate, for instance Aragorn's royal background functions as 
emblematic of his goodness.  Likewise, Boromir's sin consists largely in confusing his 
family's stewardship, an assumed responsibility, with innate royalty.  On the other 
hand, Evil is innate in the form of Sauron, and essentialised in the form of the Orcs.  It 
should be noted that the mixing of races in the Orcs recalls fears of racial 
miscegenation, particularly dramatised in Peter Jackson's movies where Maori and 
Samoan actors were cast as Orcs.  Whilst it is important to recognise the racist 
epistemology that underlines the use of colour in Lord of the Rings, it is also 
important to note that its imagery is also reflective of a long Christian tradition that 
privileges white and light as the source of goodness (think of Galadriel’s coding as a 
Virgin Mary figure) and similarly disparages darkness as the source of evil.  As Sue 
Kim points out, Tolkien draws on a medieval palette that is largely devoid of racist 
connotations, however, it is clear that the modernity has produced a conflation 
between bodies and images, meaning that whiteness has been equated with moral 
goodness and blackness the reverse (898).  Clearly the legacy of this colour-coding is 
unavoidable in the present.  I do not wish to minimise in any way the damning 
criticisms of Lord of the Rings’ race constructions, merely to point out once again at 
this juncture Jane Bennett’s point about dissonant possibilities—Lord of the Rings is a 152 
text large enough to encompass spiritual and racist readings, and many more.  The 
strong coding of Good and Evil (drawing on the corresponding colouring of the 
Christian symbolic tradition) quite clearly has religious implications, as well as raced.   
However, the closer one looks in Lord of the Rings, the more the Manichean 
characterisation comes apart, for all beings are corruptible and subject to temptation.  
Think of the twinning between Frodo and Gollum, in the end Frodo succumbs to the 
Ring's temptation.  Boromir is tempted and attempts to take the ring for himself.  And 
indeed the entire drama could have been prevented had the human king Isildur cast 
the Ring into Mount Doom in the previous War of Power.  Yet though all are tempted, 
Tolkien is not so pessimistic as to suggest that people are irrevocably damned.  What 
is the clear difference then is mercy.  What separates Frodo and Gollum is mercy; 
Smeagol's path is set from his murder of his cousin, whilst Frodo inherits the ring 
from Bilbo, who had himself made the conscious choice not to kill Gollum.  Here we 
see Tolkien's Catholicism assert itself in the form of an Augustinian original sin, yet 
characteristically Tolkien refuses to do more than suggest Christian or any real-world 
theology. 
So it is that one must make recourse to Derrida’s theories of textuality, for 
though deconstruction has mostly had an a-religious history, it is a potent tool for 
drawing forth the religious trace in texts that have no explicit “real world” referent.  
James Gooderham argues that most fantasy is marked by an absence of overt religious 
terminology from “the real.”  The trace of religious imagery is overtly disavowed in 
the fantasy text, then, for the logic of the world suggests this is a secondary world 
entirely Other to our own.  Thus the trace of religion in most fantasy texts is under 
erasure as Derrida describes (Gooderham cites Phillip Pulman as an exception).  It is, 
however, still present, displaced from the literal into the metaphorical.  Gooderham 153 
argues that fantasy functions as a metaphorical mode, so religion is “transpose[ed] 
into the landscape, beings and activities of the secondary worlds of the fantasies” (n. 
pag).  We can therefore speak without paradox of the genre as being both spiritual and 
non-religious.  It is that which makes it more consumable in a New Age framework 
than Christian—witness the way 60s counterculture embraced Lord of the Rings far 
more enthusiastically than Lewis’s overtly Christian Narnia series.   
The notion of the trace might, to some, imply some sort of stability to the trace 
text, some sort of continuing presence which can be found in other texts.  But though I 
am investigating the traces of Revelations in Lord of the Rings, this does not mean 
that Revelations is itself a static text.  “Revelations” is constructed through a fluid 
history of interpretation.  Gianni Vattimo points out that “the sacred texts which mark 
our religious experience are handed down to us by a tradition, [whose] mediation does 
not allow then to survive as unmodifiable objects” (Vattimo 88).  The religious text 
has already been modified in the reading.  This means that, theoretically, one could 
read Lord of the Rings into Revelations, our reading of the one influencing the other.  
And certainly historically various (if not all) religious groups have re-read their own 
socio-historical context back into the Christian Bible.  The identification of various 
figures as the Anti-Christ—Hitler or Napoleon for example—not only reads the Bible 
into the “real” but reads “the real” back into the Bible.
9
As I have pointed out, traces of Revelations are one such strong dialogue in 
Lord of the Rings, whether diffused through Dante’s Inferno or Milton or from the 
“original” Biblical text itself, yet indeed the Apocalypse itself did not emerge from 
nothing.  It draws strongly on the Jewish apocalyptic tradition (Cohn 37).  Revelations 
owes a heavy debt to the Hebrew Bible, with more than 300 references to it, most 
notably to the apocalyptic Book of Daniel.  Just as with Christianity, the Jewish 154 
apocalyptic tradition is strong, but only the one text, Daniel, was accepted into the 
Jewish canon.  But however strong the traces of Jewish apocalyptic thought in 
Revelations, Cohn argues that “Revelations is nevertheless a profoundly Christian 
work throughout.  Whatever is taken from the Hebrew Bible is reinterpreted in a 
Christian sense and integrated into a Christian world-view” (37).   
Revelations is one of the key touchstones of Christian thought, and any 
discussion of Christianity inevitably must mention the marked apocalyptic tendency 
of the Christian tradition(s).  In Anatomy of Criticism, Northrop Frye argues that the 
Bible provides “our grammar of apocalyptic imagery” (Frye 141).  Indeed, 
“apocalyptic terms of reference are so deeply ingrained in Western culture that they 
have taken on an archetypal function.” (Carey 270).  Though apocalypticism forms 
part of most religions to a lesser or greater degree,
10 it is most prominent in 
Christianity.  Arguably this is due to the inclusion of Revelations as a canonical text 
(Baumgartner 4), an inclusion based largely on the dubious tradition of apostolic 
authorship (Cohn 37). 
The well-known Roman Catholicism of Tolkien, as well as the reworking of 
other Christian(ised) modes such as the medieval romance suggest a possible reason 
for apocalypse’s ubiquitous place in fantasy.  There are, in fact, multiple apocalypses 
and Falls in Lord of the Rings—the whole world is, after all, in a state of decline.
11  
The previous war with Sauron when the Ring was captured by the human king Isildur 
led to a withdrawal by the Elves from the general world, leaving the world to be run 
by “corruptible” men.  And previously, again, at the beginning of the world there is an 
apocalyptic battle between Gods.  So if apocalypse promises a devastating, if 
cleansing, singularity, then it rarely delivers it.   155 
 Prior to the destruction of the Ring, apocalyptic imagery in Lord of the Rings 
focuses mainly around Mordor and to a less degree its ally Isengard, the apostate 
wizard Saruman’s tower.  The coding of Mordor, too, suggests a Hell-on-Earth, even 
before its apocalyptic destruction.  Mordor is coded in the fire-and-brimstone imagery 
of Revelations, all fire and ash—“Darkness lay there under the sun.  Fire glowed amid 
the smoke, Mount Doom was burning and a great reek rising.”  Frye calls this 
demonic imagery, contrasting it to the cleansing purgatorial fire of the Jewish 
apocalypse Daniel.  Mordor undoubtedly articulates Tolkien’s vision of ultimate evil, 
strongly inflected with modern industrialism, and heightened in the Isengard scenes in 
the movies.  Though evil is a possibility for everyone on Middle Earth, for instance in 
the greed for the One Ring which caused Smeagol to murder his friend Deagol and 
thus his subsequent transformation into Gollum(52), Mordor is evil’s geographical 
focus and as such is the clearest example of Revelations’ images of destruction.  
Though Mordor itself is not in a state of apocalypse, for it would have long before 
collapsed, its presence elucidates the apocalyptic logic that the world “must end 
because in some crucial sense it has [already] ended” (Berger 7).  Mordor is the 
apocalypse already in progress. 
Yet though apocalypse recurs periodically, and incompletely, the destruction 
of the One Ring is quite clearly the apocalyptic moment of the series—it destroys and 
makes the world new again.  The destruction of the Ring not only kills Sauron, but 
reduces Mordor to rubble: 
 
rising swiftly up, far above the Towers of the Black Gate, high above the 
mountains, a vast soaring darkness sprang into the sky, flickering with fire.  
The earth groaned and quaked.  The Towers of the Teeth swayed, tottered, 
and fell down; the mighty rampart crumbled; the Black Gate was hurled in 
ruin; and from far away, now dim, now growing, now mounting to the 
Clouds, there came a drumming rumble, a roar, a long echoing roll of 
ruinous noise.  (Tolkien 928) 156 
 
The destruction of the Ring is truly apocalyptic in the sense Berger describes, an 
“absolute, purifying cataclysm,” (6) clearing away the remnants of Sauron’s Mordor.  
Quite clearly the destruction of the Ring marks an ending in Middle Earth, for as 
Frodo says to Sam “the Quest is achieved and now all is over.  I’m glad you are here 
with me.  Here at the end of all things, Sam” (926).  In the appendixes, Tolkien marks 
the end of the story as the end of the Third Age of Middle Earth’s history with the 
departure of Gandalf, Frodo and Bilbo, with a fairly pessimistic prediction for the 
Fourth Age dominated by men.  Interestingly, unlike the essentially good-hearted 
hobbits, men are shown to be basically sinful creatures, motivated by lust for power 
and greed, a characterisation undoubtedly influenced by Tolkien’s Catholic beliefs.  
The ending of this story, then, is the handing over of Middle Earth from the care-
taking of the other-worldly Elves to the more suspicious care of men. 
Yet Evil, in the Christian drama, requires a greater Good to defeat it.  Christ is, 
quite naturally, an important figure of the apocalypse and it is inevitable that one 
would find references to him in Tolkien’s works.  Remembering that Lord of the 
Rings contains the traces of religion—not full-blown allegory of the C.S Lewis sort—
Christ-figures are multiple and necessarily incomplete.  The three notable Christ 
figures are Gandalf, Frodo and Aragorn.  Gandalf recalls the resurrected Christ 
because of his own return from death in the mines of Moria, and subsequent 
transformation from Grey to White.  Frodo functions as a Christ figure because of his 
redemptive sacrifice in carrying the Ring.  This sacrifice is played out on Frodo’s 
body, indeed one of the more striking aspects of the movie of Fellowship of the Ring 
is the repeated penetration of Frodo’s body, echoing perhaps the spearing of Christ on 
the Cross.
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Yet there are of course differences in the characterisations of Frodo and 
Gandalf that make them only partial Christ-figures.  Heroic epics, and indeed much 
modern fantasy, have tended to have larger-than-life heroes, but it is the very 
ordinariness of Frodo that enables him to succeed in his task.  Frodo and his hobbit 
friends tend to illustrate the Christian dictum “the first shall be last, and the last shall 
be first,” meaning that these humble characters are most worthy in a Christian setting 
to be exalted.  However, while this may, for Frodo, indeed imitate Christ’s role as the 
Son of Man, it hardly betrays the sort of supernatural beginnings or powers that Christ 
has historically be endowed with his dual nature as Son of God
13.  Thus Frodo 
remains only a partial Christ-figure.  Gandalf, on the other hand, exhibits a few other 
similarities to Christ besides his resurrection—his refusal of the Ring echoes Christ’s 
temptation by the Devil—yet, by and large, his antecedents lie more with the Merlin 
of the Arthurian romances than with Christ.   
So it must be said that neither of these incarnations of Christ (Frodo or 
Gandalf) are particularly apocalyptic.  The most obviously apocalyptic coding of a 
Christ figure is in fact Aragorn, the long-lost King of Gondor (946).  The third book 
of the series is called Return of the King, and it is this aspect that marks Aragorn as a 
Christ figure—specifically Christ as he appears at the end of time, post-apocalypse.  
This is a King who is returning, after all, not appearing for the first time.  Faramir 
says to him “I would not have you appearing like a beggar at the door” (843) clearly 
reminiscent of Christ’s “thief in the night” warning about his return.  One can 
therefore read the stewards of Gondor, Boromir and Faramir’s family, as 
representative of the Church on earth, who can never properly replace Jesus, as 
Faramir replays this conversation between his father and Boromir: 
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“How many hundreds of years needs it to make a steward a king, if the 
King returns not?” he asked.  “Few years, maybe, in other places of less 
royalty,” my father answered.  “In Gondor ten thousand years would not 
suffice.” (655) 
 
 
Boromir’s betrayal of Frodo, of lusting after the power of the Ring himself  
(390), bespeaks a failure to recognise a power more legitimate than his own 
stewardship.  One could easily see this as a rebuke of the Catholic Church’s own 
stewardship, in particular that of the Pope, a warning not to seek to usurp Jesus’ place 
as absent head of the Church. 
The return of Christ is supposed to mark the end of Christian eschatology, yet 
despite the common-place connotations of the word, apocalypse is not the end, since 
apocalyptic thought almost inevitably contains within it the seeds of the post-
apocalyptic.  As James Berger argues, “in nearly every apocalyptic presentation, 
something remains after the end” (5-6).  This holds true even in a comic apocalyptic 
end to the Earth such as avowed atheist Douglas Adams’s Hitch-hiker’s Guide To the 
Universe, which begins with the Earth’s demolition and continues with a post-
apocalyptic jaunt through an alien-inhabited universe.  Christian eschatology, on the 
other hand, generally promises heavenly, blissful kingdoms to come after the 
apocalyptic “cleansing.”  Revelations has the New Jerusalem and a new heaven and 
earth descending (Berger 6).  The good are rewarded, the evil are punished, and the 
world is made over anew into perfection. 
However, it’s hard to work out where exactly to place the post-apocalyptic in 
Lord of the Rings, for it’s neither paradise nor dystopic wasteland.  The victory over 
Sauron and the destruction of Mordor is pretty complete, yet there is hardly raucous 
celebration on the part of the heroes.  The Shire might suggest itself as a post-
apocalyptic Promised Kingdom, for certainly it’s a reward for the hobbit heroes—159 
particularly Sam who goes on to live a long and contented life as its long-standing 
Mayor—yet the world in general after this victory is deeply melancholic.  Even prior 
to this battle, outside of their Shire, hobbits have been relegated to the stuff of legend.  
The elves leave Middle Earth, never to return, as do Gandalf, Frodo
14 and Bilbo, and 
magic itself seems to leave (Hinlicky n.pag).  The answer to the incompleteness of the 
post-apocalyptic in Lord of the Rings is perhaps in its situation.  Hinlicky argues that 
“all the struggles of the story, all the adventures in a much-loved world, build up to its 
own abolition” (n.pag).  There’s no space for a post-apocalyptic good place in Middle 
Earth, even victory is apocalyptic.  If not precisely the end, for Tolkien at his death 
had left unpublished reams of background information on his creation, Lord of the 
Rings finishes with the sense there is little more to be told of this story.  Interestingly, 
the finality of this ending contrasts markedly from the modern fantasy genre Tolkien 
has helped spawn, where sequels and series of epic proportions flourish,
15 partly for 
commercial reasons, and partly, I suspect, out of a desire to create worlds and stories 
as epic as Tolkien’s.  
Yet despite all the traces of Christian theology I have found in it, Middle Earth 
is not, as is often simplistically read, a Christian secondary world.  It is, as Ralph 
Woods points out, set in “a prebiblical period of history—a time when there were no 
Chosen People, no incarnation, no religion at all—from a point of view that is 
distinctly Christian” (n.pag).  The sadness that permeates the world is perhaps due to 
the fact that there is no salvation in this world yet, a sort of pagan melancholy 
intuiting the absence (from a Christian perspective) of Christ.  In Wood’s view, the 
whole Christian drama of Christ’s first coming and death, and the expected 
apocalypse before his second redemptive coming is yet to come.  Wood points out 
that Tolkien’s writings on Beowulf could be effectively applied to the Lord of the 160 
Rings, where Tolkien’s thesis that Beowulf was written by a Christian meant that it 
“showed forth that permanent value of that pietas which treasures the memory of 
man’s struggles in the dark past, man fallen and not yet saved, disgraced but not 
dethroned” (Woods n.pag).  Equally then, this pagan pre-Christian epic plays out an 
incomplete version of Christianity, complete with apocalypse, yet without Christ the 
story is unable to be completed.  This is, in a sense, the apocalypse before the real 
apocalypse comes.   
The Shire then, the one respite in a pretty bleak finale, is more suggestive a 
pre-Fall Eden than of a post-apocalyptic Promised Kingdom, since it is predicated on 
its unknowingness.  Hobbits are sheltered from the rest of the adult world, and move 
into it with a good deal of regret.
 16  And certainly the Shire has little adult sexuality, 
and in fact The Hobbit doesn’t actually feature a single female character.  And just as 
the pre-sexual Eden fades away into long distant myth, the hobbits seem destined to 
end marginalised or to disappear completely (Hinlicky n.pag) from Middle Earth, 
leaving the planet for the human race.  So for all of its strong apocalyptic overtones 
then, Lord of the Rings isn’t just a story of the end of time, it’s also a creation story 
about its beginning. 
The apocalyptic fragments of the novels, then, illuminate the traces thesis 
rather well.  A true eschatological meta-narrative in the Christian mould would have 
ended as C.S Lewis’s Narnia series does in The Last Battle, with the secondary world 
destroyed, with the post-apocalyptic paradise, with the punishment of evil and the 
reward of good.  Yet as I have made clear, Lord of the Rings is not that kind of 
apocalyptic narrative.  It only suggests, through images and motifs borrowed from the 
Bible, a Christian eschatology; it is not one itself.  As Battis points out, Lord of the 
Rings lends itself to multiple and necessarily incomplete readings, and it is this aspect 161 
of the text that makes it so easily consumable by postmodern viewers accustomed to 
look for meaning in fragmented moments and images.   
 
The Postmodern New Age Tolkien 
 
In the previous section I have pointed out the relationship between Tolkien’s 
novels and the Biblical book of Revelations, yet the textual relationship when one 
considers the postmodern sacred is rather more complicated than the mere 
sedimentation of texts.  Complicating the matter further for contemporary readers is 
the undeniable fact that the Lord of the Rings movies influence our reading of the 
book.  Though the movies have generally been received as faithful adaptations, they 
feature a number of significant departures—most prominently in the love story 
between Aragorn and Arwen, a plot-line lifted not from the books proper, but rather 
from Tolkien’s copious footnotes.  The movies make changes in other, less 
noticeable, ways too.  Who could ignore the powerful rendering of Gollum in the Two 
Towers movie upon re-reading the book?  Though Tolkien describes Gollum as a 
“thin little black fellow”
17 I think most readers would continue imagining him as 
Peter Jackson’s pale white CGI-rendered character.  Even though Tolkien himself is 
an avowed Catholic and is writing a work that is quite clearly not postmodern, it is 
arguable that current reception of Tolkien is in a detraditionalised fashion, and indeed 
that current reception of Lord of the Rings is characterised by a slippage between the 
movies and the books.  Clearly, and in characteristic postmodern fashion, the movie 
texts have rewritten the novels in their own image.  Though there are indeed 
significant differences between books and movies, arguably in the way the two are 
received and consumed, those differences scarcely matter. 162 
How does one consider these texts then, when the differences between 
adaptations are elided by a postmodern readership?  One must remember Derrida’s 
point that some texts seem to totalise readings of others, though this can only ever be 
an incomplete totalisation.  Given that postmodern society is so clearly an image-
driven society, it follows thus that one must consider the recent Peter Jackson 
adaptations as totalising texts, reworking the ways in which Tolkien’s novels are read 
and consumed.  The images provoked by the movies and their substantial 
merchandising spin-offs (books, posters, figurines, t-shirts) can in many 
circumstances to be seen to provide definitive readings of the novels, and provides yet 
another layer of traces through which to approach the texts, as well as their own 
distinct textual traces.
18  Significantly too, those movies feature multiple versions 
themselves, having both a theatrical release as well as “extended edition” DVDs 
which feature at least an extra half an hour of new footage edited into the movies to 
form yet another narrative. 
What this multiplication of texts—more supplemental texts—does, then, in a 
cultural sense, is illustrate the repackaging of culture under postmodernism.  Even if 
one was to write a text with a didactic purpose, arguably in its reception it will have 
other unintended consequences—and this process is expedited by the repackaging of 
texts across multiple adaptations.  What this means is that even texts written within 
established religious traditions can be used and reworked into de-institutional 
settings.
19  Or on the other hand, texts written without spiritual purpose can 
nevertheless contain the religious symbols that makes for consumption of the 
postmodern sacred.
20  The fact that Tolkien consciously invokes Christian symbols 
makes his texts quite easily appropriable as a postmodern sacred text.  These texts, 163 
however, can be just as easily consumed in the terms of New Age de-institutionalised 
spirituality than as a Christian text. 
As a number of writers have noted, although published in the early 1950s, 
Tolkien’s trilogy was taken up by 1960s counter-culture, who saw in the texts a 
pastoral alternative to the military-industrial complex of the present.  The counter-
culture, however loosely defined, was in many ways influential in the popularisation 
of certain New Age philosophies and practices.  It was arguably the absence of an 
overtly Christian message that made the counter-culture embrace Tolkien far more 
strongly than the similarly pastoral C.S Lewis—and it is arguable that remains true 
today (though of course, the greater scope of the series probably helps a great deal 
too).  Tolkien’s enthusiasm for the pagan, too, endears him to a New Age that has 
often preferred to look for Celtic or Nordic spiritualities with which to oppose 
hegemonic Christianity.   
 Peter Jackson’s more recent film adaptations of Lord of the Rings clearly 
incorporate both Christian and New Age symbols.  Besides the Nordic and Celtic, the 
New Age frequently appropriates from Eastern spiritual traditions like Buddhism and 
Taoism.  Unsurprisingly, then, The Lord of the Rings adaptations reflect this eclectic 
borrowing.  Kristin Thompson, for instance, points out that “the widespread impact of 
martial-arts choreography from Japanese and Chinese films is reflected in [The Twin] 
Towers” (49).  She argues that Jackson’s adaptations re-write Legolas as a kind of 
“action elf” (49) and more improbably, Gandalf as a kung-fu monk.  She says, 
“Gandalf the White’s costumes and make-up appear to be derived [. . .] from those of 
the white-bearded monk (or white-eyebrowed sifu) figure in kung-fu films” (52).  
Gandalf, in Peter Jackson’s films, becomes a kind of hybrid figure, referencing kung-
fu monks and Merlin-esque wizards alike.  As a figure of wisdom and power, Gandalf 164 
becomes disconnected from any one tradition—a perfectly decontextualised New Age 
character.   
The New Age appears in less obvious ways too.  The films frequently make 
New Age style gestures to the transcendent, in the form of transcendental signified 
“Spirit.”  We see this most clearly in the scenes featuring the Lady Galadriel.  It is 
arguable that the hazy, other-worldly rendering of the Elves functions as another form 
of the transcendent, literally transcending the human abilities of being and time (being 
incredibly long-lived).  And of course, it is the Elves who leave Middle-Earth at the 
end of the story, moving on to what is suggested to be another plane of existence—but 
not, however, a Christian Heaven or Hell, this is clearly a New Age style “other” 
place.   
The notion of cyclical time in Tolkien recalls the New Age far more than 
Christianity to a modern reader.  Tolkien divides time up into Ages, and there is the 
definite suggestion of a repetition of events—Sauron “rose” at the end of the previous 
Age, which again ended with his defeat.  Cyclical time, we will recall, was one of 
Eliade’s key ideas.  Eliade argues that one can access sacred time through repeating 
pre-modern rituals appropriated from various non-Christian religions, an idea which 
has certainly been picked up by New Agers.  New Agers have opposed cyclical time 
to the masculinist, environmentally destructive linear time of industrial capitalism.  
Cyclical time is considered more “in tune with nature,” the repetition of the seasons 
and so on.  So there is something there in Tolkien’s repetitive history that recalls the 
more poetic versions of New Age thought.  While Ralph Woods is quite right in 
suggesting that for Tolkien, this idea might have been more of an incomplete pagan 
intuition of the coming of Christ, it is arguable that a messianic promise coded in 
suggestive absence rather than presence is radically unthinkable in the postmodern 165 
New Age-ised readings of The Lord of the Rings.  So the nuanced apocalypse of 
Tolkien’s book becomes stripped off its religious meanings in the reception of 
Jackson’s films.  The apocalyptic destruction of Mordor becomes sheer CGI 
spectacle.  Destruction onscreen recalls other films—specifically the disaster movie 
genre—far more than it does any specifically Christian notion of the end of days.  
Thus even the apocalypse, the apparently ultimately singular shattering event (a 
decidedly un-postmodern notion, given that it is has been a prominent part of Judaism 
and Christianity for thousands of years), becomes part of the postmodern realm of 
simulation.   
Another interesting cultural shift in the readings of the texts is in the notion of 
destiny.  Destiny is a highly important idea in The Lord of the Rings, the destinies of 
Frodo as Ring-Bearer and Aragorn the Returned King seem to be writ large in the 
stars.  But where the Catholic Tolkien may have been gesturing towards the idea of 
divine Providence—that God has a plan for all people—arguably the New Age has 
reworked and disconnected the idea from a Christian framework.  Destiny in the New 
Age can appear as a form of pop-Buddhist “letting go,” or of evidence for the 
existence of a transcendent “Spirit.”  One frequently notices the idea of destiny appear 
in the widely-held sentimentalisation of “guardian angels” or applied to “pre-
destined” romantic relationships.  While certain evangelical versions of Protestant 
Christianity have continued to use Providence as a means of re-assuring its believers 
of the existence of a benevolent care-taker God, arguably the postmodern New Age is 
currently far more influential in popularising the notion, such that the use of “destiny” 
in the Lord of the Rings films recalls the New Age before it recalls the Christian.   
Another way one can consider the Christian and New Age together is through 
the predominantly Catholic notion of the sacrament.  Richard McBrien describes 166 
sacramentality as a way of seeing “God in all things [. . .] other people, communities, 
movements, events, places, objects, the environment, the world at large, the whole 
cosmos.  The visible, the tangible, the finites, the historical—all of these are actual or 
potential carriers of the divine presence” (qtd Miller 189).  Sacramentality is, as 
Vincent Miller points out, a “broad sensibility within Catholicism manifest in 
doctrine, liturgy, and popular culture” (189).  A number of Catholic scholars have 
noted that Tolkien’s text exhibits sacramentality towards material objects.  
Sacramentality in Lord of the Rings can be found, for instance, in Galadriel’s phial of 
light, in the elvish lembas bread, in the homosociality of the Fellowship of the Ring, 
and so on.   
However, while it is true that sacramentality indeed is a Catholic practice, a 
similar sensibility may be found in New Age movements and New Age-ised 
discourses, which privilege bodily experience above all, situating the divine in the 
corporeal.  This very much sees “God in all things,” or at least the sacred, since as I 
have pointed, the New Age frequently discards the Godhead for a language of Spirit.  
The sacred emerges in the authentic corporeality of being (which raises of course the 
question of what is experienced as authentic and what is not).  The opposition that 
often appears is between “manufactured” and “real” or “homemade,” though as we 
know, both may appear as commodities.  The real is, after all, a sign, an exchange-
value like any other.  Regardless, the New Age, particularly in its environmentally 
friendly aspects (say, Goddess worship or environmental movements), shows an 
attitude towards the corporeal and in particular to the natural that is remarkably 
similar to the sacramental aesthetic.  Thus we therefore see that the oft-opposed New 
Age and Christianity (exemplified in this instance by Catholicism) can be 
nevertheless entangled within one another.  It is not unthinkable, for instance, to 167 
imagine subjects imbibing the New Age style “reverence for all living things” by 
watching Oprah during the week and then attending church services over the 
weekend.   
Both of these views point towards what Alain Badiou has called “the passion 
of the Real,” the attitude that so characterises twentieth and early twenty-first century 
culture.  As the “real” seems to melt away into Baudrillardian simulation, it has 
produced an opposing postmodern desire for real lived experience.  Baudrillard, of 
course, would no doubt point out the simulacral nature of that designated the “real” to 
be opposed to the apparently virtual—for instance his example of the Tasaday Indian 
tribe.  The real is, after all, a sign, a value like any other.  It’s highly problematic, 
therefore, to oppose as Miller does,
21 a sacramental aesthetic to consumerist 
simulation, since what one might call the sacramental may indeed be merely the 
symbolic use value of the commodity.  Sacramentality, whether Catholic or New Age, 
may simply be more fuel for the capitalist fire.   
The blurring between a Catholic sacramentality, a New Age respect for life, 
and a general postmodern turn towards the authenticity of the corporeal therefore 
demonstrates precisely how flawed the project of critically producing an ontologically 
“pure” popular culture is, especially considering the postmodern textual strategy of 
pastiche.  Texts like Lord of the Rings demonstrate how texts are constantly in 
dialogue with another, whether it be in the form of the palimpsest traces of older texts, 
or by being re-written by newer texts.  Rather than maintaining an either/or approach 
to Christian monism and New Age polytheism, one should look at pop culture as the 
supplement in action, forever deferred from a single resting place.  Lord of the Rings 
shows clearly how pre-modern ideas like apocalypse, or indeed the Manichean Good 
and Evil, can be modified by the cultural practices of postmodernism.  In my next 168 
chapter I shall look at how ideas of Good and Evil are mobilised in the postmodern 
sacred, particularly after what could be considered an apocalyptic event for the 
contemporary American imagination, the attacks on the World Trade Centre on 
September 11 2001.   
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 This has been extended further by feminist and queer scholars to suggest that women 
and queers have been used as supplementary figures by which male and heterosexual 
centres define themselves against.  Diana Fuss uses the supplement in regards to the 
homosexual/heterosexual opposition (qtd Spargo 45), and see Elizabeth Grosz for a 
discussion of the supplement and the use of Derrida’s ideas by French feminists.   
2 For example, Detweiler, Craig, and Barry Taylor. A Matrix of Meanings. Grand 
Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003. 
3 Tolkien’s most obvious imitators include the hugely popular Robert Jordan, David 
Eddings, Raymond Fiest, Terry Brooks, L.E Modesitt, Sara Douglass.  Though much 
Celtic fantasy undeniably re-writes conventional Western histories from feminist and 
pro-pagan perspectives (see the work of Katherine Kerr, Marion Zimmer Bradley’s 
Avalon series etc), it too takes Tolkien’s secondary world creation as a departure, and 
displays a similar fascination with aestheticising the past. 
4  J.K Rowling’s Harry Potter series has also been written about heavily, and is likely 
to remain so for some time, though besides these two flagship series, much of the rest 
of the genre is barely critically noticed at all. 
5 I should point out that Battis’s useage of “fantasy” next to the more venerable modes 
of pastoral, romance and epic is misleading, arguably modern fantasy as it has 
emerged from the 19
th century has drawn on those other modes, though their use in 
Tolkien has undoubtedly led to their becoming constitutively generic characteristics.   
6 For an interesting Marxist reading of Lord of the Rings see Ishay Landa’s “Slaves of 
the Ring” Tolkien’s Political Unconscious.”  Landa argues that while “there could be 
be little doubt that Tolkien’s basic ideological intent, as well as effect, have been to 
bolster the present hegemony” (121), Lord of the Rings nevertheless presents a 
largely unspoken radical potential.  For postcolonial readings see Sue Kim’s "Beyond 
Black and White: Race and Postmodernism in the Lord of the Rings Films” and Jes 
Battis’s "Gazing Upon Sauron: Hobbits, Elves, and the Queering of the Postcolonial 
Optic." For queer readings of Tolkien, besides the aforementioned Battis, see Anna 
Smol’s "’Oh...Oh...Frodo!’: Readings of Male Intimacy in the Lord of the Rings.” 
7 This is not limited to Tolkien, other popular fantastic texts have prompted a similar 
Christian defense—see for instance, The Gospel According To Harry Potter, the back 
cover of which proclaims its anxieties about HP and witchcraft.   
8 Thompson, Kristin. "Fantasy, Franchises and Frodo Baggins: The Lord of the Rings 
and Modern Hollywood." Velvet Light Trap 52 (2003): 45-63. 
9 Sadly one can see this trend continuing in the present day, for example in the United 
States in the Christian Right’s encouragement of the Bush administration’s pro-
Zionist tendencies, in order to fulfil the Biblical prophecy that God’s Chosen People 
must be safe in their homeland before Jesus can return.  Needless to say, that people 
will petition the White House in order to adjust the foreign policy of the world’s most 169 
                                                                                                                                            
powerful nation in the hopes of fulfilling an apocalyptic prophecy is scary in the 
extreme. 
10 For instance, the Jewish messianic figure Shabbetai Zevi.  Zevi  proclaimed himself 
as the Jewish messiah in 1665, but was imprisoned by the Sultan of Istanbul in 1666.  
Given the choice to convert to Islam or to die, Zevi scandalously chose apostacy, 
devastating his followers (Armstrong 375-77).  And one must remember of course 
that the Christian messianic cult of Jesus arose out of the Jewish people, and that his 
teachings need to be understood first and foremost as part of a Jewish tradition that 
includes mendicant holy men in Galilee and rabbinic theological dispute (Armstrong 
98), though obviously over time the Christian religion takes on an increasingly 
distinctive goy tone and theology (for instance Karen Armstrong points out that both 
Jews and Muslims have found the doctrine of the Trinity to be blasphemous, p 152). 
11 Falls referencing, of course, to the original Fall from grace by Adam and Eve in the 
Garden of Eden. 
12 And simultaneously also opening the text up to a queer reading.  The possibility of 
a queer Christ, while undeniably scandalous to a great many Christians, is taken up in 
theologian Marcella Althaus-Reid’s Indecent Theology.   
13 It should be noted that Frodo’s passivity creates an interesting tension with the text.  
Tolkien largely frames the works as epics, which in general terms requires an active 
hero.  Given Frodo’s near in capitation at the climax on Mount Doom, Tolkien thus 
requires other characters to take up the heroic role—Sam, and Aragorn.   
14 Slash fans will note with interest that Frodo leaves, in part, because Sam “cannot be 
always torn in two” between Frodo and his wife and family (1006). 
15 See for instance, Terry Pratchett’s 27 book comic fantasy Discworld series, or 
Katherine Kerr’s 11+ Deverry series, though these series are by no means alone in 
their generous sizes. 
16 For example, despite a few references to his genetic pre-disposition to adventure, 
Frodo predominantly spends his time longing for home. 
17 Tolkien’s rendering of race is dubious at best, the glorification of the blonde-haired 
and blue-eyed Elves, contrasted with the horror of the human-animal hybrid Orcs has 
meant that a number of far-Right neo-Nazi organisations have held up both books and 
movies as exemplary Aryan texts.  Sue Kim in her article “Beyond Black and White: 
Race and Postmodernism in the Lord of the Rings movies” gives Tolkien more 
leeway than the films, saying that “partly due to the novels’ ability to explore 
symbolism, diplomacy and war, culture and history in greater depth and subtlety, the 
novels’ black-and-white coding, while still strongly apparent, is more ambivalent than 
in the films.”  It’s easy to see that Tolkien, writing in the 1940s and 50s in the dying 
days of Empire, has a text underpinned by a racist paternal epistemology, which given 
the historical context, most scholars have found understandable though not excusable.  
On the other hand, working 50 years later on the films, Peter Jackson should have 
known better. 
18 Such as the aforementioned “kung-fu monk” motif 
19 See, for instance, the movie adaptation of Lewis’s the Lion, the Witch and the 
Wardrobe, which was quite directly influenced by Jackson’s Lord of the Rings 
trilogy.  Downplaying overt religious moralising in favour of suggestive symbols is 
just good commercial sense for capturing a mass-market post-Christian audience, 
although the movie also benefited from a post-Passion of the Christ tapping into an 
overtly religious pop-culture market.   170 
                                                                                                                                            
20 I’m thinking here, once again, of Buffy the Vampire Slayer, whose creator Joss 
Whedon is a self-described “angry atheist.” 
21 He says, “sacramentality is an interesting example of a religious resource for 
countering consumer culture, because it challenges consumer culture not by critiquing 
consumption but by challenging the abstracting dynamisms of consumption itself” 
(Miller 189). 171 
 
Chapter Five 
Good, Evil and All That Stuff:  Morality and Meta-Narrative in the 
Postmodern Sacred 
  
 
 “I stand for truth, justice… and other stuff” Clark Kent, Smallville, “Drone” (1.18) 
 
The texts of the postmodern sacred seem at first glance to resemble heroic 
narratives, epics.  They often construct very strongly an opposition between good and 
evil, “good” being of course the position of the hero with whom we are supposed to 
identify.  As such they seem to present an anti-postmodern nostalgic re-articulation of 
meta-narratives.  In short, a return of modern and sometimes even pre-modern 
narratives of legitimation.  A heroic narrative like Lord of the Rings seems to present 
the fantasy of an ultra-essentialist world in which not only does everyone know their 
place—hobbits in the Shire, dwarves, men with noble lineages and so on—but 
miraculously, knowing those places doesn’t create any conflict.  Evil is Out There,
1 in 
the irreducibly Evil of Mordor and Sauron, it is not something to be found in the 172 
maintenance of inequitable power relationships.  Marxist SF theorist Carl Freedman, 
for instance, damns the trilogy by saying  
 
Tolkien’s world is one in which the great majority of the actual material 
interests—economic, political, ideological, sexual—that drive individuals and 
societies are silently erased, to be replaced by the dominant obsession of [ . . .] 
the abstract and essentially vacuous metaphysical battle between good and 
evil” (264). 
 
 
For some readers, there is undoubtedly something seductive about the apparent 
appearance of worlds without the conflicts posed by economic marginalisation or 
identity politics.  Heroic narratives—of which Jesus provides one key example, if not 
the sole by any means—serve a different kind of purpose in the postmodern world 
than they have done in other points in history.  In some cases, they prove to be 
nostalgic fantasies, dedicated to pre-capturing pre-lapsarian worlds.  Such nostalgia 
may be in the service of conservative versions of gender and sexuality (as in phallic 
fantasies like the aforementioned David and Leigh Eddings
2), race (for example, the 
racial politics of Peter Jackson’s Lord of the Rings film are decidedly dubious
3) and 
class, or all of the above.   
Nostalgia, however, can also be productive at times in thinking through 
alternatives to modern capitalism, most prominently in the long tradition of Marxist 
and feminist utopia writers.
4  It’s my argument, then, that the postmodern sacred’s use 
of heroic narratives encompasses both conservative, even reactionary, and progressive 
and critical textual possibilities.  While these heroic narratives seem to suggest a 
return of the meta-narrative, they are nevertheless situated in a postmodern era in 
which belief in meta-narratives is epistemologically problematic, and are thus haunted 
by the prospect—even fore-knowledge—of their own failure.  To argue therefore that 173 
the postmodern sacred represents an unmitigated return of meta-narratives is 
problematic.   
The quote that heads this chapter from Smallville, the Superman prequel 
television series that traces his evolution into the familiar superhero, is indicative in 
this regard.  Rather than triumphantly saying Superman’s catchphrase “truth, justice 
and the American way” as one could expect (in an articulation that would be both for 
the first time, and a repetition), Clark equivocates.  Whilst one could read his “other 
stuff” as the inarticulate mumblings of the average high school student, it is arguable 
that the statement also reflects an ambivalence towards the kinds of modern meta-
narratives that other incarnations of Superman have reflected.  The epistemological 
certainty of a singular “American way” might be is clearly problematic now.   
The contemporary, therefore, is still marked by a radical skepticism towards 
any meta-narrative, and postmodern textual strategies are powerful as before.  Indeed, 
the closer you look, the more shades of grey there seems to be in these texts.  Most 
particularly in the two responses to September 11 I analyse—the Ori arc on Stargate 
SG:1, and the new series of Battlestar Galactica—the Evil Out There becomes the 
Evil In Here too.   It seems at times to resemble how Mark Edmundsen characterises 
the Gothic—“All are guilty.  All must, in time, pay up” (5).  It’s my argument that an 
ethical good in the postmodern sacred is not necessarily, or at least not merely, a 
matter of immutable, innate goodness (although it sometimes is in some texts), it is 
also the result of ethical action, and of the results of those actions.  What I want to do 
in this chapter, then, is look at what role morality plays in the postmodern sacred, 
specifically in terms of the notion of meta-narrative.  As we shall see, the heroic 
narratives of the postmodern sacred are not, of themselves, meta-narratives, neither 
does a concern with morality necessarily imply some kind of pre or anti-postmodern 174 
position.  Postmodernism is not lost so easily, even by those who claim to be against 
its “relativism.” 
 
The Meta-Narrative Strikes Back 
 
 
Image of the attack on the World Trade Centre on September 11 
 
Though it is clear that much of the postmodern sacred consists of heroic 
narratives that posit very strongly moral positions of good and evil, it is my argument 
that this does not necessarily involve a return to a pre-postmodern world.  Indeed, in 
many ways it works to conceal its own hidden postmodern positions underneath a 
surface of pre or anti postmodernism.  One key cultural context to the apparent return 
of the meta-narrative is the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 
September 11, 2001.  September 11 seems in some ways to provoke the return of a 
number of meta-narratives—those of nationality, Good and Evil, the West versus the 
Rest.  The simplistic “clash of civilisations” thesis between the Christian West and the 175 
Muslim Middle East advanced by Samuel Huntington
5 in the early 90s was taken up 
and repeated by media and politicians alike.  Edward Said’s scathing rebuttal of the 
notion in The Nation was sadly out of step with the jingoistic spirit of the times.
6  
Particularly in the early days after September 11, a certain kind of “patriotic” 
nationality was on display.  That patriotism was, of course, scarcely ideologically and 
culturally neutral in terms of the ideal subjects it presented—for instance Judith Butler 
notes in Precarious Life that Lebanese restaurants were held to be suspicious if not 
flying American flags in their windows (2004: 77).  The ideal subject was inevitably 
cast as normatively white and heterosexual, for as Sara Ahmed notes, “some bodies 
more than others represent the nation in mourning” (13), and heterosexual familial 
ties had the considerable advantage of being publicly and culturally legible in a way 
that queer did not.   
After September 11, a popular neo-conservative notion circulated that 9/11 
represented an end to our postmodern “vacation from history.”  New York mayor 
Rudolph Guiliani denounced “cultural relativism” in an address to the United Nations, 
whilst Roger Rosenblatt declared in Time magazine that the “age of irony” has ended 
(Fish 27).  Where the rise of postmodern theory at its most extreme had suggested to 
some that nothing could be considered real anymore, September 11 for many 
Americans provides an unambiguously Real event.  The shock of September 11 (and 
indeed, if slightly bizarrely considering it occurred in another country, the Bali 
bombings for many Australians) is that the mass violence that occurs through the rest 
of the world has finally occurred in the United States.  This notion, of course, displays 
a hideous parochialism given the number of disasters, natural and man-made, that 
occur in the rest of the world.  And what makes that mindset even more bewildering is 
that for September 11 to be a singular event of the Real one must ignore the 176 
Oklahoma bombings, the attempted bombing of the World Trade Centre in 1993, and 
the fact that America has long been the home of the gun-toting mass killer 
(Columbine et al).  Yet none of these managed to trouble the hitherto apparent 
American ease with simulation?
7   
The notion, therefore, that somehow the media techniques that birthed 
postmodernism have somehow disappeared with the destruction of the World Trade 
Centre is merely wishful thinking, facile and simplistic analysis.  Death, especially 
televised death of the sort found in the endless looping of the Twin Towers, proves no 
barrier to the simulated spectacle of postmodernism.  As any regular viewer of nightly 
television news knows, the death of real people is a Gothic spectacle to be consumed 
as readily as those of any fictional horror text.  Baudrillard had already pointed this 
out in his analysis of the Gulf War, pointing out that the deaths of Iraqis were erased 
and rendered as movie/video game spectacle, though interestingly he seems to suggest 
at times in The Spirit of Terrorism that September 11 should be considered a real 
event of symbolic exchange.  Is one to regard this as a failure of nerve for Baudrillard, 
an intellectual buckling to the American rhetoric that this is an event like no other?
8  I 
would suggest however that September 11 has clearly been brought into the reign of 
the simulated spectacle, for the Two Towers footage has been aetheticised to the point 
of over-familiarity—indeed, the most powerful moment of Michael Moore’s 
Fahrenheit 9/11 relies on this fact, when instead of showing the planes crashing into 
the towers, the screen goes blank and we merely hear the screams of dying people.  
Indeed, the attacks rely on a postmodern media-scape, for as Žižek points out, “the 
‘terrorists’ themselves did [. . .] not do it primarily to provoke real material damage, 
but FOR THE SPECTACULAR EFFECT OF IT” (2002: n.p.).  Arguably, the various 
fundamentalisms must suppress some of their usual antipathy towards capitalism and 177 
modern technology in order to function; say in the use of mobile phones by terrorists, 
or the simulated presence online of church websites.  Even movements that are anti-
postmodern cannot but help be postmodern in some sense, for the pre-postmodern 
“Reality” principle (as Baudrillard calls it) is not truly recoverable in the wake of the 
media’s destabilising influence.  And even in the very midst of the September 11 
coverage, it is interesting to note the ‘too real’ spectacle of people falling from the 
Twin Towers.  Footage of this seemed to be shown on the day only but was swiftly 
removed from public view, rarely if ever repeated again by the media.  So even the 
traumatic repetition of the destruction of the Twin Towers becomes selectively cut so 
as to avoid this stain of reality, becoming a spectacle of collapsing buildings and only 
an implied human element.   
So the argument that the real has returned with a vengeance misses precisely 
the ways in which “real” life becomes a spectacle for the media, is experienced—
mediated—through reference to pop culture simulations.  To point this out is not to 
elide or erase the deaths of the people who died on September 11, or in Iraq, rather it 
is to point out that the postmodern condition is not so easily lost; it is not a position 
that can be consciously taken up or put down after tragedy.  For example, Republic 
American president George W. Bush is surely no friend of postmodern theory.  His 
electoral success, like Ronald Reagan before him, seems based upon an appeal to 
conservative versions of meta-narratives of nationality, gender, heterosexuality, race 
and so on.  Yet Bush’s presidency is nevertheless postmodern in that it presumes that 
media representation is more important than “reality” off-screen.  Of the many 
examples that one could cite, Bush’s declaration on the USS Abraham Lincoln in May 
2003 that Iraq was “one victory in the war on terror,” standing beneath a sign that 
read “Mission Accomplished,” seems somewhat premature three years later given the 178 
ongoing death toll in Iraq today.  And of course, one scarcely can forget the 
“borrowed kettle” (as Žižek puts it
9) of the non-existent Weapons of Mass 
Destruction that justified the invasion of Iraq in the first place.   
Regardless, this apparent return of the real seems to suggest that meta-
narratives have returned, for good.   Of course, talk of the nation state, and indeed of 
morality, had hardly disappeared from the postmodern world prior to September 11, 
yet this is the clear implication, an indictment of postmodernism as nihilistic and a-
moral.  Post 9/11, now one can apparently talk of Good and Evil, the nation-state, 
those absolutes that the postmodern skepticism had problematised. Yet this clearly 
ignores the way in which “spin” and “management speak,” the language of marketing, 
bureaucrats and the like has become the predominant mode of political discourse.  A 
modern discourse of universal human rights is practically unheard of now—think of 
the calls to “rethink” human rights to allow torture by the US (Žižek, 2004: 53).  The 
postmodern “language games” that Lyotard describes are as widespread as ever, 
indeed they have become ever more specialised.   
The swing towards meta-narrative may also be considered to be part of the 
wider conservative backlash to the social movements of the 1960s and 70s (the Civil 
Rights movement, feminism, gay liberation and so on).  Susan Faludi in Backlash 
argued strongly that the 1980s was marked by a strong discourse dedicated to erasing 
the steps towards gender equality that feminism had made through-out the Seventies 
(say, in the form of Equal Opportunity legislation, access to birth control and so on).  
The 2004 elections in the United States, in which many states voted to enact bans on 
gay marriage, is arguably a reaction to the gains gay, lesbian and bisexual people have 
made in gaining such basic legal rights as the right to have sex (in states or countries 
with anti-sodomy laws) and to have relationships recognised legally, as well as an 179 
increased media visibility in the form of television shows like Will & Grace and 
Queer Eye For The Straight Guy.
10  Tellingly, many of the arguments against gay 
marriage relied on the logic that to legally recognise same-sex relationships would be 
in some way to diminish the value of heterosexual relationships.
11  In short, the 
granting of equal legal rights for people who have been historically marginalised—
such as women, queers, people of colour and people with disabilities—is suggested to 
diminish the rights of those who already possess those rights.  The argument is even 
made, with gob-smacking chutzpah, that those same people whose rights have never 
been in question are now being actively oppressed by “minorities,” whose oppressive 
behaviour it seems, is largely to demand equal rights and refuse to allow hate speech 
to be directed at them.  This is the conservative backlash in full swing, and it is clearly 
in part what is fuelling the neo-con “return” of the meta-narrative—the desire to re-
instate the oppressions that modern universalisms produced (and of course, largely 
concealed beneath the rhetoric of rationality and progress).   
Although it is not entirely reducible to religious fundamentalism, this backlash 
has taken many of the anxieties of the religious Right about race, nationality and 
sexuality.  Karen Armstrong argues that: 
 
Protestant fundamentalists and Christian conservatives in most denominations 
seem to have felt deeply unmanned by the evil forces of secular humanism [. . 
.] the reason for this was the new self-assertion of women; even 
fundamentalist women were infected by this cultural virus and, as a result, 
men were becoming “feminised” or even “castrated.”  This fear also underlay 
the fundamentalist hatred of homosexuality, which like feminism, they 
regarded as an epidemic, the cause of America’s decline. (312) 
 
The alliance in the United States from the 1980s onwards between Christianity and 
the Republican Right is significant in that it yoked together the backlash rhetoric of 
the Right with the sanctifying power of Jesus.  Christianity and a conservative version 
of gender, sexuality and race have become almost synonymous in the present.  This 180 
has inevitably produced some theological inconsistencies—the Christian Right’s pro-
gun, pro-war stance seems ill at ease with Jesus’ message of peace.  As Armstrong 
points out, this seems linked to “buried worries about what they considered an 
emasculating tendency in Christianity itself, which had become a religion of womanly 
values: forgiveness, mercy and tenderness” (312).  That particular aspect of the 
Christian Right seems to have been lost in translation in Australia and the UK, where 
the “right to bear arms” has never been constitutionally enshrined in the same way as 
the U.S, yet the broad strokes of the conservative backlash rhetoric remain largely the 
same.  Marion Maddox for instance, convincingly argues that the Australian Howard 
government has been incredibly successful in harnessing the rhetoric of religious-
neutral “family” values in order to pursue Christian Right social policies of race, 
gender and sexuality.
12   
It is arguable that conservatives have presented all of these narratives—
gender, race, sexuality, nationality—as marked by an incredible loss, not merely of 
power, but of the privilege of maintaining an ignorance of the Other.
13  The “return” 
of the meta-narrative invoked by the neo-conservatives after September 11 is 
therefore a return profoundly permeated by nostalgia.  Conservatives posit a 
nebulously dated “golden age” before the traumatic events of civil rights, feminism, 
gay liberation—not to mention the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal, both of 
which made an unproblematic nationalism that much more difficult.
14  Australian 
Prime Minister John Howard used his Australia Day address in 2006 to criticise the 
evils of postmodernism plaguing contemporary history teaching.  The problem for 
Howard is that contemporary history in Australia no longer teaches the uncritical 
celebration of British imperialism and colonialism with which Howard himself clearly 
identifies.
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not that the apparent singularity of September 11 has shocked the West out of its 
postmodernist daze.  Rather, September 11 merely gave a convenient pre-text around 
which to hang an already-existent conservative project in the United States and 
Australia dedicated to the nostalgic reclamation of meta-narratives of nation, race, 
gender, class and sexuality (although the UK remains slightly different given that the 
Centre-Left Blair government has been in power both during the 90s and post-
September 11).  The backlash politics in both Australia and the US, as Marion 
Maddox and Karen Armstrong show, are implicitly linked to the rise of the Christian 
Right.   
Paradoxically, considering the free market economic policies of the Right, 
backlash plays on the fears created by the precariousness of jobs and communities in 
global capitalism (the risk society as Ulrich Beck called it).  As Wendy Brown argues: 
 
Modern empire mobiles fear on a mass scale; it is above all parasitic on the 
fear incited by the spectre of terrorism, but it is also dependent on the fear 
related to the porousness of modern nation-states and to the exposure of 
vulnerable individuals and deracinated communities to the vicissitudes of 
global forces.  Empire promises protection from dangers that it rhetorically 
magnifies in order to secure itself, a magnification that intensifies our fear in 
the dark (10) 
 
So the “return of the real” is arguably related to the maintenance of power, it 
mobilises fears produced by terrorism and by the postmodern turn more generally.  As 
Baudrillard said long before September 11, “order always opts for the real [. . .] it 
always prefers this hypothesis” (1994:21).  That is to say, it prefers the real as a 
narrative for legitimating its power, not that power itself functions on the level of the 
real.  So, given that, the questions for this study of pop culture are: how does the 
postmodern sacred play out the apparent return of the meta-narrative, how does this 
nevertheless conceal its hidden postmodern positions, and how are questions of 
morality tied (or not tied) to the heroic narrative in the postmodern sacred? 182 
 
Holding Out For A Hero 
 
 
Keanu Reeves as Neo in The Matrix
 
  Direct questions of morality can often seem slightly out of place in modern 
Literature and Cultural Studies critical practice.  Yet by theorising that texts both 
explicitly and implicitly construct inequitable power relations, such cultural theory 
has traced the ways in which textual practice translates into real-world marginality.  In 
other words, texts always work to privilege some reading positions and not others, 
and that process works to culturally disempower certain groups.  Although there are 
of course major differences between the fields, this is an insight more or less 
applicable to many of the disciplinary “streams” that intersect with CS practice—
post-colonialism, critical race theory, feminism, queer theory, disability studies, and 
so on.  The oft-made accusation that Cultural Studies displaces morality into a morass 183 
of cultural relativism in which no ethical judgments can be made is, frankly, 
ludicrous.  Such studies are at their heart highly ethical projects.  Nevertheless, direct 
discussions of ethics are rare (compared to, say, philosophy), often displaced into a 
meta-analysis of what cultural concepts of ethics do, what and who they work in the 
service of.   
The texts of the postmodern sacred, however, are not so bashful when it comes 
to morality.  SF, horror and fantasy do not merely feature protagonists, they feature 
heroes.  That’s a key difference when it comes to discussing morality.  Whilst in 
general we are supposed to identify with heroes, they are nevertheless extra-ordinary 
people (or indeed aliens) able to perform feats beyond ordinary human capability.  As 
such, they shoulder a super-human responsibility to protect the rest of the populace.  
Superman’s strength derives from his being born on another planet, Krypton (and 
though Superman and his “truth, justice and the American way” may not have begun 
as postmodern, by the time the prequel television series Smallville had arrived in 
2001, he had certainly become so
16).  Buffy, we will remember, “stand[s] alone [to] 
fight the vampires, the demons and the powers of darkness” (“Welcome to the 
Hellmouth” 1.01).  Witches and wizards are a favourite trope of the postmodern 
sacred (to name just two, Charmed, Harry Potter).  Robots, demons, Slayers, 
sometimes even traditionally “evil” beings like vampires and werewolves (Blade, 
Underworld) may be recruited in the service of fighting evil and protecting the 
vulnerable.   
As we saw in Chapter Three, gods and monsters are far closer than are often 
thought.  They require each other to define themselves against.  Both are separated 
from “ordinary” humanity by virtue of their superior strengths and abilities.  Heroes 
often exist in a liminal space on the edge of society, protecting the world but not 184 
necessarily being entirely of it.  So their separation is often not merely a metaphoric 
separation, but literal.  This is a trope of both “classic” comic books—Clark Kent has 
his Fortress of Solitude, Batman his cavernous mansion—and of newer texts that have 
drawn equally from comic-book sources as from the mythic (The League of 
Extraordinary Gentleman, for instance draws characters from 19
th century literature 
like Wilde’s Picture of Dorian Gray, Dracula, and Tom Sawyer and refracts them 
through a postmodern comic sensibility). 
The trilogy of films that make up The Matrix provide an interesting case of the 
interplay between religion and ethics in the postmodern sacred—in particular with the 
way in which they foreground an action movie Christ-figure in a seeming restatement 
of pre or anti postmodern meta-narratives.  Whilst the first movie was made before 
September 11, the follow-up sequels were released after, meaning that the series 
reflects an enduring cultural ambivalence towards postmodern simulation that both 
precedes 9/11 and continues after.  For those unfamiliar with the three movies—The 
Matrix, The Matrix Reloaded and Matrix Revolutions—the story is relatively simple.  
Sometime in the future, around 2199, mankind has been enslaved by a race of 
powerful aliens, and living in capsules feeding a giant machine.  They’re unaware of 
this however, inhabiting mentally a shared computer simulation of the year 1999.  
Neo, played by Keanu Reeves, is a hacker who in the first film finds out the nature of 
“reality” in the Matrix, and then leads a human rebellion against the machines and a 
rogue computer program called Agent Smith (played by Hugo Weaving).  The series 
has been variously read by critics as Buddhist
17 and Christian, as well as a 
postmodern critique of simulation
18 and dystopic vision of a mechanised future.  
Following on from my argument in Chapter Four about the two-way supplementary 
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Buddhist are equally valid readings, the text(s) are suggestive of both in different 
ways, as well as significantly influenced by Greek and Roman mythology.  The series 
provides a cornucopia of symbols and names pastiched from various religious and 
mythic traditions—characters Trinity (Christian) and Morpheus (the God of dreams in 
Ovid’s Metamorphosis), the ship Nebuchadnezzar (a Babylonian king mentioned in 
the Book of Daniel), the city Zion (Jewish and Christian), the Oracle (a possible 
reference to the Greek Oracle at Delphi) and so on.  Indeed, Gregory Bassham 
criticises The Matrix’s treatment of religious themes for its “cafeteria pluralism,” 
(118) that “while fashionable, is very difficult to make sense of, or to defend” (125).  
Bassham’s critique seems to miss the point, for spiritually inflected pop culture 
cannot presume any one religious belief in its mass audience.  As a matter of 
capitalistic pragmatism textual producers must strive to avoid alienating their 
audiences, as any overt reference is likely to do.  Religious pluralism provides a sense 
of mythic grandeur precisely because of its inability to be pinned to any one religious 
credo.   
The Matrix provides on the one hand a hero in the form of Neo, a properly 
mythic hero resonant with Christ symbolism.  Neo is called “The One” throughout the 
three movies by Morpheus, the prophesied saviour for mankind.  The messianic 
overtones are in the series right from the beginning, from Trinity’s speech to Neo in 
the club.  She says: 
 
You’re looking for him.  I know because I was once looking for the same 
thing.  And when he found me, he told me I wasn’t really looking for him; I 
was looking for an answer.  It’s the question that drives us, Neo.  It’s the 
question that brought you here.  You know the question, just as I did.   
Neo: what is the Matrix? 
Trinity: the answer is out there Neo.  It’s looking for you, and it will find you 
if you want it to. (The Matrix) 
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The “him” being referred to in the speech is, of course, Morpheus, the John the 
Baptist figure to Neo’s Jesus (Morpheus, in return, “has spent his entire life looking 
for [Neo]”).  The pre-figuring of the “real” Messiah with another is a common trope 
in Christianity, in which the coming of Jesus is intuited by Jew and pagan alike, 
played out in an incomplete fashion.  Like most Hollywood Messiahs, Neo is an 
action-movie Christ, a phallic hero without many of those inconvenient ethical 
demands traditional religion tends to make.   
  On the one hand, then, The Matrix seems to present a meta-narrative of 
morality, a demand for human sovereignty couched in messianic terms.  Like Star 
Wars before it,
19 The Matrix draws more or less self-consciously on religious and 
mythic structures.  As such it’s unsurprising that it gathered a fanatical response in 
some fans.  While the first movie was  a sleeper hit, it seems likely that 
writer/directors the Wachowski brothers had hoped the mythic elements would 
produce the kind of fanatical following for the film that SF and fantasy have been 
known to produce.   
 
The Matrix and the postmodern 
 
The Matrix series maintains an ambiguous position towards the postmodern.  
On the one hand, much of the force of the first movie derives from its lay-postmodern 
“revelation” of the simulated world of the matrix (and by inference, the implication 
that today’s world is just as simulated).  In that sense, The Matrix is a nostalgic, anti-
postmodern piece.  The fight, after all, is on behalf of a human sovereignty 
unmediated by simulated technology.  That technology is parasitical, draining humans 
of their energy, literally and metaphorically.  The unreality of the simulated world in 187 
the first movie is suggested to be a “splinter in your mind” needing to be removed, yet 
this is increasingly complicated by the following two movies.   
The ambivalences in the text run much deeper than a simple rejection of 
postmodern simulation.  It is not merely anti-postmodern, even as it may at times 
verge towards a trite affirmation of “reality.”  Baudrillard himself sees that as a sign 
the films mis-read his work, keeping a “real” outside of simulation in a way that the 
theory refuses.  Yet, the “real” world that the rebels inhabit is often a dank, lifeless 
existence, scarcely an affirmation of unmediated experience.  Recall the traitor 
Cypher’s speech in the first movie about how he would rather eat fake steak than real 
porridge.  Similarly, much of the movies’ appeal derives from the spectacular, unreal, 
effects and abilities that the computer Matrix endows both Neo and Agent Smith with.  
The computer Matrix provides the pretext for the bending of “real” life—the amazing 
“bullet time” effect, the famous kung-fu move in which the actors pause mid-air while 
the camera rotates disorientingly, Neo’s ability to fly, the “cool” accoutrements of 
leather jackets, sunglasses, impressively phallic guns and so on.  In short, the action 
inside the Matrix provides much of the visceral thrills of the series.  Such a play of 
“surfaces” is not to be dismissed easily, for in foregrounding the aesthetic to the point 
of fetish, The Matrix is clearly postmodern in the pleasures it attempts to evoke.  And 
to state the obvious, The Matrix pastiches a great many other texts, notably Blade 
Runner, Hong Kong kung-fu flicks and Japanese anime like Akira and Ghost in the 
Shell.  The Wachowski brothers, after all, explicitly stated their goal was to create a 
live action anime (and indeed went on to hire a number of anime directors to create an 
anime series of short films called The Animatrix that bridged the first and second 
films).
20  Thus, even as it attempts to find a way out of the postmodern world of 
simulations through a heroic Christ figure, The Matrix remains profoundly enmeshed 188 
in the postmodern, unwilling or even unable to imagine a world outside textual 
referentiality.   
 
Harry Potter 
 
 
Daniel Radcliffe as Harry Potter in Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets 
 
  The immensely successful Harry Potter series of books and movies provides 
an interesting point of comparison to The Matrix.  Whilst it was initially targeted at 
children and young adults, Harry Potter has since found an enormous, mass market 
audience and is arguably one of the more influential fantastic texts.  While The Matrix 
(especially the first movie) series is arguably one of the key touchstones of 
contemporary SF, Harry Potter, along with the perennial favourite Lord of the Rings, 
occupies a comparable position in the fantasy genre.  Interestingly, perhaps because of 
its young audience, Harry Potter is currently second to none in terms of provoking 
evangelical anxiety about the evils of “witch-craft” and Satanism.   
An at-times uneasy blend of jolly-hockey-sticks style boarding school stories 
and fantastic elements, the titular hero Harry fights foes both powerful and mundane, 
from the evil sorcerer Lord Voldemort to the various childhood and teenage dramas of 
mean teachers and peers, social exclusion, heterosexual romance
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blending of source texts like boarding school stories such as Enid Blyton’s Mallory 
Towers and Twins at Saint Claire’s series, Tolkien’s The Hobbit and Lord of the 
Rings, and the presence of other characteristic fantasy tropes like dragons and magic 
spells, Harry Potter is clearly a postmodern pastiche.  And the films take that 
pastiching impulse in other ways too; for instance, the books describe wizard’s 
clothes as brightly coloured, yet the wizards in Diagon Alley are imagined in the first 
movie (Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone) as dressed in the clothes of a 
Dickensian style London—a pastiche which certainly rang true to Rowling’s nostalgic 
textual impulses.  Indeed the literary critic Harold Bloom has criticised the series for 
its profound lack of originality (which is, I suspect, to miss the point of where a 
critique of the series could or should be made.  The racial and class politics involved 
in unearthing the merry old days of Empire embedded in the public boarding school 
story, for instance, are scarcely progressive).  Andrew Blake, too, argues that the 
success of Harry Potter is due to its New Labour style “retro-lutionary” aesthetic, in 
which the new is sold by simulating the aesthetics of the past.  He says, “the stories 
explore the old, and a little under the surface deal with the new: past literary forms 
and present concerns exist side by side” (17).   
Like The Matrix, Harry Potter features an apparently preternaturally gifted 
protagonist fighting the forces of evil.  Like many properly mythic heroes, Harry is 
marked out as special from birth.  He is known throughout the wizarding world as 
“The Boy Who Lived,” having survived an attack by Voldemort as a mere infant at a 
time in which few were able to survive a confrontation with him.  Harry’s separation 
from the other students is visually coded with the lightning bolt scar on his forehead 
from his attack by Voldemort as a child.  When he first begins at the wizard school 
Hogwarts in Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone,
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reverence and respect by the other students.  Despite her clear superiority in using 
magic, Hermione’s speech to Harry at the end of the first book makes clear that it’s he 
who is truly heroic.   
Conversely, evilness is usually easily readable in the series; there is often a 
clear slide between unpleasantness and evil (in the form of Professor Snape, Draco 
Malfoy and his family, and other Slytherins).  Thus despite the assurances of 
Hogwarts headmaster Dumbledore, Professor Snape remains continually ethically 
suspicious largely because he is nasty to Harry—his eventual defection to Voldemort 
in Harry Potter and the Half Blood Prince is completely unsurprising.  In this, the 
notion advanced by Susan Nieman that much modern evil stems not from personal 
malevolence but rather systemically produced violence (as exemplified by the 
Holocaust, or corporate neglect, and so on), in which good, nice people nevertheless 
contribute to the perpetuation of injustice and even evil, is a profoundly foreign notion 
one to Rowling.  But if this at times suggests a kind of moral simplicity, then HP is by 
no means alone in either children’s literature or adult fantasy in doing so.
23   
And yet while Harry seems at first glance to be innately heroic, author J.K 
Rowling makes that heroism ethical, the product of love and altruism.  Although they 
are by no means perfect, and fall out a number of times, the friendship between Harry, 
Ron and Hermione is consistently affirmed as one of the series’ central themes.  And 
it is in fact the love of Harry’s mother, Lily, which prevents Voldemort from killing 
him, rather than Harry’s natural heroism.  Good emerges not merely from heroic 
action, but from the consequences of those actions.  Nicholas Flamel, creator of the 
Philosopher’s Stone of the first book, and his wife both make the ethical choice to die 
at the ripe old age of 665.  As Dumbledore says to Harry: 
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To one as young as you, I’m sure it seems incredible, but to Nicholas and 
Perenelle, it really is like going to bed after a very very long day.  After all, to 
the well organised mind, death is but the next great adventure.  You know, the 
[Philosopher’s] Stone really was not such a wonderful thing.  As much money 
and life as you could want!  The two things most human beings would choose 
above all—the trouble is, humans do have a knack of choosing precisely those 
things that are worst for them (297).   
 
 
Here the desire to artificially extend one’s life—what in other circumstances may be 
desperately fought against in HP—is subjected to ethical scrutiny.  And of course, for 
the religious scholar, there seems a clear significance of dying at 665 instead of 666.  
In what amounts to a magical euthanasia argument, there seems a clear ethical line 
between the grace of Nicholas and Perenelle’s surrender to the inevitable and 
Voldemort’s desperate desire to remain alive.   
Unlike Dumbledore, the evil Voldemort is unable to imagine a worse fate than 
death.  Voldemort will do anything for immortality and power.  As Jerry L. Walls puts 
it, “rather than sacrifice himself for others, he is willing to sacrifice innocent beings 
for his own selfish purposes.  This is shown in the fact that he was willing to perform 
the monstrous act of slaying a unicorn in order to keep himself alive” (75).  Whilst it 
makes for exciting and epic battles in fantastic narratives, such an utterly self-centred 
disregard for others is rarely helpful in conceptualising real-world evil.  In its 
characterisation of evil, Harry Potter is perhaps far less sophisticated than, say, The 
Sopranos,
24 in which the lead character is a mafia boss who loves his wife and 
children and nevertheless commits acts of horrible violence, sometimes for business 
reasons, sometimes because of his explosive temper.  Harry Potter is, however, also 
far more comforting in that it posits evil as something Out There and irreducible 
different rather than the friendly neighbour who attends church and his daughter’s 
soccer matches and just happens to run a mafia family.   192 
So while HP offers shades of nuance in the way it conceives of heroism and 
duty, it provides a far less nuanced reading of Evil—a position that is typical of 
postmodern sacred texts.  In Stargate SG:1, you will recall, the alien race Goa’uld are 
almost entirely evil from the very moment a symbiote enters its host.
25  Excepting the 
vampires-with-souls Spike and Angel, the same is true of vampires on Buffy and 
Angel.  So while there are indeed shades of grey in some areas of the postmodern 
sacred, in many ways the texts offer black-and-white comic book texts.  However, 
these are not necessarily to be taken at face value, of themselves the presence of polar 
Good and Evil do not entail a refusal of the complexity of postmodern life.  In fact, 
the desire to recapture a lost world of simple morality and real experience is a 
characteristically postmodern desire.   
 
Responses to September 11 in the Postmodern Sacred 1:  Stargate SG:1 
 
 
An Ori Prior on Stargate SG:1 
 
  The postmodern sacred’s restatement of the singularity of heroes, and the 
heroic narrative is one, arguably its chief, response to the crisis of the meta-narrative 193 
in postmodernity.  Those texts like Harry Potter and the first Matrix that were 
produced before 2001 might seem to intuit a shift towards a post-September 11 re-
statement of the meta-narrative.  However, as we shall see, a number of texts of the 
postmodern sacred have made explicit responses to September 11 and the increasingly 
authoritarian policies of the West.  These texts, in particular, the new version of 
Battlestar Galactica and series 9 and 10 of Stargate SG:1 present critiques of the 
politics of fear being utilised by politicians, affirm the democratic rights of the general 
public, and present and critique fundamentalist versions of spiritual experience.   
I have mentioned on a number of occasions the SF television series Stargate 
SG:1 (in particular Chapter Three treats Stargate in some detail with regard to its 
corporeal “Gods”).  Although it retains common elements through-out, Stargate series 
nine and ten can be considered quite distinct from the previous eight.  This is partly 
due to significant changes in the cast—star Richard Dean Anderson leaves at the end 
of series 8, replaced by Ben Browder, former star of cancelled SF series Farscape 
(though thankfully not in the same role as Anderson, soap opera style).  Fellow 
Farscape alumni Claudia Black joins SG:1 as the alien Vala, while a new General 
(General Landry) takes control of the base.  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, the series 
shifts emphasis thematically.  In the first eight series, the plucky Earth adventurers 
from the U.S military step through wormholes
26 built by super-powerful aliens 
thousands of years before and do battle with a parasitic alien race called the Goa’uld.  
However, at the end of the eighth series, the Goa’uld are largely defeated by SG:1 and 
their allies, and are replaced by another nemesis—an enemy called the Ori.  The Ori 
are beings who have “ascended” to a higher plane of existence, like the Ancients who 
built the Stargate system.  However, unlike the Ancients, who pursue an ethics of 
non-action and regard the pain of life as necessary for each being’s path towards 194 
enlightenment, the Ori demand worship from humans.  We find out that the Ori in fact 
derive power from the strength of their worshippers, and that while they promise their 
followers ascension they do not in fact deliver it.  Series 9 and 10 see the Ori spread 
from their universe of origin into the Milky Way, where they begin conquering and 
converting people by force, exterminating en masse those who do not convert to their 
faith. 
The shift in the series in the series, then, is an interesting one.  The Goa’uld 
were a multi-racial group of power-hungry feudal rulers, who by virtue of their 
advanced technology were able to pose convincingly as Gods.  The task of SG:1 was 
usually scientific de-mystification, to expose the Goa’uld as frauds.  The Ori, on the 
other hand, do legitimately possess mystical powers, and bestow some of these on 
their followers.  The issue is thus not about whether the Ori are Gods—or at least 
supernatural beings—so much as about fundamentalist interpretations that produce 
invasions and mass-murders, as well as the Ori’s falsehoods and blatant self-interest 
in demanding the faith of their human subjects.  Indeed, it is arguable that where the 
Goa’uld provoke a fear of the racialised Other, the Ori are more about a fear of the 
rise of the fundamentalist Christian Right as much as Muslim fundamentalism.  As the 
picture of the Ori Prior that heads this section suggests, the followers of the Ori are 
almost uniformly white; indeed the make-up on the Priors is an exaggerated 
whiteness.  Significantly too, the “quotes” from their holy texts recall firstly the 
Judeo-Christian Bible.  In “A Line in the Sand” (10.12), Tobin, a follower of the Ori, 
tries to prevent a Prior from destroying a village.  The episode hinges on a theological 
argument between the two in which the Prior re-interprets the holy text in order to 
justify mass murder.   
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Prior: they have been touched by evil.  There is no salvation for them.   
Tobin: but we eliminated all of the unbelievers 
Prior: not all of them 
Tobin: I thought the village had capitulated, if you’ll allow me 
Prior: Markon walked away from the Ori to satisfy his hunger, but no matter 
how much he ate he did not feel full.  Realising his mistake, he ran back to the 
Ori, but they denied his pleas and struck down the village that welcomed him 
back.   
Tobin: forgive me Prior, but I was reviewing that very passage just this 
morning.  Markon prayed for forgiveness, and took the first step.   
Prior: and the hands of the Ori enveloped all those who welcomed him back.  
The village was destroyed.  All those who stand by and accept transgressions 
must be punished.   
Tobin: that is not the implication of the text, Prior.  The Ori granted 
forgiveness when Markon realised his mistake, and blessed the village with 
their light for showing him the way back to the path.   
Prior: you dare question my judgement?   
Tobin: no, it’s just not how I was taught. 
Prior: there are many words but only one truth. (“Line in the Sand” 10.12, 
italics added) 
 
 
The arc of series 9 and 10 is an estranged critique of rigid fundamentalist codes of 
belief and, as the exchange shows, absolutist interpretative strategies.  However, the 
series is at pains to affirm the right of individuals to their own private beliefs.  Dr 
Jackson says to Adrea, the leader of the Ori army, “there’s a difference between 
devotion and blind submission, you can’t expect to win the faith of your followers 
through fear and intimidation [. . .] give people a choice” (“Counter Strike” 10.07).   
So, given that the series has previously affirmed individual spiritual 
experience in the form of the “ascended” race of Ancients, there is hardly an un-
mitigated dismissal of spiritual experience at work here.  Rather, the series provokes 
an implicit contrast between the Ancients and the Ori.  Like Bender’s God in 
Futurama (who “you can’t count on for jack”), the Ancients are unwilling to intervene 
directly in the affairs of humans—although they do offer some cryptic help and 
advice along the way.  Dr Jackson says of the Ancients, “they’re not going to help us.  
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frustrating, the point is that the struggle of life towards enlightenment, towards 
“ascension,” is one that only the individual can take.  Stargate thus affirms human 
action, for even if supernatural beings exist, it is up to us to change the world (or 
universe, as may be).  In comparison, the Ori offer their followers a short-cut towards 
enlightenment, granting their Priors supernatural powers, yet in the end, their promise 
of ascension after death is false.   
What is interesting is that the majority of the series 9 and 10 arcs present a 
fairly disguised critique of the Bush administration—it is the alien Ori who are the 
religious fundamentalists, our heroes SG:1 are after all the best representatives of the 
American military.  In effect then, we have a battle in which both sides are coded as 
American, albeit Americans of very different kinds (shades of the bitter “red 
state/blue state” division between Republican and Democrat in the 2004 US election).  
In “The Road Not Taken” (10.13) the series’ critique of the Bush administration 
becomes most pointed.  In the episode, the explicit subject of the critique becomes the 
American government itself, when Colonel Samantha Carter, one of the show’s main 
characters, is sucked into a parallel universe when experimenting with an alien 
device.
27  In that universe, the Stargate program has become public knowledge, 
causing riots, widespread panic and strife amongst the nations (compared to the SG:1 
universe where a multi-national group makes up the team on the spin-off series 
Stargate Atlantis).  In this alternative universe, General Landry has become the U.S 
president and has implemented a number of highly authoritarian policies—a unilateral 
“foreign” policy in the universe (compared to the regular SG:1’s various alien allies), 
martial law, a suspension of the usual democratic rights of the American public.  After 
saving the planet from Ori attack, Carter asks Landry about a protestor who has 
interrupted her congratulation party: 197 
 
Landry: not everyone is happy about some of the compromises we’ve had to 
make 
Carter: compromises like martial law 
Landry: Believe me Colonel I have no desire to go down in history as the man 
who destroyed civil liberties in America.  But I think you’ll agree that 
compared to other presidents I have faced some pretty unique challenges.  
(“The Road Not Taken,” 10.13) 
 
 
It’s highly significant that General Landry is the new President—the point is not that 
these policies are the result of a power-hungry leader, rather the result of good people 
letting fear control their actions (and in turn marshalling fear to justify their own 
policies, as Brown suggests).  “The Road Not Taken” suggests that the fear 
engendered by September 11 (or the Ori attacks) is understandable, but that the rights 
of American citizens should not be surrendered in exchange for security.  As the 
series generally affirms a benevolent, collaborative American imperialism, the 
critique is most definitely a centrist liberal one (as distinct from a radical critique 
which might question the foundations of military intervention).  Of course, such is to 
be expected from an American show designed for a mass market, one should scarcely 
expect entertainment to do the work of activist politics.   
Still, the episode is extremely pointed in making its critique of post-September 
11 anti-terror legislation.  Carter argues with General Hammond, the former 
commander of the Stargate program in the “real” Stargate universe, suggesting that 
fear-mongering authoritarian policies may be as motivated by political aspirations as 
much as concern for the safety of the nation: 
 
Carter: why be hasty, especially when those 302s are so handy in putting 
down your political enemies? 
Hammond: Now I understand you’re coming to see certain things about this 
world that you don’t like.  To tell the truth, we don’t much like it either.  But 
you weren’t here for the riots; you didn’t see American citizens shooting each 
other over food, water and gasoline.  Hank Landry brought us back from the 
brink of chaos. 198 
Carter: that was three years ago. 
Hammond: the threat is still out there! 
Carter: that’s the problem.  It always will be. 
 
 
Such a conversation clearly poses a critique of the post September 11 “war on terror” 
by America and its allies.  As a number of writers have pointed out, the war on terror 
poses an expanding definition of threat (Afghanistan, Iraq, the prospects of war on 
Iran or North Korea), especially taking into consideration the doctrine of pre-emptive 
strikes which has arisen to justify war.  And as Wendy Brown argues, postmodern 
empire (to use Hardt and Negri’s term) is illegitimate in terms of notions of 
democracy and legal sovereignty and “can be justified only through fear, by declaring 
a perpetual state of emergency that allows conventional democratic principles to be 
overridden [. . .] it is above all parasitic on the fear incited by the spectre of terrorism” 
(10).  Although antagonistic, the new forms of global empire and terrorism remain in 
some way complicit with another, and it is this inter-dependence which is tackled 
further in the new adaptation of SF series Battlestar Galactica.   
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Responses to September 11 in the Postmodern Sacred 2:  Battlestar Galactica 
 
 
Tricia Helfer as the Cylon Number Six in Battlestar Galactica 
 
  The new version of Battlestar Galactica, presents a similar approach to 
Stargate SG:1 to the post-September 11 world, albeit with some interesting contrasts.  
The series’ premise is relatively simple.  Humans created a robot race called the 
Cylons, who eventually rebelled and overthrew their masters.  This new series is set 
40 years after the original, an intervening period during which no contact between 
human and Cylon occurred, and the Cylons “evolved” to take on human form (as can 
be seen by the picture of Number Six which heads this section).  These human 
appearing Cylons have multiple copies; indeed, some are sleeper agents, unaware 
themselves that they are not human.  The mini-series which commences this new saga 
begins with the Cylons resuming hostilities by decimating the 12 human colonies with 
unprovoked nuclear attacks.  The remaining 50 000 members of the human race flee 
into space, where they are followed by the Cylon fleet.   200 
With the mini-series beginning on 2004, this new Battlestar Galactica clearly 
emerges as a response to 9/11, the Iraq war and the post-September “war on terror.”  
Beginning, lest we forget, with a catastrophic attack on Caprican home-world, 
Battlestar Galactica is clearly post-traumatic.  The human race is battling for its very 
survival, dispossessed from its homes, besieged by enemies both inside and out.  If 
that seems hardly to equate with the continued American world-wide hegemony, it 
nevertheless arguably resonates emotionally with a post-September 11 American 
sense of defenselessness.  Battlestar Galactica begins from a post 9/11 sense of 
“Fortress America” and as such addresses Islam more than most of the other texts in 
the postmodern sacred (if not always particularly positively, given that is usually an 
estranged comment on Islamic terrorism). 
Like in “The Road Not Taken” Stargate episode, Battlestar Galactica walks 
the fine line between security and democracy—a typical post 9/11 conceptualisation 
in which democracy is deemed to be in some ways antithetical to protection from 
terrorism.  Indeed, with martial law and the suspension of elections
28 it’s as if 
September 11 has suspended the normal workings of democracy.  Democracy on 
Galactica is held to be slightly suspicious, the necessary evil with which the 
benevolent leadership of President Roslin and Commander Adama must engage.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the election of Doctor Baltar at the end of season two ends 
disastrously, with his decision to abandon the mythic search for Earth and settle on a 
dank, remote planet ending predictably in the enslavement of the human race by the 
Cylons.  As such, Battlestar Galactica illuminates a palpable contemporary American 
ambivalence towards democracy—as Žižek points out, for the neo-conservatives, the 
problem is the “overdoing” of democracy, both at home and abroad (2004: 58). 201 
Similarly, post-September 11 human rights, which are abstractly affirmed by 
politicians such as Bush and Howard as the fruits of “freedom,” in practice are 
routinely abrogated in the pursuit of the “war on terror.” The status of the prisoners in 
the American prison at Guantanamo Bay illustrates this perfectly, designated as 
“enemy combatants” outside of the bounds of either the Geneva Convention, 
American domestic law, or the rule of international law.  In Battlestar Galactica, the 
legal status of the Cylons is exactly that of the enemy combatants, without recourse to 
rights.  When the (human) Chief is being interrogated by his own people, he says “I’d 
like to exercise my Article 21 rights at this time,” to which the reply rapidly comes, 
“I’m sure you would.  I guess you haven’t heard—Cylons don’t have rights” 
(“Resistance” 2.04).  Such post-September 11 extra-legal governmental powers do not 
extend merely to the “proper subjects” of terror legislation—terrorists—but to 
potentially anyone unfortunate to come to the attention of the military.  As Georgio 
Agamben points out, the Patriot Act enacted in the U.S after September 11 effectively 
creates the “state of exception” as the ground level of functioning for the law, “which 
radically erase[s] any legal status of the individual, thus producing a legally 
unnamable and unclassifiable being” (3).  Battlestar Galactica is canny enough to 
represent this cultural context, as well as filling out the picture with the continuing 
ethical negotiations of those in power.   
Similarly, the Cylons dramatise a post-September 11 shift in conceptualising 
evil.  Whereas the Cylons in the 1978 series were entirely synthetic robots and thus 
not human appearing, the new Cylons appear human.  At the beginning of every 
episode, the following text appears: 
 
The Cylons were created by Man. 
They Rebelled. 
They evolved. 202 
They look and feel human. 
Some are even programmed to think they are human. 
There are many copies. 
And they have a plan.
29
 
 
The new “human” Cylons thus dramatise two linked conflicts—first, about 
identifying evil, and second, about humanity; an identity crisis, if you will.  The 
Cylons, who look and feel human—like “us”—make simple visual identification of 
evil obsolete.  That implied “us” is interesting enough in itself; for the show’s 
interpellated American audience,
30 Galactica makes humanity and American-ness 
synonymous.  Yet, evil in Battlestar Galactica is no longer visually signified, one 
cannot look to the scar or other visible signs of “evil.”  This is not evil as utterly 
external, the inhuman Other.  Battlestar Galactica is about the post September 11 shift 
towards internal vigilance, in which the enemy is already among us.  As the opening 
reads, some even think they are human.  No one can absolutely guarantee their 
humanity, even to themselves.  Similarly, it dramatises an anxiety about the 
individuality of subjects—there are many copies—which recalls not only the anxieties 
raised by the prospect of cloning, but also the proliferation of fundamentalisms and 
terrorism.  After all, terrorism has been constituted as a virus, one that proliferates, 
multiplies, one that is suggested to erase the subject’s own identity.   
Battlestar Galactica introduces terrorism as an explicit theme early on, for 
instance the episode “Bastille Day” (1.03) sees an interesting discussion between Lee 
Adama (Apollo) and Tom Zarek over the terminology of terrorism (as opposed to 
“freedom fighter”). Zarek is initially posed as a freedom fighter, a writer Apollo had 
greatly admired in college: 
 
Zarek: I thought you respected me, read my book 
Adama: that was before you resorted to violence and hostage taking 
Zarek: Always better when the oppressed don’t fight back, isn’t it? 203 
 
Yet if the episode seems to attempt to make terrorism legible as a political response to 
oppression, it nevertheless resolves itself in individual pathology, for in the end, Lee 
comes to believe that “you’ve been saying that everything you’re doing is for freedom 
but, the truth is, it’s all about Tom Zarek and his personal death wish.”  
Unsurprisingly, Zarek remains an enigmatic, untrustworthy figure through-out; his 
alliance with the traitor Doctor Baltar’s disastrous presidential campaign (even with 
Zarek’s being unaware of Baltar’s duplicity) is symptomatic of this.  “Freedom,” then, 
remains the domain of Galactica’s American-coded leaders, even though they suspend 
legal freedoms like elections, the right to abortions and human rights.   Similarly, in 
the “real world,” freedom after September 11 has become more a matter of 
ontological freedom—“we” are always-already free, “they” are always-already not—
rather than human rights enshrined in law. 
In its third and most recent season of Battlestar Galactica though, the series 
takes an interesting turn in revisiting the terrorism/freedom fighter argument.  In the 
finale of the second season, Doctor Baltar is elected president and decides to settle the 
fleet permanently on a dank planet called New Caprica.  After a year’s peace, the 
Cylons invade, and the human population on New Caprica surrenders.  The military 
on Battlestars Galatica and Pegasus flee with a small number of ships who’ve 
managed to escape the invasion.  So whereas the first two seasons depict a human, 
American coded, race on the run from the Cylons, the third begins with an occupation 
that uncannily resembles the American invasion of Iraq.  “Insurgents” plan suicide 
bombings and the Cylons “crack down” heavily with imprisonment, torture, and 
eventually executions.  The Cylons detain people indefinitely without charge, a clear 
reference to the American “state of exception” politics for “enemy combatants.”  The 
use of the word “insurgents,” a favoured euphemism of the Bush administration, 204 
makes clear the analogy the series is drawing.  We see, for instance, quite graphically, 
the torture of Colonel Tigh (shades of Abu Girab perhaps).  Here, Galactica abruptly 
switches the position of identification for the viewer, creating an implicit (and perhaps 
even unwanted) identification with the people of Iraq—our “heroes” are now the 
“terrorists.”  But even here, the series walks an ambivalent line between humanising 
“terrorism” and condoning violence.  Roslin says “desperate people take desperate 
measures,” but is unable to tell Baltar that she approves of the suicide bombers 
(“Precipice” 3.02).   
But if the bitter fight between humans and Cylons seems all too easily a post-
September 11 “clash of civilisations,” it is interesting that the series complicates those 
politics by posing a very real spirituality not exclusively the province of either.  The 
Cylons (particularly Number Six who has taken up residence in Doctor Baltar’s head) 
make similar religious claims to the Ori on Stargate.  Very early on in the series, 
Number Six challenges Dr Baltar’s scientific rationalist beliefs: 
 
Number Six: You have to believe in something 
Baltar: I believe in a world I can and do understand, a rational universe, 
explained through rational means 
Number Six: I love you, that’s not rational 
Baltar: I know.  No, but you’re not rational (“33” 1.01) 
 
 
What’s interesting here is that it is the artificial, robot race of Cylons, who are 
espousing a religious creed.  Religion, typically regarded as one of the more irrational 
forms of human experience, meets up with its opposite, the mechanical, the rational.  
Interestingly, the humans practice a version of Greek polytheism.  In “Flesh and 
Bone” (1.08) Artemis and Aphrodite are specifically mentioned, and humans talk 
more generally of “the Gods.”  The Cylon religion, on the other hand, is monotheistic.  
As the Cylon prisoner says in “Flesh and Bone” (1.08), “I look to one God, not too 205 
many.”  The clash between human and Cylon then seems to be between poly and 
mono theism, which would interestingly ally the American-coded humans with New 
Age pagan polytheism.   
But if the emphasis on terrorism and Cylon infiltration seems to suggest that 
the Cylons are in some sense coded as disguised Muslims, this is hardly total.  Except 
for Sharon, played by Grace Park (an American-Canadian actress of Korean descent), 
the Cylons are played by white actors like Tricia Helfer and Lucy Lawless (familiar to 
SF audiences from her role as Xena: Warrior Princess).  The Cylons are generally not 
characterised through the expected tropes of Orientalism (say, exoticism in the form 
of food, music, incense etc, the veil for Muslim women, feminised masculinity for the 
men).  This paradox is most apparent given that Cylon religion is mediated through 
the hyper-sexualised body of Number Six.  Number Six embodies an excessive 
feminine sexuality, she is highly sexually coded, often wearing a red dress and red 
lipstick, and most of her early scenes with Doctor Baltar are sexually charged, if not 
the sexual act itself.  Unsurprisingly perhaps, she suggests to Doctor Baltar that they 
have a baby, since “procreation is one of God’s commandments” (“33” 1.01), a 
thought which clearly horrifies him.  Both human and artificial, sexual and maternal, 
Number Six is textually over-determined.  It’s fitting then that like all the human 
appearing Cylons, there are multiple copies of her, dramatising her excessiveness—
not only multiple copies in the “real” world, but then there is the phantom Six who 
appears to Doctor Baltar.  That Six could be, a sign of Baltar’s disintegrating mental 
state, a Cylon implant in his brain, or even as she suggests, an angel of God.  In 
contrast to the proliferating Sixes, there seems a much clearer demarcation between 
the two chief Sharons.  The Sharon (codenamed Boomer) on board Galactica is 
unaware that she is in fact a Cylon until she shoots Adama, whilst the one on Caprica 206 
for the first series is aware and chooses out of love for Helo to defect to the human 
cause.  Later when the Caprican Sharon joins the crew of Galactica, she is codenamed 
“Athena” rather than Boomer.  Not inconsequentially, the two Sharons are involved 
with different men, one with the Chief of the deck crew on Galactica, the other with 
Helo.  While Sharon, who has “always been a flawed model” is the most human of the 
Cylons, in contrast, Number Six is marked by her indecipherability, slightly human, 
slightly not—an ambiguity aptly captured in Homi Bhabha’s “not quite the same, not 
quite the Other” formulation (qtd Ahmed 149).
31  Cylon religion would seem to 
vacillate between Islam and Christianity (with few specifically Jewish references I 
think), but more usually, to conflate the religions of the Book together under the 
rubric of “God.”     
However, this seeming critique of monotheistic religion is scarcely an atheist, 
rationalist dismissal of the spiritual altogether.  Typically for a text of the postmodern 
sacred, Battlestar Galactica also endorses real, usually individual, spiritual experience.  
In “The Hand of God” (1.10), President Roslin, dying of cancer, begins to hallucinate 
in seeming fulfillment of a 3500 year old prophecy.  Under the influence of “kamala 
extract,” a herbal remedy treating her cancer, Roslin discloses to a preacher that she 
had had prescient dreams of the Cylon prisoner captured in “Flesh and Bone” (1.08), 
and hallucinates a nest of snakes during a press conference.  The preacher tells her 
that the prophecy foretells of the exile and the renewal of the human species, and that 
the leader of the time would die of a “wasting disease” before they enter the Promised 
Land.  The prophecy clearly recalls the story in Exodus in the Hebrew Bible in which 
the Jews are exiled to Egypt and return to Israel under Moses’ direction, although 
Moses himself dies before entering the land.  Such a reference has an undeniable 
mythic resonance in our post-Christian world, even as the series makes contemporary 207 
revisions such as a female leader, a polytheistic faith of “the Gods,” and of course a 
massive space fleet.  Clearly the spirituality of Battlestar Galactica is that of the 
postmodern sacred, drawing on a supplementary relationship between New Age and 
Christianity spiritual symbols and affirming individualised spiritual experience.   
Yet inevitably in drawing on Christian, pagan and New Age symbols, 
Battlestar Galactica puts its human religions in part in dialogue with real-world 
Christianity.  Whilst in general the Cylons present an estranged version of Islamic 
terrorism (or at least, of American fears engendered by September 11), the coding of 
the one particular colony, the Geminons, is that of Christian literalists.  Roslin, who 
has publicly declared herself a messianic figure, has from that moment in “ “ been 
most vociferously supported by the Gemini colony, who believe in a literal 
interpretation of the holy scriptures.  In the episode “The Captain’s Hand” (2.17), a 
pregnant girl from the Gemini colony stows aboard the Galactica.  The Geminons 
consider abortion a religious obscenity, and alone amongst the colonies, have made 
abortion illegal.  Significantly, too, they seem to be a strict patriarchal society—
“under Geminon law, the girl is still the property of her parents.”  Ultimately, and 
despite her own personal beliefs (“I’ve fought for a woman’s right to control her body 
my entire political career”), the President makes a ban on abortions in the fleet out of 
pragmatic concern for the dwindling human population, but to the disappointment of 
the Gemini representative, allows the girl to escape prosecution for her abortion.  
Roslin says, bitterly, “you have your pound of flesh, and I suggest you take your 
victory and move on.”  Abortion, of course, has been a hugely divisive issue through-
out the Western world, and most violently in the United States amongst its 
“fundamentalist” variants (Catholics and Protestants alike).  Whilst the episode stops 
short of truly critiquing fundamentalist Christians, it presents a skeptical attitude 208 
towards both pro-choice and pro-life positions, and is instead another ethical 
examination of the rights/survival dichotomy the series has run with.  Of course, in 
the real world, the human race is in danger of over-population, not under, but this is 
population boom is occurring largely in non-Western countries such as China and 
India.  So Galactica’s this use of “human” disguises an implicitly Western struggle to 
reproduce.  In Australia, the conservative Liberal government has placed a strong 
emphasis on “baby bonuses” (that is, financial incentives for Australians to have 
children), and the UK is considering a tax break for married couples (reference?).  So 
the critical interrogation of abortion in Galactica is at best flawed, and perhaps more 
conservative from a feminist perspective than one might expect from a series that 
typically depicts women in positions of power without much fanfare.   
 
Meta-narrative?   
 
So, whilst it is clear that the postmodern sacred does indeed indulge in heroic 
narratives, it is hardly an unmediated return of the meta-narrative or of an 
unproblematic “morality.”  Rather, it is impossible to attempt to disconnect the meta-
narrative from nostalgia.  Meta-narratives cannot return, for in placing authenticity in 
the past, by its own terms, the nostalgic discourse of the postmodern mediascape 
make true authenticity, true experience, forever out of reach.  The heroic narrative as 
it appears in the postmodern sacred then needs to be understood as nostalgic pastiche, 
a play with belief in a world which finds belief difficult to maintain.  Rather than the 
unmitigated return of the meta-narrative, the postmodern sacred’s use of heroic 
narratives is about the heroic as aesthetic.  The Manichean Good/Evil binary of much 
fantasy, for instance, becomes as much about the aesthetic demands of the genre for 209 
Tolkien-esque grandeur than about a true affirmation of the simplistic moral binary.  
Rather than escaping the simulated world of capitalist exchange, as these texts are 
often suggested to do, the postmodern heroic narrative shows precisely how 
unrecoverable the meta-narrative really is.  The Matrix, which seems to attempt to 
recover the real in a vaguely Leftist critique of postmodern capitalism, proves unable 
to get past its own intoxication with simulation.  The ending of the trilogy in Matrix 
Revolutions, in which Neo makes a pact with the machine creators of the Matrix to 
destroy Agent Smith, seems to point towards the rapprochement the Left has made 
with global capitalism—even Hardt and Negri talk about destroying empire from 
within.   
In another way, the two responses to September 11 I have analysed in Stargate 
SG:1 and Battlestar Galactica show precisely how complicated the relationship to 
meta-narrative has become.  On the surface, one would think this would be stuff of 
heroic narratives—Good versus Evil—but, in different ways, both show how the 
meta-narratives of enlightenment and progress have been displaced into managerial 
speak and political spin.  The ambivalent relationship Galactica has to modern 
universal narratives of democracy and human rights is clearly symptomatic of this—
uneasy at the chipping away at human rights that terror legislation has brought, and 
keenly aware of the possible “threat” that democracy brings (the neo-con idea of 
“overdoing” democracy).  Like Stargate, Battlestar Galactica is not unsympathetic to 
the fear produced by 9/11, but it retains some form of critical edge against 
authoritarian post-September 11 politics.  But if it seems clear that the meta-narrative 
cannot return, it is equally clear that postmodernity is marked in a number of ways by 
a nostalgia for modern and pre-modern narratives and texts, and it is this complicated 
relationship that we shall tackle further in the last chapter.   210 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 One can see a similar conceptualisation of Evil as entirely external, for instance, in 
the gated communities of the United States.  This of course ignores the fact that the 
perpetrators of most violent crimes are generally known by the victim, endemic 
amounts of domestic violence and so on.  Indeed it is arguable that such violence is a 
part of the functioning of the heterosexist, patriarchal family.  My thanks to Candy 
Robinson for this point.   
2 See Chapter Three for more on Eddings.   
3 Jackson’s slide from the estranged racism of the Lord of the Rings movies into the 
colonialist nostalgia of his King Kong re-make is entirely unsurprising from this 
angle, then.   
4 Thomas More’s Utopia itself, written in 1516 provides the model for utopia as a 
political critique.  Of all the many utopias since, a utopia like William Morris’s late 
19
th century work News From Nowhere is particularly exemplary—being both 
nostalgic in its desire for pre-modern arts and crafts and making a Marxist critique of 
the inequities of modern industrialism.  See Fredric Jameson’s recent Archaeologies 
of the Future for an in-depth look at Marxist utopian writing.   
5 Huntington advances this argument in his article “The Clash of Civilisations” in 
1993, later adapted and expanded into a book several years later. 
6 Said says of the clash of civilisation thesis: “the personification of enormous entities 
called "the West" and "Islam" is recklessly affirmed, as if hugely complicated matters 
like identity and culture existed in a cartoonlike world where Popeye and Bluto bash 
each other mercilessly, with one always more virtuous pugilist getting the upper hand 
over his adversary. Certainly neither Huntington nor Lewis has much time to spare for 
the internal dynamics and plurality of every civilization, or for the fact that the major 
contest in most modern cultures concerns the definition or interpretation of each 
culture, or for the unattractive possibility that a great deal of demagogy and downright 
ignorance is involved in presuming to speak for a whole religion or civilization. No, 
the West is the West, and Islam Islam” (n.pag).  Said’s point becomes particularly 
clear in the aftermath of the London bombings, which were committed by British-
born Muslims.  The possibility of separating the West from “the rest” as Huntington 
does seems a fundamentally flawed intellectual project, one that does not account for 
multiple kinds of identifications and allegiances—religious, national, cultural and so 
on.   
7 It’s arguable that the discourse developed to explain the mass-killer—as the product 
of video games, Goth-rock like Marilyn Manson, and so on—is itself an anti-
postmodern discourse, the argument being that killers have confused texts for 
“reality” itself.   
8 For example, New York mayor Rudolph Guiliani’s comment that “there is no moral 
equivalent for this attack” (Butler, 2004: 12) is suggestive, given that the largely 
unreported, ungrievable deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan probably outweigh the victims 
of S11 many times over.  Butler points out that this remark occurs in response to a 
Saudi prince’s suggestion that United States’ foreign policy attempt to intervene in the 
Israeli slaughter of Palestinians.  She says “here the two views could not be said 
together, and it has to do with the utterability of the word ‘slaughter’ in the context of 
saying that Israelis have slaughtered and do slaughter Palestinians, in large numbers” 
(13).  In some ways, the insistence that September 11 is an event like no other makes 211 
                                                                                                                                            
it so—that perception means it holds a unique power in the American collective 
imaginary.   
9 In Iraq: the Borrowed Kettle, Žižek argues that the United States’ explanation for the 
non appearance of the Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction can be explained using the 
Freudian three part justification for borrowing a broken kettle-- "(1) I never borrowed 
a kettle from you, (2) I returned it to you intact, (3) the kettle was already broken 
when I got it from you. Such an enumeration of inconsistent arguments, of course, 
confirms exactly what it endeavors to deny - that I returned a broken kettle to you” 
(1). 
10 Neither of which, in my opinion, is particularly progressive in showing queer lives 
in anything other than the most one-dimensional, stereotyped of ways.   
11 Judith Butler in “Is Kinship Always-Already Heterosexual” (2004b) raises the 
question of whether queers should marry given the profoundly conservative nature of 
the institution.  Butler’s work suggests that it is possible to be opposed to gay 
marriage and to the homophobic arguments which conservatives have raised against 
it.  In any case, the question of whether one should have civil rights and whether one 
should choose to exercise them are quite obviously not the same.   
12 Maddox argues persuasively that one of the chief strategies of the Howard 
Government has been to scapegoat groups like single mothers, queers, Aboriginals, 
Muslims, and so on.  She says, “one hallmark of the ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ strategy in 
relation to family, sexuality and the terminally ill was to pick on a group too small to 
wield much electoral clout but which could be brought to symbolise an issue close 
enough to many hearts to induce fear” (109).   
13 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick argues in Epistemology of the Closet, for instance, that 
part of the privilege of heteronormativity is the ability to not know about queer life, in 
which any indication of queerness is considered too much for some straight people.  
The privilege for dominant groups to maintain their ignorance can be manifested in 
other ways with regards to race or gender—for instance, the demand that immigrants 
learn to speak “our” language and not their own native tongue.   
14 It is arguable that, even as conservatives like Bush and Howard make nostalgic 
appeals to unproblematic nationalism, they are profoundly reliant on the postmodern 
cynicism of the electorate.  For example, both seem remarkably scandal-proof.  A 
scandal like Watergate is profoundly unthinkable now, for even if one has been 
caught lying on public record, not only is that unlikely to topple a contemporary 
politician from power, but indeed often barely diminishes their popularity ratings.  
Appeals to a meta-narrative of Truth—say, whether the US presented their case for 
war in Iraq truthfully—are easily responded to in the micro-narratives of utilitarian 
management-speak.   
15 Howard, John. "A Sense of Balance: The Australian Achievement in 2006".  2006. 
<http://www.pm.gov.au/News/Speeches/speech1754.html>. 
16 As previously mentioned, the series clearly works in part as a pastiche of The X 
Files with its array of “meteor caused” monsters.  Clark’s friend Chloe, editor of the 
student newspaper, pins those stories onto her “Wall of Weird.” 
17 See James Ford’s article “Buddhism, Mythology and The Matrix.”   
18 The first movie directly references Baudrillard’s theories of simulation.  We see 
Neo with a copy of Simulations, and Morpheus cites Baudrillard’s “welcome to the 
desert of the real.”  Needless to say, this has generated some interest in the movies 
amongst postmodern critics.   212 
                                                                                                                                            
19 George Lucas, of course, infamously used Joseph Campbell’s theories on myth in 
structuring his original trilogy.  Interestingly, Lucas had the courage to include incest 
in the form of the Luke/Leia relationship, which while suitably mythic was scarcely 
likely to endear him to many audiences.  And in keeping with the mythic overtones, 
the first Star Wars series has sometimes been called, mock seriously, “the holy 
trilogy” by fans.   
20 See Carl Silvio’s work on The Animatrix for how the anime films handle the 
questions of post-humanity raised by the films.  
21 As with the majority of the texts I have analysed, Harry Potter has a large and 
devoted fan fiction following, producing both het fic and homoerotic slash.  Because 
of the anxiety about being arrested for peddling child pornography, much HP fiction 
is set after the characters have turned 18.   
22 Released as Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone in the United States.  Presumably 
(and slightly depressingly), the publishers must have felt the mention of philosophy 
would confuse American audiences.  All references are to the version released in the 
UK and Australia.   
23 Indeed, it’s arguable that many adult fantasies veer far closer to Manichean, even 
fascist, conceptualisations of good and evil, in which evil is often racialised in the 
form of non-human races such as Orcs or goblins that must be slaughtered for the 
good of humanity etc.   
24 Just to make clear, The Sopranos is not a text that I consider part of the postmodern 
sacred, for the simple reason it does not contain any of the supernatural elements of 
the other texts I have been examining.  It’s possible that of itself makes it a more 
sophisticated and realistic text, given that it has to locate evil in humanity, rather than 
the supernatural or demonic.   
25 This is suggested to be genetic, the result of the Goa’uld being born with the full 
memories of their parents.  The Tok’ra, who are an offshoot of the Goa’uld and who 
live in truly symbiotic relationships with their hosts, are all descended from the one 
rebel Queen.  Even so, despite their rhetoric of peaceful co-existence, the Tok’ra are 
on a number of occasions shown to have little regard for the wishes of their hosts (for 
example, “Abyss” 6.06), uncomfortably resembling their Goa’uld enemies.   
26 See Jan Johnstone-Smith’s chapter in her American Science Fiction TV (153- 184) 
for more on the wormhole in Stargate and other series like Farscape.  In particular, 
she looks at the ways in which the CGI involved in creating the wormhole 
reconfigures audience reception of SF.  She says that Stargate “points to and denies its 
artifice, creating in its wake a new kind of formal engagement for the audience” 
(180).   
27 This is a familiar enough plot in Stargate, alternate universes feature in “There But 
For The Grace of God” (1.19), “Point of View” (3.06), “2010” (4.16) and “The 
Changeling” (6.19). 
28 The suspension of democratic elections on Galactica, not the US—though perhaps 
the dubious legality of George Bush’s election in 2000 lingers somewhere in the 
American unconscious. 
29 This text is modified in series 2 and 3 removing the “look and feel human/some are 
even programmed” aspects of the text.   
30 Like a great deal of contemporary shows and movies (Stargate among them), 
Battlestar Galactica is in fact shot in Vancouver, Canada, and screened worldwide.  
Nevertheless, it remains clearly within the domain of American popular culture.  If 
not specifically American, it is hard to place anywhere else.   213 
                                                                                                                                            
31 Bhabha makes this statement about mixed-race subjects, but it captures the 
ambiguity of other liminal subjects equally well—Sara Ahmed, for instance, applies 
the phrase to queerness as “almost normal, but not quite” (149).   214 
Chapter Six 
Nostalgia and the Sacredness of “Real” Experience in Postmodernity 
 
The Really Really Realness of Postmodernity 
 
 
 
“Do you remember a time when chocolate chip cookies came fresh from the oven?  
Petridge Farm remembers. [. . .] Do you remember a time when women couldn’t vote 
and certain folk weren’t allowed on golf courses?  Petridge Farm remembers”  
TV advertisement on Futurama (“A Fishful of Dollars 1.06) 
 
It’s arguable that the apparent return of meta-narratives after September 11 is 
nevertheless highly enmeshed in postmodern strategies.  Indeed, postmodern 
simulation produces its seeming opposite, a desire for real life; or to steal a phrase 
from Slavoj Žižek, “the Passion of the Real.”
1  This passion for the real emerges as a 
response to postmodern simulation, yet inevitably becomes simulated itself, for as 
Mark C Taylor notes, “what is promoted as ‘genuine culture’ always turns out to be 
‘simulacra of genuine culture’” (1997: 204).  There is no pure “outside” from 
postmodernity.  Yet nevertheless authenticity in the postmodern remains a highly 
sought after, a prized, if problematic, value.  As a perusal of any supermarket shelf 215 
will tell you, the ubiquitous use of images of domesticity and “real” food (the 
“homestyle” to be opposed to those other “manufactured” products) makes clear that 
authenticity is a part of the system of symbolic exchange of the postmodern world.   
The opposition between real and fake, or authentic/inauthentic, is one means 
of distributing value, it is hardly disinterested, often provoking a moral judgment as 
well as an aesthetic one.  This is an immensely charged opposition, “the real thing” as 
the Coke slogan once went, is that which is valued.  To be inauthentic, however, is to 
in some sense to not quite be—which is not to doubt its actual materiality, but rather 
the truthfulness of what it claims to be.  When we call a painting fake, for instance, it 
doesn’t imply that it doesn’t exist in a material sense, but rather, that the painting has 
not been painted by the person who it is claimed to have been done by.  It still exists, 
but it doesn’t exist in quite the same way that the “real” painting does.  This 
opposition between real and fake, between being and not-quite-being, holds true right 
across the culture, working to privilege one set of objects or values against another.  
For, when something is perceived to be authentic, this is generally considered to be a 
positive attribute.  But where this authenticity actually derives from, however, is more 
of a slippery slope.  Often, as the example of “homestyle” soup suggests, it is nature, 
or at least the natural, to be opposed to the fakeness of culture.  That apparent esteem 
for nature seems odd considering it hardly impedes the clearing of natural areas like 
rainforests for “development.”  In one, the natural or the authentic attaches a certain 
value which aids in capitalistic transactions; in the other, it impedes it (and is hence 
ignored).  So, however powerful it can be at times, the symbolic significance attached 
to the “natural” in postmodern capitalism is clearly highly selective.
2  Authenticity, 
then, remains only partially applicable, which is ironic given that, as we shall see in 
examining nostalgia, it is so often about the impossible dream of organic wholeness.   216 
The search for realness, however, is a highly elusive one, for any gesture 
remains trapped in the aestheticising, simulucral world of postmodernity.  Postmodern 
attempts at authenticity are often focused on the body, for as Taylor puts it, “when 
reality becomes virtual, the body disappears” (1997: 127).  For example, one finds in 
youth culture a series of spectacular, seeming transgressions, aimed at producing 
some kind of real experience.
3  This is articulated through various musical genres—
the nihilism of punk, hip-hop’s never-ending quest for “realness”—and through sub-
cultural practises like body piercing and dress.  As Taylor maintains: 
 
many people who regard modernisation and postmodernisation as a fall rather 
than an advance attempt to resist the march of history by recovering the body.  
When the body appears to be endangered, it becomes an obsession.  This is 
one of the primary reasons that tattooing (as well as piercing and scarification) 
has become so widespread during this particular historical and cultural period.  
Tattooing represents the effort to mark the body at the very moment it is 
disappearing. (1997: 129) 
 
Taylor rightly points out that bodily centered practices like tattooing may often be 
employed in the service of anti-postmodern reclamation of the body.  Yet, 
paradoxically, tattooing intriguingly may also be considered postmodernism 
incarnate, for “when the sign becomes embodied, the body becomes a sign” (Taylor, 
1997: 123).  Taylor’s work points to an ambivalence within postmodern culture as to 
the effects of simulation.   
That ambivalence means that even apparently anti-postmodern gestures 
remain profoundly entangled within postmodern aestheticism.  Practices like 
tattooing, as well as the other aforementioned spectacular transgressive fashions, 
remain primarily aesthetic practices, able to be disconnected from the socio-political 
contexts that produced them as signs of “authentic” bodily experience and pastiched 
into new, seemingly less authentic modalities of being.  So while authenticity 217 
becomes the subject of a desperate search for real being in the postmodern (see 
Žižek’s discussion of self-harming “cutters,” for instance
4), this is co-mingled with 
the knowledge that such authenticity will be inevitably fleeting in a postmodern world 
of simulation, in which everything is reduced to the aesthetic in one way or another. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly then, the desire for realness underlines a postmodern 
infatuation with transgression.  While it is inaccurate to say that postmodernity is 
entirely de-centred, it is nevertheless intoxicated with Otherness—race, class, gender, 
and non-normative sexuality are all fuel for aestheticisation.  Postmodern eclecticism 
amounts in many instances to little more than a cultural tourism of Otherness, 
appropriating the most easily assimilated signs—food, dress, language, and so on.
5  
The increasing incorporation of BDSM (that is, sado-masochism) into normative 
“vanilla” heterosexuality proves another interesting case in point, assimilating a 
sexual practice historically regarded as “perverse” by the psychological profession 
into the mainstream of heterosexual monogamy, and losing along the way some of the 
safety protocols (“safe words”, the use of gloves, lube and so) that BDSM “players” 
have developed.  That incorporation (in the form of fetish clothing for instance, or 
“light” play like spanking) still retains a privileged centre from which appropriation 
can occur—the oft-repeated criticism of the appearance of leather queers in Pride 
parades, for instance, is that they “throw their sexuality” in straight faces.  Here 
BDSM and queerness overlay each other, for the always-already perversion of 
queerness is redoubled by the non-normative BDSM, implicated as a category in a 
way in which heterosexual monogamy never is.
6  What both do, however, is to signal 
that the postmodern move towards transgression is motivated by a desire for real, 
often heightened or excessive, experience, the sense that only the body (whether in 
pleasure, pain or both) can truly guarantee authenticity—and isn’t that the desire 218 
working explicitly in Fight Club, albeit disconnected from a blatant sexuality (though 
there is of course a clear undercurrent of homoeroticism running through both movie 
and book)?  That link between the body and postmodernism is made clear in 
Baudrillard’s America, where he says that the body has become the site of 
considerable anxiety, where he says the goal of Americans (the consummate 
postmoderns for Baudrillard) is not to have one’s body, but rather to be into it—a 
position that already presumes a disconnection from the body far more profound that? 
a Platonic mind/body split.   
Now, there may seem to be a fair distance between BDSM and Lord of the 
Rings, but the same impetus underlies postmodern consumption of the spiritual.
7  
Both take as their starting point a disconnected postmodern subjectivity, and both are 
consumerist solutions to problems created by consumerism itself.  The postmodern 
produces subjects who feel in some measure alienated from the material, not only 
from their bodies but from an authentic “real” life experience of the material (in the 
form of food, clothing, and so on).  The difficulty is that the material is never 
disconnected from the symbolic realm of simulation in the postmodern, indeed the 
postmodern subject is haunted by the knowledge of that impossibility.  The example 
of “homestyle” food again works to illuminate this mediation rather well.  The desire 
for “real” food—namely, food prepared “outside” of capitalist simulation—produces 
a simulation of the real, thus perpetuating the cycle once more.  The desire for 
“realness” may be partially or temporarily satisfied by the simulation of the 
“authentic” home-style food, but at the same time, the simulacral nature of such a 
product ensures that that the nostalgic desire for “real” life is produced once again.   
So the material—the bodily—is mediated by the symbolic, the textual, in 
postmodernity.  Yet paradoxically, the textual offers itself as an attempt at an 219 
authentic materiality in the postmodern.  Popular culture is, of course, highly visceral, 
experienced as image and sound in the case of visual texts, the seductiveness of the 
image in written.  In the unreal texts of the postmodern sacred, the desire for real life 
is displaced into new, secondary worlds.  Baudrillard points towards the 
excessiveness of simulated postmodern visual culture when he terms it “hyper-real.”  
The media image, in postmodern culture, has become more real than “real life” 
(which can only now be bracketed, mediated as it is by the textual).  Postmodern 
culture is therefore trapped in its own circular logic, where the hyper-reality of the 
image offers itself as a solution to a problem of its own making—the search for “real” 
bodily experience.   
Postmodernity, then, needs to be understood as not merely the victory of the 
simulacral symbol over the real—or at least, not only that—but a concurrent desire for 
the real that works as the supplemental underside to the postmodern media.  I argued 
earlier in the previous chapter that the “return of the meta-narrative” discourse of 
conservative politicians was underpinned by their own hidden postmodern positions 
and strategies.  But it is not just in the stage managing of the political “events” that 
putatively anti-postmodern leaders like Bush reveal their own hidden postmodern 
positions.  Brian Massumi argues that the rise of the mass media has meant that 
contemporary leaders work through affect, from Reagan onwards the “functions of 
head of state and commander in chief fused with the role of the television personality” 
(Zournazi 233), something readily apparent in not only the folksy charm of George 
“Dubya” Bush, but in Bill Clinton’s “feeling” our pain, and so on.  Massumi argues 
powerfully that, rather than a Foucaultian institutionary disciplining of the subject: 
 
Power is no longer fundamentally normative, like it was in its disciplinary 
forms – it’s affective.  The mass media have an extremely important role to 220 
play in that.  The legitimisation of political power, of state power, no longer 
goes through the reason of the state and the correct application of 
governmental judgment.  It goes through affective channels.  For example, an 
American president can deploy troops overseas because it makes a population 
feel good about their country or feel secure, not because the leader is able to 
present well-honed arguments that convince the population it is a justified use 
of force.  (Zournazi 232)   
 
 
Massumi’s foregrounding of the role of the mass media suggests the intimate 
relationship this affective shift has with postmodern, for the politics of affect relies 
clearly on postmodern simulation.  It is most definitely not the “real” world that 
produces this affective role; rather it is the image on the television screen  The 
tabloidisation of the news media is indicative of this shift, the mark of tabloid news is, 
after all, that it tells us how to feel about any given news event or personality.   
The affectivity of the media is starkly capitalistic, as Massumi points out, “one 
of the biggest fears after September 11 was that the economy would go into recession 
because of a crisis in consumer confidence.  So everyone was called upon to keep 
spending, as a proud, patriotic act” (233).  The link between capitalism and “feeling 
good” was made readily apparent in the gushing media biographies for Ronald 
Reagan upon his death that repeated, ad nauseum, the statement that he allowed 
Americans to “feel good about themselves again” after the Watergate scandal and the 
Vietnam war.
8  Not un-coincidentally, the Reaganite 80s are renowned for their 
“greed is good” capitalistic ethos and the aforementioned conservative appeals to 
meta-narratives of nationalism, gender, race and sexuality.  All of this is about politics 
as a form of textual consumption, wherein truth and authenticity are guaranteed not by 
Enlightenment meta-narratives of Reason, Truth and so on, but by one’s own 
individual feelings.  Patriotism, now, is a form of fandom.   
 
 221 
Nostalgia and the linking of text and body 
 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, this affective shift has a significant nostalgic element 
to it—what is suggested to be a link to unmediated experience and feeling through the 
consumption of products or images. Nostalgia is a pervasive element of the 
postmodern mediascape, discernible in many forms.  Nostalgia often occurs in 
“realistic” texts, like that for a Small Town U.S.A in such TV series as Gilmore Girls 
or Ed.  Such texts present idealised versions of American small town life, lacking 
many of the concerns about violence, law and order and the like that loom so large in 
contemporary political discourse (and perhaps as significantly, largely feature an 
absence of people of colour and queers).  Such nostalgia is not limited to the lost, 
“real” world, though, it is mediated through the textual representations of the past—as 
Baudrillard says, “the cinema is fascinated by itself as a lost object as much as it (and 
we) are fascinated by the real as a lost referent” (1994: 47, italics original).  Indeed, 
as I have argued earlier, postmodern culture is profoundly unable to think the “real” 
without recourse to “fictional” texts.   
The postmodern longing for true authenticity often manifests itself in 
nostalgia, which is as Susan Stewart argues, “sadness without an object” (23).  Fredric 
Jameson has argued that postmodern culture is notable for its nostalgic perspective 
towards history, mourning the lost authenticity of the past.  His oft-mentioned theory 
of pastiche clearly suggests that, for much postmodern culture, little exists besides the 
texts and styles of the past.  As Susan Stewart puts it, “nostalgia is the repetition that 
mourns the inauthenticity of repetition” (23).  Yet that repetition collapses the very 
historical perspective—the groundedness of a specific time, place and aesthetic—that 
nostalgia would seem to long for by rendering history as merely a series of aesthetic 222 
styles.  Such a perspective is remarkably well encapsulated by a dire pop song popular 
in 2006, “I wish I was a punk rocker, with flowers in my hair,”
 9 in which the 
radically opposed 60s hippie counter-culture and 1970s punk rock are conflated 
together into one lost authentic past.    
To steal a phrase from Derrida in Spectres of Marx, “the time is out of joint” 
in postmodernity (though he himself rarely uses the term postmodern).  Derrida 
himself is referring to a messianic promise in Marxism yet to come, but perhaps the 
time is out of joint in postmodernity in other ways.  Aesthetic and temporality 
become, if not entirely disconnected, then estranged in some sense.  In some sense, 
postmodernity makes all of history accessible through its aesthetic recreation, and in 
doing so exposes its own estrangement from history.  Taylor argues apropos of the 
fashion industry: 
 
Fashion recycles images.  All fashion is retro even when it claims to be 
innovative.  Since the new can only be affirmed by negating the old, the out-
of-date forever haunts the up-to-date.  The cycles of fashion, which attempt to 
naturalise artifice by appearing seasonally, form a specular system in which 
this year’s trends take shape by rejecting, appropriating, or reforming the 
styles of previous years.  The passé is always passing away in a fashion that 
eternally disrupts the “just now.” (1997: 206) 
 
 
Fashion, the quintessential postmodern industry, in continuously reworking the past, 
pastiching and recontextualising signs, exposes the postmodern crisis of history.  It is 
not that history has ended per se, but rather that aesthetic and history have been 
disconnected from one another.  Taylor reminds us that “modern derives from the 
Latin modo, which means ‘just now’ and by extension, ‘of today’ (1997: 169), but 
how can one say what is specifically of today, when one is listening to simulations of 
50s girl-group pop,
10 wearing 60s-hippie-meets-70s-punk clothes, and watching 
medievalist fantasy?  Everything in postmodern culture, in that sense, is a period 223 
piece of a sort, whether set in the contemporary or not, and the aesthetic’s place in 
history (“oh that is so last year”) becomes a question of the types of pastiche one is 
currently doing.  In reducing history to the aesthetic, postmodernism unwittingly 
releases the haunting presence of the past—since the past, is, as hyper-real, somehow 
more real than the present.  Where some kinds of theory suggest the present to be 
disconnected from the past (the loss of meta-narratives in Lyotard, the disintegration 
of class, family and other social categories in Beck and Beck-Gernsheim’s 
individualisation theory), the spectral presence of the past—the ghost in simulation—
exposes its opposite, the fact that the present is overwhelmed by the weight of 
aesthetic history.   
Of course, the awareness of that history is still often experienced as a loss.  
Stewart argues in her On Longing that nostalgia relies on a set of contradictory 
assumptions: 
 
First, the assumption that immediate lived experience is more “real,” bearing 
within itself an authenticity that cannot be mediated; yet second, the 
assumption that the mediated experience can be known through language and 
the temporality of narrative can offer pattern and insight by virtue of its 
capacity for transcendence [. . .] By the narrative process of nostalgic 
reconstruction the present is denied and the past takes on an authenticity of 
being, an authenticity which, ironically, it can only achieve through narrative 
(23). 
 
 
So we see in nostalgia a number of elements of postmodern culture coming together.  
Textuality, which is above all the key postmodern motif, is simultaneously affirmed 
and denied, both in written and visual forms of representation.  The mediating force of 
narrative is held to be both problem and solution—that which virtualises our “real” 
world, and that which offers us the chance of a vicarious experience of another, more 
real, world.  Paradoxically, however, it is the very nostalgia of postmodern culture 
that leads us towards an awareness of its simulated nature, and hence towards the 224 
nostalgic past as a symbol of true experience.  So nostalgia makes a double move—it 
foregrounds the inauthenticity of the present against the perceived authenticity of the 
past.  In doing so, it frequently opposes the commodity status of the present as proof 
of their inauthenticity, and it erases the commodification of the past’s beloved texts, 
preferring to see them as “pure” and unmediated.  Thus there is a distinction produced 
between “commercial” present and real past, when actually both are equally 
commodified.  It is a commodity fetishism of a particularly limited kind—erasing the 
traces of production from the texts of the past, whilst bemoaning the commodity 
status of the present.   
 
Primitivist nostalgia and the New Age 
 
 
A typical “tribal” tattoo
11 
 
Of course, nostalgia of itself is scarcely a postmodern phenomenon; for 
instance, one finds Ancient Greek pastoral nostalgia, medieval nostalgia, early 225 
modern (the hobby farm of Marie Antoinette for instance
12), and so on.  Yet it is has 
become inextricably linked to postmodernism; if the postmodern can be always be 
considered in some measure nostalgic, then nostalgia too has become postmodern.  
This is as apparent in religious and spiritual consumption as it is in apparently secular 
contexts.  In the first chapter, I argued that in New Age spirituality, personal spiritual 
experience was held to be key.  It’s unsurprising, however, that given its rapacious 
appetite for textual appropriation, New Age discourses inevitably in some fashion 
construct nostalgic textual simulations of lost pasts—Celtic druids, Native American 
shamans, and so on.  When, as Taylor argues, “modernism presupposes primitivism; 
indeed, they are two sides of the same coin,” (Taylor 1999: 53) he is pointing to the 
fact that modernity, and its successor, postmodernity, requires primitivism as a space 
on which to project its own anxieties and contradictions.  “The primitive” is a 
construction of modernity simultaneously “harmonious, whole, unified and fulfilled 
[and] uncivilised, violent, horrifying and savage” (53).  The New Age tendency 
towards primitivist nostalgia, then, draws quite clearly on pre-existing modes of 
nostalgia, even as it utilises them in a postmodern fashion.   
It’s perhaps unsurprising then that there is a fair amount of primitivism in the 
aforementioned body modification practices of tattooing, piercing and scarification.
13  
This becomes obvious simply from a perusal of store names, for instance, some of the 
local tattooing/piercing stores here in Perth are called Primal Urge, Exotic Piercing 
and so on.  The primitivist impulse
14 is most obvious when one considers the ethnic 
Otherness that the designs themselves often trade on—Celtic crosses and bands, 
Maori, Japanese lettering and so on.  The incoherent modern construction of the 
savage as harmonious and violent then comes together in the tattooing and piercing 
parlour through vicarious postmodern textuality—firstly, through the direct citation 226 
and pastiche of various tribal tattoos, and second, through the notion that only the 
violent rite-of-passage can produce the sense of harmonious self the savage is 
supposed to have.  But like any nostalgic act, body modification is haunted by the 
knowledge of its own failure, one cannot truly (re?) assemble the self into a 
harmonious whole, hence one must either repeat the act, gathering body mod after 
body mod, or abandon the project of “reclaiming” the body altogether.   
Postmodern nostalgia often directs itself at the pre-modern, for its perceived 
authenticity, its “erasure of the gap between nature and culture” (Stewart 23).  Thus 
we see most of the fantasy genre set in pre-modern, often barely changed medieval 
European worlds.  While the influence of Tolkien here is not to be under-estimated, it 
is also, I suspect a result partly of its generic blending between the medieval romance 
and the pastoral.
15  Yet the pastoral nostalgia for the simple bucolic life of the Shire in 
The Lord of the Rings for example is not merely a convenient pre-text for the action 
(and the return of the Good/Evil meta-narrative), rather it is necessary.  As Alec 
Worley points out, in Tolkien-style epic fantasy, “the setting [. . .] becomes a focal 
point of the story.  [In] this type of fantasy, its secondary world [is] wholly imagined, 
yet rigorously detailed in terms of history and politics” (14).  This is not textually 
necessary, for one could easily shift the action and begin with the lives of the kings 
and wizards, but it is perhaps ideologically necessary, since fantastic nostalgia seeks 
to deal with the broad scope of pre-modern life.  In this sense, fantasy is nostalgia for 
the medieval Great Chain of Being, where everyone had a pre-defined place, knew 
their place, and all was right in the world.  In this, needless to say, this strain of 
fantasy is deeply conservative, and such nostalgia has the unfortunate effect as Carl 
Freedman notes, of creating worlds “miles wide but only inches deep” (263).   
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Nostalgia and the Postmodern Sacred 
 
Of course, the question is, if nostalgia aims at reclaiming a lost “real,” how 
does this apply to texts that are clearly unreal?  After all, unreality would seem to be a 
given.  Baudrillard in a suggestive chapter on simulacra and science fiction argues 
that “it is no longer possible to fabricate the unreal from the real, the imaginary from 
the givens of the real” (1994: 124).  If the “real” world is unable to be distinguished 
from its simulation, then previously unreal texts have become merely one simulation 
amongst many.  Instead of the mirror image of the real, or extrapolations from present 
scientific knowledge, we have only texts that refer to other texts, simulations referring 
to other simulations.  We surely continue to refer to these texts—and to the worlds 
within—as real or unreal as a convenience, critical short-cuts, but without a sure 
ontological foundation.   
So if the unreality principle of science fiction has been lost, its inverse 
relationship to the real, then we are back in the symbolic exchanges of postmodern 
textuality, and hence, nostalgia.  What has arguably been lost, it seems, is a “real” 
unrealistic text.  So, nostalgia in popular culture is scarcely confined to realistic texts; 
it is clearly present in the postmodern sacred’s “unreal” texts as well.  Of the genres 
that make up the postmodern sacred—science fiction, fantasy, horror—science fiction 
may seem the least nostalgic, considering it is often concerned with conceptualising 
new futures and alternatives to the present.  Generically, SF would seem to retain the 
most critical potential, to produce a distance from the present that renders it both 
strange and changeable (Suvin’s “estranged cognition” 1979).  Yet SF has had a 
significantly nostalgic element since at least the 50s Buck Rogers pastiche of Star 
Wars (as Jameson calls it), and that has only deepened.  By the early 90s, nostalgia in 228 
SF was such that G’Kar could complain that “the future is not what it used to be” on 
Babylon 5 (“The Long Dark” 2.05), an articulation that speaks as much to a nostalgic 
dissatisfaction with the genre as to an ostensible plot.  Similarly, the recent SF series 
Farscape, owes significant debts to Star Wars and to Star Trek and its numerous spin-
offs (say, in the strong resemblance of D’Argo to the Klingon Worf on Star Trek: The 
Next Generation, the “voyage home” arc of Creichton
16 that Star Trek Voyager had 
recently also used, and so on).  That Farscape would make reference to those texts is 
unsurprising, considering that Star Wars and Star Trek clearly exist as privileged 
referents amongst fans in the SF genre.   
In the fantasy genre, much of the appeal of the Harry Potter series lies in its 
nostalgic recreation of boarding school stories, of creating a timeless and eternal 
Merry Old England existing parallel to the present.  Ironically given the insistence 
with which J.K Rowling and Bloomsbury protect the Harry Potter copyright, Harry 
Potter draws on a whole host of older texts.  First and foremost, as I have mentioned, 
Hogwarts recalls the boarding school stories of Enid Blyton and Frank Richards’ Billy 
Bunter stories (Blake 19).  The idea of a magical boarding school was used by Ursula 
LeGuin in The Wizard of Earthsea in 1973, and Jill Murphy’s Worst Witch series.
17  
The investigations carried out by Harry and his friends owe something to the child 
detectives of the Famous Five.  Then there are the references to Tolkien—the giant 
spider of Chamber of Secrets recalling Shelob from the Lord of the Rings.  Harry 
Potter recalls a whole assortment of older texts, presenting those aesthetics as part of 
the awe-inducing wonder of a “magical” world running parallel to contemporary 
England.   
Andrew Blake calls the series deliberately “retro-lutionary,” a surface 
aesthetic simulation of past literary forms, co-existing with the social concerns and 229 
perspective of the present (17).  “Retro-lutionary,” itself an advertising term coined to 
sell Jaguar cars (16), is a good way of encapsulating the postmodern nostalgia for old 
aesthetics.  After all, advertising has become the lingua franca of postmodernity, and 
Blake rightly points out the links between advertising, the neo-liberal politics of 
Britain’s New Labour government and nostalgic texts.  Blake suggests that Harry 
Potter became such a phenomenal success because of the postmodern times we live 
in—in which museums and “schools offered simulations of past experience rather 
than curricula centred on interpretation; pupils would dress up as medieval peasants 
rather than learn about the causes of the War of Roses” (10).  Harry Potter, like most 
nostalgic texts, can elide or even completely jettison those elements of the past that do 
not fit with contemporary norms—the racism, class elitism, misogyny, homophobia 
and so on of the past that present-day subjects find impossible to ignore—and 
foreground the aesthetic.
18  Importantly, as well as whitewashing politics (in all its 
multifarious forms) from history, this produces an individual, consumerist experience 
of “the past.”  So, we are on the same individualised terrain as the New Age, and it 
becomes difficult to tell the difference between nostalgia and spirituality, given that 
both pose the past as the source of authentic being.  And in the case of Harry Potter, 
this past-in-the-present grants a glimpse of the supernatural in the form of magic, 
something to marvel at in awe—but this is hardly any different from the “ancient” 
New Age style spell books marketed to teen girls.   
However, as with many of the texts of the postmodern sacred, Harry Potter 
moves ambivalently between a nostalgic desire for an “outside” to postmodern 
capitalism and a celebration of it.  While the magical world Harry Potter at times 
suggests a longing for an alternative to the mundane suburbia the Dursleys inhabit—
“I love magic!” Harry exclaims ecstatically in Goblet of Fire—its imagining of this 230 
parallel world is often fairly prosaic.  Besides the bureaucracy of “the Ministry of 
Magic” who largely run the wizarding world, much of the enchantment of the texts 
seems blatantly capitalistic.  Magic and magical abilities take on a capitalistic edge; 
for instance, in the branding of flying brooms the wonder of flying is rendered as little 
more than a playground contest to have the latest consumer goods (“Nimbus 500s” 
and so on).  Ron’s brothers George and Fred become entrepreneurs, peddling what are 
in effect magical practical jokes.  Similarly, the “magic” of the Quiddith World Cup 
in Goblet of Fire seems little different from the spectacle of Muggle sporting events.  
Rather than positing a pure “outside,” the desire at work in such moments seems to be 
attempting an estranged recovery of the magic of capitalism itself.   
Pastiching texts which are already themselves pastiches shows the tremendous 
tiredness of postmodernity, the inability to truly think through the new without 
referring to other texts.
19  For example, the most popular children’s animated series of 
the last decade, Shrek, is itself a meta-riff on the fairy tale genre, interspersed with 
popular cultural references (visual, say in Princess Fiona’s Matrix style kung-fu 
moves, dialogue, musical and so on)—postmodernism for children.  And because 
nostalgia has become a characteristic aspect of postmodern cultural life, it can be 
directed towards relatively recent texts or trends—say for instance, the “real life” 
example of twenty-somethings going to “School Disco” club nights in fake school 
uniform to dance to the songs popular when they were at school.
20  Unsurprisingly 
given he wrote the first book at the age of 16, Christopher Paolini’s Eragon books and 
movie read like a pastiche solely of other recent fantasy texts—the medieval setting of 
Lord of the Rings, the obligatory epic destiny of a small rural boy of countless fantasy 
series (David Eddings, Robert Jordan, Raymond E. Feist and so on) and the dragons 
of Anne MacCaffery’s Pern series.  Such a limited perspective is of course excusable 231 
in a writer so young; much less so for the publisher, movie studio and audiences that 
have made Eragon so successful.  The pleasures of Eragon’s narrative, such as they 
are, seem to derive from the second-hand wonder of other, older fantasy texts, as well 
as what is an almost constitutive pastoral medievalist nostalgia in the genre.
21  Genre 
and nostalgia seem increasingly difficult to tell apart in postmodern culture.   
 
Nostalgia in the Postmodern Sacred 1: Xena Warrior Princess 
 
 
Poseidon attacking Xena, Gabrielle and Eve (“Motherhood” 5.22) 
 
The television series Xena: Warrior Princess provides an interesting version of 
postmodern nostalgia.  A spin-off of Hercules: The Legendary Adventures, Xena ran 
between 1995 and 2001, and like Hercules was ostensibly set in ancient ur-Greece, 
“in a time of myths and legends” (that is, before history proper commenced).  Both 
shows, however, balanced their mythic settings with a knowing postmodern 
referentiality.  In this, Xena is squarely a 1990s text, an exuberant (if trashy) re-
figuring of myth and history.  Whilst the setting could, in other hands, lend itself to a 
portentous, humourless mythic rendering (for instance, the dire sword-and-sandals 232 
epics Troy and Alexander), Xena maintains an ironic distance to its subject material.  
Whilst many postmodern texts produce their hyper-reality through the absolute 
fidelity towards reproducing the real (and this most particularly in nostalgic texts), 
Xena abandons the search for authenticity, and instead creates an ahistorical play with 
signifiers.  As Joanne Morreale points out, “Xena may be regarded as a pastiche in the 
way it weaves a tapestry of images and themes from different cultures, mythological 
and Biblical traditions, and historical time periods” (82).  Xena is myth and history 
refracted through a postmodernism more versed in B Grade movies than it is in 
classics.  And as David Adcock argues, it is clearly a Baudrillardian simulation of 
mythic “Greece,” a copy without an original.     
In “Athenian City Academy of the Performing Arts” (1.13), what seems to be 
in part a standard “clip show” is playfully reworked.
22  In the episode, Xena’s 
companion Gabrielle enters a story-telling contest, and it is this metaleptic device (as 
Genet terms it) that frames the episode.  The episode begins with a moonlit fight 
scene from a previous Xena episode, but the footage is stopped and “rewound” when 
an audience member interrupts Gabrielle to point out that she’d said the action had 
occurred during the day.  The scene then recommences, this time set in day-time.  
When other storytellers in the episode tell stories, the footage for their story is drawn 
from old epic movies—and then critiqued as “lacking in character development.”  The 
climax of the episode features a story by Homer, whose story is merely an extended 
clip from Kirk Douglas’s Spartacus movie.  The episode is a play with the overt 
fictionality of Xena, explicitly drawing on its own generic history in using other 
Greek style texts.   
The fictionality of the text is also foregrounded in the episode “The Xena 
Scrolls” (2.10).  The majority of the episode is set in the 1940s.  The actors play 233 
descendents of their usual characters.  Mell (Xena) and Janice (Gabrielle) are 
archaeologists who uncover the “Xena Scrolls,” which tell of Xena’s exploits (that is, 
the series’ episodes).  It is suggested that, rather than being fictional myths, the 
episodes are in fact real history.  This is of course a claim not to be taken seriously, 
given the overt textuality of Xena’s pastiche of various, often contemporary, sources.  
The episode concludes by shifting further into the future to a scene in which a writer 
(played by Ted Raimi, who more usually Xena’s erstwhile companion Joxer) uses the 
Xena scrolls to pitch an idea for the series to a producer named Robert J Tapert.  
Robert J Tapert is, of course, Xena’s real-life producer, and the episode ends the Xena 
opening credits rolling.  The episode thus weaves together the fictional elements of 
the Xenaverse with a play with it being “really” history, and the real-world 
knowledge of its status as a produced commodity. 
The explicit unreality of Xena is produced in other ways as well.  In “Girls 
Just Wanna Have Fun” (2.04), Gabrielle wanders into a nightclub style dance, 
complete with hip-hop music in the soundtrack.  The music on Xena more usually 
tends towards the combination of classical film scores, and Celtic and vaguely 
“exotic” (that is, Eastern or African) sounding instruments—the Bulgarian gaida and 
kava, the dhol and tabla percussion of Indian bhangra music—an amorphous blend 
meant to signify “pre-modernness.”  This musical blend is postmodern in itself, an 
unobtrusive eclecticism that repeats in other texts of the postmodern sacred (the early 
series of Buffy, Dead Like Me).  The theme for Xena is a reworking of the Bulgarian 
folk song “Kaval Sviri” and combines a gaida (a Bulgarian bagpipe) with the more 
usual film instruments of horns, strings and timpani percussion.  In “Girls Just Want 
To Have Fun” however, the music for the dance scene is unambiguously postmodern, 
with the rapping and hip-hop drum loop setting the song clearly in the present.   234 
So if it is clear that Xena is a postmodern text, its religious content of Xena is 
equally obvious.  Like Stargate and Constantine, Xena provides a literal, corporeality 
to its spirituality.  The Gods on Xena are the very real Gods of Greek myth, who both 
reside in transcendental realms (Mount Olympus and the underworld) and interact 
with humans.  The Gods on Xena are capricious, even malicious at times, especially 
Ares, the God of war, who often seeks to lure Xena towards her dark side.  Ares loses 
his divinity in “Ten Little Warlords” (2.08), causing ordinary people to become 
aggressive, and Xena is forced to help him regain his stolen powers.  Hades, God of 
the underworld, appears in a number of episodes (“Death In Chains,” and “Mortal 
Beloved”).  In “Mortal Beloved” (1.16), Xena travels to the underworld, where 
Hades’ rule has been usurped by a serial killer named Atyminius, who has stolen 
Hades’ helmet, the source of his power.  The episode replays all the classic tropes of 
Greek myths, from the journey with the boat keeper Charon on the river Styx, to 
Tartarus and the Elysian fields.  In “Death In Chains” (1.09), Celesta, Death 
personified, is imprisoned by King Sisyphus.  Whilst this might initially seem 
positive, the episode suggests that the absence of death only prolongs the pain of the 
sick and dying.  It is only with the intervention of Xena who frees Celesta that the 
necessary balance between life and death can be restored (shades of New Age Taoism 
perhaps?).  Other divine appearances include Aphrodite and Cupid in “For Him The 
Bell Tolls” (2.16).  So Xena provides another example of the corporeal God in the 
postmodern sacred, and of literal heaven and hells.  Yet given the postmodern 
production and consumption of Xena, the corporeal God is hardly one to believe in.   
Like most of the other texts of the postmodern sacred, Xena neither discards 
the Judeo-Christian legacy nor holds faithfully to it.  In “The Giant Killer” (2.03), 
Xena helps David kill the giant Goliath, rewriting the Biblical story.  Goliath is 235 
refigured as an old friend of Xena’s, a giant hired to work for the Philistines.  Goliath 
is given a sympathetic back-story—10 years previous, he and Xena had fought side-
by-side, in a battle in which Goliath had saved Xena’s life only to have his wife and 
children killed.  Ignoring a warning from Xena, Goliath works for the Philistine leader 
Dagon to find the information that would help him avenge his family’s deaths, a path 
which leads him to conflict with Xena and the Israelites.  This of course leads to his 
eventual death at David’s hand, but it is hardly the triumphant Israelite victory more 
usually told.  Goliath is pitiable, foolish in seeking revenge, but not evil.  Xena regrets 
Goliath’s death, calling him “a great warrior, a loving husband and my friend.” 
Xena re-writes the Jewish and Christian religions in “The Giant Killer” along 
with its characterisations.  Rather than assert the singularity of Biblical God, David 
says that he is “greater than Zeus, Ares, all the lesser Gods put together” (italics 
added).  Some hints of Hebrew spirituality are included, David reads a Psalm, and 
during the climactic scene, whilst a heavenly choir sings on the soundtrack, there a 
few strategic shots of clouds that might suggest the existence of a transcendent God.  
Given the polytheistic context of Xena, this introduction of a Jewish story only serves 
to relativise the Biblical monotheisms.  It serves to displace the exclusive Judeo-
Christian purchase on spiritual truth even as it includes it, and in doing so renders the 
Bible as just another myth amongst the Greek and Roman myths more usually told on 
Xena.  As David Adcock suggests, “Xena appropriates ‘authentic’ cultural tropes, 
mythemes and icons, but in the recontextualised fabric, the entire ‘original’ is called 
into question” (n.pag).  Xena as a simulation exposes the simulacral nature of not only 
its popular culture and pagan sources, but the Judeo-Christian traditions as well.   
There are other, more veiled, references to Christianity too.  In its third series, 
Xena begins a long story arc involving the God “Dahak,” a derivation of the Persian 236 
god Zahhak.  Dahak recalls both Christian and pagan worship at the same time—
Dahak is termed “the one true God” by its adherents.  Gabrielle becomes pregnant by 
a worshipper of the God.  Whilst Xena is convinced that the child is evil, Gabrielle is 
not so sure.  Rather than kill the child as Xena suggests, she secretly puts the child in 
a basket and floats her down a river—definite shades of Moses.  Her child, Hope, 
grows at a supernatural rate and is a young woman the next time they meet.  But 
Hope, of course, is evil, and it is only when she murders Xena’s son Solan that 
Gabrielle realises her daughter’s true nature.  So, the arc recalls both pagan worship, 
and an inverted Christian coding.  In some ways, it recalls Žižek’s argument regarding 
Star Wars, where he says that “since the ideological universe of Star Wars is the New 
Age pagan universe, it is quite logical that the central figure of Evil should echo 
Christ” (2006:101).  However, Xena’s relationship to Christianity is more ambivalent 
than that of Star Wars.   
In its final two seasons, Xena begins its most obvious Christian plot trajectory.  
Xena herself gives birth to the immaculately conceived Eve, who it is suggested will 
bring about a change that will end the time of the Greek Gods.  The pagan polytheism 
of Xena is thus suggested to give way to a (Christian-coded) monotheism 
(“Motherhood” 6.01).  Ivar Kvistad argues that the concluding seasons of Xena 
suggest that because of 
 
the structural logic of the series’ representation of epochal succession, the 
Judeo-Christian tradition becomes the rightful successor and antidote to the 
pagan world [and that] construct it as the superior religious and moral 
paradigm amongst its competitors. (n.pag).   
 
 
Kvistad goes so far as to suggest that Xena’s Judeo-Christian turn fits easily into a 
neo-conservative framework.  Kvistad makes an interesting point, however it is 
difficult to definitively position the series into a Judeo-Christian framework.  But 237 
Xena’s blank irony is hardly affirmative of any one strand of its texts.  The presence 
of such Christian figures as the arch-angel Michael appears as just another trope in 
Xena’s stylised, hyper-real versions of religion.  Christianity thus becomes as 
simulated as the Greek myths it is supposed to have superseded.  Importantly, too, 
Xena enters into the supplementary relationship between the New Age and 
Christianity.  If its concluding season suggests that it tipped more strongly towards 
Christianity, its earlier seasons problematise that reading, relativising and re-writing 
the Judeo-Christian tradition.  Screening for 6 seasons, Xena contains enough 
ambivalences and ironies to encompass a multiplicity of readings.  As a pastiched 
simulation, it creates incomplete and fragmentary readings, which is, I suspect, part of 
its appeal.   
Then there is the decidedly un-neo-conservative takes on gender and sexuality.  
As it gleefully re-writes myth, Xena shows its postmodern positions ethically too.  
Xena herself is most definitely a post-feminist heroine—a strong, fighting action hero 
with a spectacularised, often sexualised body.  Whilst this is not an unproblematic 
development for some feminist writers, it is nevertheless interesting and preferable to 
classically passive heroines waiting to be saved by men and heterosexual romance.  
Morreale, for instance, suggests that Xena’s textual excess may be regarded as camp, 
giving the series a feminist potential for a critical estrangement on gender.  And of 
course, the homoerotic relationship between Xena and her companion Gabrielle 
gathered the series a devoted lesbian following, something the series clearly played to 
but never tipped into a definitive textual reading of the two as a couple.  While of 
course same-sex love was a feature of the ancient world, Xena hardly features the 
many queer-coded characters one would expect to find in the mythic Greek milieu.
23  
Instead, it walks the line between subtext and text dictated by the generally 238 
homophobic norms of contemporary TV and film.  Xena thus very definitely 
disguises its postmodern ethics towards gender and sexuality beneath its pre-modern 
setting.  As Kvistad makes clear, the Sapphic relationship between Xena and 
Gabrielle is as important to the series as its religious under-pinning.  The lesbian 
text/subtext sits ill at ease with an American neo-conservative religious reading.   
So there are a number of nostalgic tendencies at work in Xena.  There is a 
muted pastoralism, a virtue of its real-world filming in New Zealand.  Then, there are 
the lost heroic narratives of postmodernism.  Every episode begins with the voice-
over “in a time of ancient Gods, warlords and kings, a land in turmoil cried out for a 
hero.”  In postmodernism, which begins as Taylor says, “with a sense of irrevocable 
loss and incurable fault,” (1984: 6) there is very definitely the sense that real-world 
heroes are difficult to find.  But if an unproblematic hero has been lost, then it is a 
traumatic loss which the postmodern sacred returns to, again and again.  The 
postmodern condition serves to qualify heroism—for instance, in the way that doctors 
are sued by their patients, or the suspicion directed towards altruism (what’s in it for 
them?).  Even given some temporary revivals of real-life heroes (the fire-fighters of 
New York in September 11), it still remains difficult to imagine heroes like Xena in a 
Realist setting.  So the estranged setting of Xena in the distant, mythic, past, is 
perhaps the only solution to the postmodern nostalgia for heroic figures.   
But the chief nostalgia at work in Xena is that of cinema, for itself as a “lost 
object” as Baudrillard puts it (47).  As episodes like “Athenian City Academy of the 
Performing Arts” (1.13) show, Xena foregrounds its own inauthenticity and textuality.  
So this strain of nostalgia is hardly mournful.  Xena is very definitely in the “end of 
history” celebratory mode of postmodernism dominant in the 1990s.  In contrast to 
Harry Potter, Xena is postmodern nostalgia at its most inauthentic, an intentionally 239 
inaccurate rendering of Greek myths that has discarded fidelity for postmodern 
eclecticism and revision.  In this, Xena is perhaps more indicative of the 90s than any 
other text in the postmodern sacred. 
 
Nostalgia in the Postmodern Sacred 2: Buffy the Vampire Slayer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Buffy and the Sunnydale swimming team (“Go Fish” 2.20) 
 
Nostalgia can be a multifaceted thing.  While as Susan Stewart argues, it is 
always marked by loss, it can be celebratory or depressed.  It may be pro or anti 
postmodernism, but in either case, it remains profoundly postmodern in perspective.  
In general, nostalgic texts like Harry Potter and Xena have a tendency to elide the 
ethically unpalatable aspects of the past, preferring to revel instead in aesthetics.  The 
wilfully unfaithful reading of myth on Xena makes the series a very obviously pre-
September 11 text.  On Buffy the Vampire Slayer however, we see a television series 
that straddles 9/11, and that makes an immense difference in tone in its later seasons.  
Buffy, the jarringly titled Joss Whedon created cult series, offers up a cornucopia of 
nostalgia, most frequently a nostalgia for the lost referent of film.  Indeed, Whedon 
has gone on record stating he envisioned the series as a “cull-from-every-genre-all-240 
the-time thing” (qtd Albright 65).  Over its 144 episodes, the series often seems awash 
in postmodern irony and self-reflexivity, painfully aware of its own textuality, but 
also at key moments provides an anti-postmodern nostalgia for real experience (see 
chapter two for more on Buffy and the transcendental signified).  As such it provides 
the perfect example for the two duelling nostalgic tendencies I have described in this 
chapter.  The premise of the series, for those unaware, is that Buffy Summers, a high 
school student, is a supernaturally gifted killer (“a Slayer”) of vampires and other 
supernatural entities like demons.  She, along with Giles, her “Watcher” from a 
Council in England dedicated to fighting evil, and some close friends, fights to save 
mankind from various supernatural beings out to do us harm.  As the title suggests, 
the series plays off a contrast between the horror and the teen lifestyle of Buffy and 
her friends in the fictional small Californian town of Sunnydale.  Buffy is a television 
series largely about vampires, especially in its earliest seasons, however the series 
also makes use of many other film and mythological creatures and references.  Its 
chief referent is clearly the horror genre,
24 yet it also takes in other fantastic elements, 
weaving in fairy tales and science fiction motifs into its own invented mythology.  
Richard S Albright rightly points out that Buffy “rejoices in its postmodern refusal to 
be pinned down to a single generic formula” (65).   
Whilst the dialogue frequently re-works the language of game-shows
25 and 
advertisements, the series’ postmodern referentiality goes deeper than dialogue.  AS 
well as its pop culture references, Buffy liberally weaves in references to fairy tales 
and classic literature.  Hansel and Gretel appear as demonic entities goading the 
Sunnydale adults into a literal witch-hunt in “Gingerbread” (3.10), in a clear metaphor 
for contemporary hysteria about child abuse.  In “Go Fish,” (2.20) the Sunnydale 
swim team become monsters reminiscent of The Creature from the Black Lagoon, a 241 
reference the series is only to quick to knowingly point out.
26  Buffy re-imagines Dr 
Jekyll and Mister Hyde in “Beauty and the Beasts” (3.04) as an allegory for domestic 
abuse.  Adam, the “Big Bad” (ie the main evil antagonist) of Season Four, is a version 
of Frankensten’s monster, an amalgam of demon and human parts.   
In “Buffy Vs Dracula,” (5.01) we see the series’ mythology square up, finally, 
to the vampire genre’s most famous text.  When Buffy meets Dracula, she says “get 
out,” as if to purge the series of the one referent it has hitherto circled but never 
named.  She asks, in disbelief, 
 
Buffy: so let me get this straight, you’re Dracula.  The guy, the Count. 
Dracula: I am 
Buffy: and you’re sure this isn’t just a fanboy
27 thing?  Cause I’ve fought 
more than a few pimply, overweight vamps who called themselves Lestat.
28  
(“Buffy Vs Dracula” 5.01) 
 
While the episode replays a number of classic vampire tropes that the series has 
otherwise eschewed—Dracula turns into mist, bats—it maintains its sense of irony 
towards its subject matter.  Xander asks Dracula sarcastically, “where’d you get your 
accent, Sesame Street?” yet the excitement of the characters after their first meeting 
with the Count is clearly that of fans meeting an idol (and very much a fanboy and 
fangirl thing).  While Buffy itself is a meta-riff on the horror genre, this episode, 
which comes after four seasons, folds the series back on itself, playing with the 
genre’s source materials part-mockingly and part-seriously.  Once again, the 
postmodern sacred is caught somewhere between belief and unbelief.   
Interestingly, Buffy only features Dracula once, as though the incorporation of 
the Dracula mythology into the series renders anything more than a superficial self-
referential encounter redundant.  Yet Buffy’s nostalgic tendency is hardly limited to 
pastiching the horror genre; the dialogue frequently makes quick-witted references to 
other shows and movies, not to mention popular culture ephemera like game-shows 242 
and ads.  In “Once More With Feeling,” (6.07) the series’ infamous musical episode, 
the referent shifts to Broadway musicals as a demon’s spell compels people to break 
out into song and elaborate dance numbers.  Indeed, Anya complains that her number 
is a “retro pastiche, it’s never going to be breakaway pop hit.”
29  “Superstar” (4.07) 
features an alternate Sunnydale in which the geek Jonathon has transformed himself 
into a suave James Bond style character, complete with suit and bow-tie—a published 
author, accomplished musician, consultant for the U.S Army and so on.  The Bond 
references occur too in the soundtrack, which clearly allude to John Barry’s famous 
scores.  “Dirty Girls” (7.18) features an original series Star Trek sequence in which 
Faith fights a Vulcan.   
The series is well known for its lightning quick dialogue, in particular for the 
creative ways it makes use of pop culture references.  For instance, in “The Wish,” 
(3.09) Cordelia refers to the alternative universe she now inhabits as “Bizarre-o 
World,” one of many references the series makes to the Superman comics.
30  In the 
same episode, Xander refers to his and Willow’s feelings of guilt (for having been 
caught cheating) as “Guiltapalooza.”  The reference is here is to Lollapalooza, a 
massive music festival tour that featured many different acts, yet Buffy 
characteristically twists the reference into a new phrase of its own, playing on the 
audience’s presumed knowledge of the festival in order to create a new phrase. This 
kind of language usage, dubbed “Slayer Slang,” has attracted the notice of a number 
of scholars.
31  Richard S. Albright suggests that “correspondences between the 
Buffyverse and our world are hyperrealised through a sharing of imaginary works 
between both worlds” (64).  In other words, the popular culture references in Buffy 
work to ground the fictional universe in our postmodern referentiality.  Albright 
argues, for instance, for the villains of season six, the Evil Trio of Andrew, Jonathon 243 
and Warren, “the boundary between fantasy and reality is permeable and they seem 
motivated to make their lives imitate art, to live in the imaginary worlds that supply so 
much of their dialogue” (64).  The Trio argue over such geek topics as SF and comics 
(Star Wars, Star Trek: The Next Generation, Superman and Spiderman), and who 
makes the best Bond (“Life Serial” 6.05).   
So referentiality on Buffy then becomes a matter of explicit discussion as well 
as textual incorporation.  Postmodern pastiche, after all, can function in a number of 
different ways—for instance, the seamless unacknowledged retreads of the sort that 
Jameson talks about with regard to Body Heat, Chinatown and so on.  Then, there is 
the self-referentiality of genre, in which a text points self-consciously towards its own 
generic features.  Finally, there is explicit referentiality, in which texts either self-
consciously recreate scenes from other texts (visual quoting, if you will), or have 
characters discuss other texts.  Buffy, unsurprisingly, does all of these at times.  The 
“Once More With Feeling,” episode both signals un-specifically to Hollywood 
musicals of the 1940s and 50s (Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers?), as well as having 
its characters explicitly discuss the conventions of the genre.
32   
Yet the series also plays out the underside of postmodern simulation, the 
desire for “real” experience.  This occurs most dramatically in the series 6 arc.  At the 
end of Series 5, Buffy dives dramatically into a dimensional portal, closing it off, 
saving the world, and dying in the process.  Convinced, however, that Buffy is in a 
“hell dimension,” her friends work a spell to bring her back (“Bargaining” 6.01 and 
6.02). Of course, this being television, nothing is ever simple, so that hell dimension 
turns out to have been heaven.  The heaven described resembles not so much a 
Christian heaven as a Buddhist state of nirvana, a world free of hurt and pain.  By 
contrast, this world is “hard… and bright… and violent,” (“After Life” 6.03) an 244 
excess of sensation too much for Buffy to cope with.  “Hard and bright and violent” 
seems a succinct way of describing some of the negative experiences of postmodern 
simulation.   
Not unexpectedly then, she comes back from heaven withdrawn, unable to feel 
anything.  “Give me something to sing about” she sings in “Once More With 
Feeling.”  Paradoxically, this world is too much, and too little, for Buffy.  In between 
working shifts at a burger joint, Buffy starts having rough, BDSM sex with the 
vampire Spike, just to feel something.  Their first sexual encounter in “Smashed” 
(6.09) begins with the pair fighting, then having sex, as a building collapses around 
them.
33  Much like Taylor’s tattooed and pierced anti-postmoderns, Buffy attempts to 
recover her lost sense of self by recovering her body through rough sex.  Tellingly, 
Jana Reiss suggests that Buffy’s “misery, her profound despair, makes it impossible 
for her to crack jokes” (45) in the sixth season—this turn towards the body coincides 
with her inability to trade in postmodern referentiality.  But this does not mean that 
Buffy has suddenly exited postmodernism for “the real,” rather, it has shifted gears 
into a postmodernist nostalgia of a different sort.   
Ignoring for the moment the theological implications of Buffy’s falling from 
heaven (which I have already dealt with in chapter two), the arc illuminates a 
peculiarly postmodern approach to the body.  Disconnected from itself, yet unable to 
break out of the circularity of postmodern simulation and self-referentiality—the 
knowingness of singing “Give me something to sing about,” while the seeming 
outside of rough sex becomes just another move in the postmodern commodification 
of the body.  Once again, “what is promoted as ‘genuine culture’ always turns out to 
be ‘simulacra of genuine culture’” (Taylor, 1997: 204), and this is as true for bodily 245 
experiences as it is for culture (and most especially bodily experiences being 
simulated on-screen).   
It’s no accident that the storyline coincides with the most regularly shown job 
Buffy has on the series (she works part time as a school counsellor in Series 7, but this 
is infrequently shown), indeed a number of episodes played viscerally on the fast food 
angle before agitation from sponsors forced the producers to abandon the storyline.  
Fast food, as we know, combines modern forms of discipline with postmodern forms 
of simulation.  George Ritzer argues that employees’ ability to interact with costumers 
in such jobs has become so heavily scripted— the ubiquitous “have a nice day!”—that 
human interaction itself has become a form of simulation in postmodern capitalism.  
Such interactions are produced by the combination of explicit surveillance (on the part 
of managers, supervisors and so on) as well as internalised discipline.  Thus 
postmodern forms of capitalism are often highly reliant on modern rationalist forms of 
organisation, surveillance and discipline.  For Buffy, working in such an environment, 
where she is told she is “one of the lifers,” is clearly motivation for her to use violent 
sex to get “out” of herself (not to mention her job).  The arc swings between the two 
extremes of postmodern extra-textual “reality” and simulation, and while the violent 
sex might at first glance seem ill-at-ease with Buffy’s playful postmodern 
referentiality, it instead condenses a dynamic at the heart of the postmodern condition.   
It’s arguable that the graphic sex and violence emerge as a response to the 
anaestheticising effects of postmodern simulation, a way to reclaim the material from 
the symbolic.  Does that, then, mean that “realism” to us has become only reduced to 
the most visceral experiences of life?  Do we need sex and violence to be this “real” 
and graphic precisely because our lives are so fake; or is it the opposite, Buffy as 246 
simulation, textual copies without originals?  Or possibly, and this is particularly 
evident in the post-September 11 discourse on the “real,” it may be both.   
A deep-seated ambivalence towards simulation is clearly at work in the series, 
since the postmodern referentiality in Buffy, whilst often a matter of glib banter, is 
also occasionally interrogated more deeply than perhaps one would expect from a 
fantastic television series airing on a major network.  The remarkable episode 
“Storyteller” (7.16) is a case in point where the series rises above its generic 
limitations.  Andrew, after fleeing Sunnydale at the end of Season Six, has returned 
and murders his friend Jonathon at the bidding of his (dead) friend/crush Warren in 
“Lessons” (7.01).  He has now joined Buffy and her team, part prisoner, part guest.  
The episode begins with an elaborate Masterpiece Theatre style set and Andrew’s 
mock poetic narration, and features multiple textual frames—the glossy TV look of 
Andrew’s pop-culture fantasies, the grainy video-camera look of the documentary 
Andrew is making about Buffy, the “real world” shots of the characters in the show’s 
usual style.  Andrew’s narration provides a direct self-referential textuality to the 
episode.  In the climactic scene, Buffy has taken Andrew to the Sunnydale High 
school basement where Andrew murdered Jonathon and threatens him with a knife: 
 
Andrew:  So this is my redemption at last, buy back my bruised soul with the 
blood of my heart but [falters] not enough to kill 
Buffy: Stop!  Stop telling stories.  Life isn’t a story [ . . .] you always do this, 
you make everything into a story so no-one’s responsible for anything because 
they’re just following a script 
Andrew: Please don't kill me.  Warren said Jonathan would be OK. I trusted 
him, and I lost my friend. 
Buffy:  You didn't lose him.  You murdered him. 
Andrew: I know, but you don't need to kill me.  You said we could all get 
through this. 
Buffy:  I made it up.  I'm making it all up.  What kind of hero does that make 
me? 
Andrew:  No, you're doing great.  Really.  Kudos. 
Buffy:  Yeah?  Well, I don't like having to give a bunch of speeches about how 
we're all gonna live, because we won't.  This isn't some story where good 247 
triumphs because good triumphs.  Good people are going to die!  Girls.  
Maybe me.  Probably you.  Probably right now. 
 
 
Of course, Buffy doesn’t actually kill Andrew (she is, after all a hero).
34  The episode 
ends with Andrew speaking directly into the camera, in the toilet, saying “here's the 
thing.  I killed my best friend.  There's a big fight coming, and I don't know what's 
going to happen.  I don't even think I'm going to live through it.  That's, uh, probably 
the way it should be.  I guess I'm..” and then he turns the camera off.  The episode 
proves remarkable for its strained relationship towards narrative, at once affirming the 
pleasures of textuality, and then swiftly undercutting itself.  Andrew’s storytelling is 
pleasurable, and his postmodern referencing is hardly dissimilar to any other character 
on the show.  The episode’s apparent confirmation of “reality”—Andrew admitting he 
really did kill Jonathon, and that cannot be easily moralised away into a redemption 
narrative—is not merely a trite, easy affirmation, rather it is an examination of the 
consequences of the postmodern turn.  But even as it seems to raise a critique of 
narrativising away reality, Buffy is painfully aware of its own textuality, its own 
unreality—and indeed the unreality that the postmodern hyper-real has produced of its 
own world—and self aware enough to realise how much pleasure its audience takes 
from the nostalgic aesthetic.   
This is made abundantly clear in the one truly Realist episode of Buffy’s seven 
seasons.  In “Normal Again” (6.17), the entire foundation of the series is undermined.  
Buffy is poisoned by the Trio and flicks back between realities, between the familiar 
“reality” of her life as a Slayer in Sunnydale, and her life as a patient in a mental 
hospital.  It is suggested that all of Buffy’s adventures onscreen are the result of 
psychosis, that her friends, sister and supernatural powers are simply figments of her 
imagination—a Realist interpretation of the text if ever there was one.  The doctor 248 
tells Buffy that she needs to kill her friends, but this proves too difficult and 
eventually, she chooses Sunnydale over the mental institution.  The conclusion of the 
episode is deeply ambivalent; it ends not in Sunnydale and the resumption of “real” 
life, but in the mental hospital, with the doctor telling Buffy’s mother that “we’ve lost 
her” and Buffy staring blankly in her catatonia.  Whilst this could easily fall into the 
clichéd “it was all just a dream” explanation for fantastic texts, Buffy is more nuanced 
a text than that.  It’s important to note that the episode occurs towards the end of the 
sixth season, there are another 27 episodes after this one.  So clearly this episode is 
not a mere Realist denouement that retrospectively re-writes the series as a psychotic 
delusion.
35  But “Normal Again” does however offer the one plausibly Realist 
explanation for the series, and it is characteristic of the text that it neither ends firmly 
on one side or another—neither reality nor fantasy.  We end, predictably, back in 
Sunnydale, but more uncertainly than when we began.   
Buffy, as a nostalgic postmodern text, knows the pleasures of its viewers lie in 
playing with unreality, with both belief and unbelief.  The serial form of episodic TV 
usually means an equilibrium is disturbed and then recovered, but Buffy persistently 
challenges that.  Instead of the Realist closure that “Normal Again” promises (and 
indeed many fans speculated that the final episode would revisit the mental 
institution), the series ends with Buffy and her friends looking out on a destroyed 
Sunnydale.  Willow asks Buffy “what are we going to do now, Buffy?” and Buffy 
answers wordlessly with an inscrutable smile (“Chosen” 7.22).  This ending too is 
open-ended, leaving the viewer to answer the question instead.  This is one text that 
does not “always [opt] for the real” (1994:21) as Baudrillard puts it, but neither can it 
so easily banish the weight of skepticism, even for itself in an explicitly fantastic text.   249 
One final reference to sum up this discussion of Buffy’s postmodernist 
sensibility.  In “I Only Have Eyes For You,” (2.19) 50s school nostalgia ala Happy 
Days returns in the form of phantom lovers, who are doomed to replay their deaths 
through possessing human proxies.  As the title suggests, the old Flamingos doo-wop 
song features prominently in the episode, as do a number of flashbacks to the period.  
We see a number of standard tropes of 50s nostalgia—the fashion, the language (“he’s 
dreamy”), a high school yearbook.  Of course, Buffy is hardly alone in re-visiting the 
period, for as Fredric Jameson reminds us, the 1950s remain the privileged referent 
for American nostalgia (1991: 19).  Metaphorically, though, the episode works as 
reminder of the haunting the past (and most especially the 1950s onwards for 
Americans) works on the contemporary.
36  However ambivalent we may be towards 
postmodern referentiality, and even as we seek to find real experiences outside of the 
textual, like the lovers on Buffy we seem nevertheless doomed to repeat the past again 
and again, trapped eternally in a nostalgia mode.  If the earliest seasons of Buffy seem 
to exhibit a more celebratory mode of postmodern nostalgia, the sixth and seventh 
seasons mark a post-September 11 shift towards an ostensibly anti-postmodern 
postmodernism.  The loss of nostalgia remains a constant, but this is more bitter than 
sweet, and the search for a pure authentic experience remains as elusive as ever.   
 
Notes 
                                                 
1 Žižek himself in “Welcome to the Desert of the Real” borrows this phrase from 
Alain Badiou.  One should note here the Lacanian valences of Žižek’s use of the term 
“Real.”  In general I have eschewed a psychoanalytic framework, although in this 
case the term works well enough without the psychoanalytic connotations.   
2 Just as conservative appeals to “natural” heterosexuality have to selectively ignore 
the wide array of same-sex eroticism found in the animal kingdom.   
3  Though I should note that these transgressions are ultimately contained, socially 
licensed as part of a teen liminal space prior to entering the adult world of work and a 
reproductive heterosexual sociality.   
4 See his “Welcome To the Desert of the Real” essay. 250 
                                                                                                                                            
5 Lyotard gives a typical example of postmodern eclectism, doing all of the following: 
eating McDonalds for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, listening to reggae, wearing 
Paris perfume in Hong Kong and so on (76).   
6 It is unsurprising, therefore, that our culture’s image of ultimate Evil—Nazi 
Germany—is often coded as queer and sado-masochistic, what Laura Frost aptly calls 
“sexual scapegoating as a means of defining fascism” (99)—despite the wide-spread 
Nazi persecution of homosexuals.  It is hard to imagine heterosexuality being 
pathologised in quite the same way.   
7 Interestingly, the comedienne Margaret Cho makes this point about BDSM and 
speculative fiction in Notorious C.H.O when she says “there’s this really creepy 
connection between BDSM and Star Trek.  And the Renaissance fair.”    
8 His inactivity towards the growing AIDS epidemic through-out his presidency 
presumably helped many Americans feel good too.   
9 “I Wish I Was A Punk Rocker (With Flowers In My Hair)” by Sandy Thom.  The 
full chorus goes: 
“Oh I wish I was a punk rocker with flowers in my hair  
In 77 and 69 revolution was in the air  
I was born too late and to a world that doesn't care  
Oh I wish I was a punk rocker with flowers in my hair.” 
10 For example, British group The Pipettes, with their polka-dot dresses and Phil 
Spector “Wall of Sound” style production.   
11 Picture from http://www.micktomo.com/galleryNew/tribal_tattoos/003_G.  
Accessed 12/04/2007. 
12 We see these threads coming together in Sophia Coppola’s postmodern Marie 
Antoinette, which which features a vignette dramatising Marie Antoinette’s grotesque 
pastoral nostalgia in the midst of a movie that aestheticises simultaneously 18
th 
century French decadence and 1980s pop music like Adam Ant. 
13 See Taylor’s chapter in Hiding (74-145) and Victoria Pitts for an in-depth scholarly 
reading of body modification practices.    
14 Of course, no movement so based on individualising and customising people’s 
bodies can be entirely generic, there exists simultaneously in body mod a post-human 
approach to the body that seeks not to reclaim some primal sense of self, but rather to 
abandon the limitations of the human.  This strand of body modification is embodied 
most obviously by the performance artist Stelarc.   
15 One does find, of course, other versions of fantasy that are not set in medieval 
European worlds—for instance, the estranged Orientalist world of Raymond Fiest and 
Janny Wurts’ Daughter of Empire novel series.   
16 Of course, one could easily suggest this to be a re-working on Homer’s Odyssey, 
the archetypal “journey home.”  Yet arguably contemporary texts are as invested in 
re-working other “just past”  texts than engaging with myth and legend.   
17 Interestingly, both of these series have been adapted into visual texts, quite likely 
because of a fantasy market fuelled by the success of Harry Potter.  The Worst Witch 
was developed into a British television series, and LeGuin’s Earthsea into a film by 
anime giant Studio Ghibli.   
18 Life On Mars, a recent British series, proves an interesting exception, however.  
The premise of Life On Mars is that Sam, a present day policeman, is injured in a car 
accident and is sent back to 1973.  The SF elements on Life On Mars are minimal, 
however, this time travel fantasy is little more than a Todorov style hesitation as to 
whether Sam has travelled back in time or is in a coma.  Sam is paired with DCI Gene 251 
                                                                                                                                            
Hunt, an old-style misogynistic, homophobic, racist and corrupt policeman.  Hunt 
roughs up witnesses, makes back-door deals with gangsters and plants evidence on 
people he believes to be guilty.  Unsurprisingly though, he is still portrayed as 
extremely charismatic, as a policeman with his heart in the right place.  Sam protests 
Hunt’s ways, but it is clear that the enjoyment derived from the program is in the 
nostalgia for the racism, sexism and homophobia of the past.  Sam’s presence there 
seems to be largely to speak for the present, a way of accessing the “pleasures” of 
racism and so on whilst appearing to condemn them.  Tellingly, Hunt says to him, 
“you like it here more than you care to admit.”  There are of course a series of 
nostalgic cues—old clothes and cars, David Bowie’s “Life On Mars” song that the 
series takes its title from, a meeting with glam rocker Marc Bolan, reminiscences 
about Sam’s childhood days going to the football with his father—but rather than 
fixate on these, Life On Mars is besotted with the usually disavowed ideological 
elements of the past.  Thus, it is deeply retrogressive, a sad comment on the 
contemporary backlash against “PC.”  Life On Mars provokes a different kind of 
nostalgia to the Harry Potter sort—if Harry Potter conceals its present-day perspective 
beneath an old aesthetic, Life On Mars seeks to truly abandon it, knowing full well 
the lessons of feminism, gay liberation and so on, and not caring.  Life On Mars is the 
most nihilistic of postmodern nostalgic texts, a conservative backlash scarcely 
covered by an ostensibly liberal surface.  Life on Mars has none of the supernatural 
elements or religious symbols of the postmodern sacred.  Instead, it is the authenticity 
of the “real” that is sacred in Life On Mars, a real so unrecoverable in the present that 
Sam prefers to stay comatose (in the present) in order to stay in the 1970s world of his 
mind. 
19 The utter aesthetic barrenness of this trend surely reaches its apotheosis in the 
“parody” movie Scary Movie, which was a redundant parody of postmodern horror 
movies like Scream and I Know What You Did Last Summer, which were already 
ironic riffs on slasher films.  Depressingly, Scary Movie has now spawned three 
sequels.   
20 You know, when music was, like, really really real.   
21 Although not absolute, there seems few exceptions to Tolkien-esque medievalist 
nostalgia, certainly in fantasy’s most commercially successful areas.  However, 
Samuel Delany’s Nevérÿon series, Sherry S Tepper and Joanna Russ provide a few 
welcome, if not exactly culturally ubiquitous, exceptions.  All of these, interestingly, 
work within a broadly feminist tradition that engages with the utopian/dystopian 
modes, and as such are interested in issues of social transformation that are more 
usually elided in medievalist nostalgia.     
22 Clip shows are television episodes cut largely together out of other older episodes.   
23 This contemporary heteronormativity is obvious too in Xena’s parent series 
Hercules: The Legendary Journeys, which transmutes the relationship between 
Hercules and his lover Iolus into friendship.   
24 Creator Joss Whedon states in the commentaries of the pilot “Welcome to the 
Hellmouth” (1.01) that the premise of the show was based upon a reversal of the 
standard horror movie formula in which a blond girl walks into a dark alley and is 
attacked by something monstrous.  Whedon’s revision has attracted praise from some 
feminists, although others have their reservations.   
25 For instance, this exchange: 
Buffy: Ok, what do I want? 
Angel: To kill them, to kill them all. 252 
                                                                                                                                            
Buffy: Sorry that’s incorrect, but you do get this lovely watch and a year’s supply of 
Turtle Wax.  What I want is to be left alone.  (“Welcome to the Hellmouth” 1.01) 
26 Cordelia:  You, you, you. What about me? It's one thing to be dating the lame 
unpopular guy, but it's another to be dating the creature from the Blue Lagoon. 
Xander: Black Lagoon. The creature from the Blue Lagoon was Brooke Shields. 
27 Fanboy or fangirl is another term for fans of SF, fantasy, horror, anime and so on, 
sometimes pejoratively, sometimes affectionate or self-description.   
28 Lestat, of course, being the main character of Anne Rice’s immensely successful 
late 80s/early 90s vampire series.  The books spawned two movies, Interview with a 
Vampire, which starred Tom Cruise, Brad Pitt and Antonio Banderas, and Queen of 
the Damned, which featured the late R&B singer Aaliyah in the titular role.   
29 See Richard S. Albright’s article “’Breakaway pop hit.. or book number?’” ‘Once 
More With Feeling’ and Genre” for a more in-depth look at the episode’s use of the 
musical genre.  See also, Jeffrey Middents for a look at how the episode configures 
race.   
30 Amongst others, Xander’s Jimmy Olson joke in “The Zeppo” (3.13), Oz and 
Xander’s discussion of the various types of kryptonite in “Helpless” (3.12) 
31 See for instance Michael Adams’ book Slayer Slang: A Buffy the Vampire Slayer 
Lexicon. 
32 Tara: We were talking and then..  it was like.. 
Buffy: Like you were in a musical 
Giles: Of course, that would explain the huge backing orchestra I couldn’t see and the 
synchronised dancing from the room service chaps (“Once More With Feeling” 6.07) 
33 The series has persistently coded fighting as a metaphor for sex, and vice versa.  
For instance, Faith, the other Slayer, has sex with Xander after an unresolved, 
unsatisfying fight in “The Zeppo” (3.13)—“a fight like that and no kill… I’m about 
ready to pop.”  It should be noted that, as Justine Larbalestier points out, “in the 
Buffyverse sex in the context of a loving relationship is good, and sex that is not 
about love is bad, or at the very least, empty” (216).  The rough sex of the 
Buffy/Spike relationship is coded as a self-destructive flirtation with the dark side that 
she must repent from, well before his attempted rape in “Seeing Red” (6.19).   
34 Buffy’s inability to take a human life has already been established in “The Gift” 
(5.22), when Giles kills the innocent Ben, who shares his body periodically with the 
evil hell-god Glory.  Giles tells us, “sooner of later Glory will re-emerge and make 
Buffy pay for that mercy [of not killing Ben]…and the world with her.  Buffy knows 
that, and she still couldn’t take a human life.  She’s a hero, you see.”  Giles himself 
then makes the pragmatic decision to kill Ben, to do what Buffy could not. 
35 SF fans call these types of radical re-writings of texts “retcons.”  A ret-con 
retrospectively changes the premise of a show or comic.   
36 Interestingly, the Buffy spin-off Angel features an episode almost entirely set in the 
1950s (“Are You Now, Or Have You Ever Been” 2.02), which shows the dark side of 
the period—McCarthyism, racial discrimination, homophobia and a lynching.  Those 
aspects of the 1950s are, needless to say, rarely featured in nostalgic depictions.   253 
Conclusion 
The Real is Sacred/The Real as Sacred 
 
 In summing up, it seems especially necessary to weigh the ideological 
implications of the postmodern sacred.  Slavoj Žižek in On Belief argues that 
Buddhism works as the ideological supplement to late capitalism.  He points out that 
the Buddhist logic of “letting go” enables its practitioners to surrender to the 
inevitability of postmodern capital and to maintain the illusion of not participating in 
the game of capitalistic accumulation (2001: 12).  Buddhism is, in the Freudian-
Lacanian terminology, a fetish by which subjects disavowal their own complicity in 
postmodern capitalism.  Buddhism and the New Age, in Žižek’s opinion, thus 
produce a-political subjects, “who fully participate in the capitalist dynamic whilst 
retaining the appearance of mental sanity” (2001: 13).  Žižek instead argues through 
his characteristic use of Hegel and Lacan that one should instead look towards the 
monism of Christianity.   
Now Žižek’s initial point is a well-made one, for it is not by accident that 
Buddhism in the West has been largely popularised by that most capitalistic industry, 
the entertainment industry (one only has to think of celebrity Buddhists like Richard 
Gere or the Beastie Boys), and of course, the aforementioned pop New Ageism of 
Oprah.  Yet he arguably overstates his case, for though Buddhism is no longer on the 
New Age fringe, Christianity remains ideologically hegemonic, especially in the 
United States—and it is the more fundamentalist forms of Christianity that are, 
ironically, some of the most capitalistic.  What Žižek has overlooked in his haste 
towards one of his famous reversals of Leftist orthodoxies, of course, is how 
Christianity itself functions not so much as the ideological supplement of capitalism 254 
in the United States but the very pre-condition for its existence.  America, of course, 
has famously considered itself “God’s own country,” yet has, traditionally, seen little 
conflict between rampant capitalism and Christianity.  God blesses America with its 
wealth—therefore, God loves capitalism (and never mind some of those unfortunate 
commandments in the Bible about justice that might be extended to, say, worker’s 
civil rights).  The second Bush administration has made explicit the latent connections 
made between capital, “patriotism,” evangelical Protestant Christianity and an 
aggressive foreign policy.  This contrasts strongly to an Australian political climate 
that has largely considered public expressions of faith and patriotism gauche or even 
inappropriate but even here, it is the Right which is allying conservative Christian and 
free market dogmas in increasingly visible ways (for instance, the oft-mentioned 
conservative Catholicism of Federal Health and Aging minister Tony Abbott).  Žižek 
suggests playfully that, were he alive today, Max Weber would probably write a 
sequel to The Protestant Ethic on the late capitalist Buddhist ethic (2001:13)—but 
Weber could just as easily write a sequel on evangelical Christianity and how it 
informs the American spirit of global capitalism.  It is one of the strengths of Žižek’s 
thought that he provocatively questions the presumptions of the intellectual Left, so it 
is unsurprising that Žižek has mercilessly pilloried the common “respect” for New 
Age pop-spirituality, and conversely the disdain for organised religion, as “watered-
down” belief.  He suggests that it is true belief, in whatever form that occurs, that is 
incompatible with the secular West. 
Žižek’s recent work on religion and belief poses some interesting questions for 
any consideration of popular culture spirituality—particularly one such as my own, 
which considers both the New Age and the Judeo-Christian as entangled in a 
supplementary relationship.  It is doubtful however that the Left could truly engage 255 
with the Christian legacy as Žižek suggests (especially through a Hegelian-Lacanian 
framework).  Key Leftist struggles such as feminist and queer rights are, if not 
irreducibly incompatible with Christianity, then certainly at odds with it.  The queer 
feminist theology of Marcella Althaus-Reid, for instance, is in stark contrast with the 
all-too-common misogyny and homophobia of the Roman Catholic tradition she 
writes in.  The conservative reigns of Popes John Paul II and Benedict has seen 
Catholicism retreat from progressive approaches to gender, sexuality and other 
religions.
1   
Then there is the problem of actually believing in God under postmodernity.  
It is arguable that the secular and religious in postmodernity have become difficult to 
tell apart.  It is not merely that Christian belief has become “watered down” into New 
Age obscurantism—many people who once called themselves atheists now prefer 
agnostic.  Recall once again Mark C Taylor’s work.  Taylor argues that the problem 
of postmodernity is not merely belief or unbelief, it is that, for many people, they are 
caught somewhere in between.  The postmodern religious culture finds itself 
somewhere between a fundamentalist belief in a singular God, a pagan belief in 
everything, and a modern skeptical disbelief in anything—three often incompatible 
belief systems.  Yet, even given the significant differences between those positions, it 
is interesting to see how they begin to incorporate elements of each other—Oprah’s 
spirituality which speaks of “‘karma’ and ‘grace’ in equal parts” (Parkins 149).  And 
even with their oft-stated antipathy towards the New Age, it is not unusual to even 
hear evangelical Christian fundamentalists to speak of their faith in characteristically 
New Age terms (as “self-fulfilment” and so on).   
It is unsurprising then that a fictional popular culture has evolved which makes 
equal use of the New Age, of Enlightenment skepticism, and the traditions of Judaism 256 
and Christianity.  I have argued through-out this thesis that, while eclectic in its use of 
spiritual symbols,  the postmodern sacred persistently draws on a New Age style 
method of consumption, one in which spiritual experience and truth “come by way of 
one’s own experience” (Heelas 21).  As we saw in the case of Peter Jackson’s Lord of 
the Rings adaptations, the New Age is retrospectively re-writing Christian figures like 
sacraments, angels, and even God.  But, if it seems to more strongly depend on a New 
Age framework, the postmodern sacred is not reducible to it, and it is hardly 
necessarily an indicator of real-world belief or practice.  As I have argued throughout, 
an engagement with popular culture requires neither belief nor unbelief.  Those 
people systematically excluded from organised religion can find themselves, through 
acts of adept reading, the fragments of an inclusive postmodern spirituality.  Those 
who do have religious beliefs can find echoes of their beliefs in popular culture.  Yet 
this consumerist shift is not unproblematic, given that it is individually focused and 
driven by the logic of postmodern global capitalism.   
Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman asks the question of whether “one can 
legitimately recognise the orgasmic experience of postmodern sensation-gatherers as 
essentially religious?” (180). There are striking similarities to be sure, yet I am 
hesitant to uncritically equate the transcendent experiences of saints and the like with 
the various postmodern ecstasies fuelled by the needs of the market.  It is debateable 
whether “orgasmic experience” is necessarily essentially religious; it tends to be one 
aspect of religious cultures amongst many.  The question for me, is not so much, is 
postmodern sensation-gathering religious, as is postmodern sensation-gathering being 
consumed as religious?  That question seeks to find not the ontological status of 
postmodern consumption—is pop culture spirituality really religious—but the 
functionality of it, what it does.  Bauman says that: 257 
 
Postmodern cultural pressures, while intensifying the search for ‘peak 
experiences,’ have at the same time uncoupled it from religion-prone interests 
and concerns, privatised it, and cast mainly non-religious institutions in the 
role of purveyors of relevant services.  The ‘whole experience’ of revelation, 
ecstasy, breaking the boundaries of the self and total transcendence, once the 
privilege of the selected ‘aristocracy of culture’ – saints, hermits, mystics, 
ascetic monks, tsadiks or dervishes – and coming either as an unsolicited 
miracle, in no obvious fashion related to what the receiver of grace has done to 
earn it, or as an act of grace rewarding the life of self-immolation and denial, 
has been put by postmodern culture in every individual’s reach, recast as a 
realistic target and plausible prospect of each individual’s self-training, and 
relocated at the product of life devoted to the art of consumer self-indulgence 
(180). 
 
 
As Bauman points out, one can hardly regard the process of spiritual consumption as 
religious in and of itself.  There is nothing very other-worldly about the everyday 
practices of global capitalism.  If the postmodern sacred provides a vicarious 
experience of belief, or the supernatural, then it is only that.  One cannot presume 
consumption to necessarily be an affirmation of real world belief in any faith, but 
neither can presume the opposite.   
One form that this search for “peak” experience takes is the search for “real” 
life.  If “real experience” seems so difficult to access in postmodernity that subjects 
feel compelled to raid the cultural artefacts of the past, even the cultural 
representations of the unreal, then it should be hardly surprising that “the real” begins 
to take on a quasi-spiritual aura.  As Baudrillard says, “paradoxically, it is the real 
which has become our true utopia—but a utopia that is no longer in the realm of the 
possible, that can only be dreamt of as one would dream of a lost object” (1994:123).  
But if this search for the real seems to have some similarities with classical 
theology—God as pure Being—then it differs equally, looking for this-worldly 
authenticity rather than other-worldly transcendence.  It is also the reverse, pure 
Being as God, a way of rendering consumerism as spiritual.  Once again, then, the 258 
spiritual seems to appear in postmodernity, only to dart away upon closer 
examination.   
So the utopic dream of truly recovering the real through consumption, in the 
form of the postmodern sacred, is simply not possible.  That it is not should be 
unsurprising, considering the considerable paradoxes at work here—and most 
especially, consuming to treat the alienation produced by postmodernist consumerism.  
Yet this hardly discounts the postmodern sacred from being culturally vital or 
significant.  It might seem slightly bizarre that contemporary subjects would aim at 
experiencing the sacred through popular culture; however, such are the paradoxes of 
postmodern life.  Yet, as I have argued, there is no true outside from the virtual 
postmodern media culture, thus consuming the spiritual through it makes about as 
much sense as anything else.  Most especially after September 11, religion and 
spirituality are important concerns for every subject; whether one believes or not, and 
it is in the popular culture of the postmodern sacred that we find the contradictions of 
contemporary spiritual life coming together in an important, if not unproblematic, 
way.  Searching for lost heroes, authenticity and meta-narratives, the postmodern 
sacred finds only fragments and traces of the transcendental, and the endless deferral 
of spiritual satisfaction to another episode, another show, another movie.   
 
                                                 
1 For instance, the recent announcement of Pope Benedict that Protestants do not 
worship in “real” churches, and the decision to resuscitate a form of liturgy that had 
been removed by the Vatican II council.  This outraged Jewish leaders, for the 
understandable reason that the liturgy calls for the conversion of Jews.  See John 
Hooper and Stephen Bates for more on the Protestant comment, and Jason Burke on 
the liturgy revival.   259 
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